“There are these two young fish swimming along and they happen to meet an older fish swimming the other way, who nods at them and says, ‘Morning, boys. How’s the water?’ And the two young fish swim on for a bit, and then eventually one of them looks over at the other and goes, ‘What the hell is water?’”
Liberalism as a Political Philosophy
Liberalism may be everywhere, but what is it? For American conservatives, a liberal is usually someone who values the basic freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution, like freedom of religion and freedom of speech. For left-leaning individuals, a liberal may rather be someone with a particular fiscal agenda, especially as regards international policy.Irony is interesting, for it’s not usually associated with a political framework. In Chapter 1, Mr. Lefebvre remarks that “the only shared end” of a liberal society is ironic: “to maintain itself as a fair system of cooperation so that members can pursue, within reasonable limits, their own conceptions of the good life.”
A liberal society establishes shared means, but it remains neutral on the notion of a common, universal end for its citizens. The freedom that liberalism affords includes, in principle, the freedom to pursue a moral outlook that negates liberalism.
As a legal and political philosophy, liberalism is thus permissive. It establishes foundational “rules” for people to pursue their well-being as they see fit.
Liberalism as a Moral Framework
In the Introduction, Mr. Lefebvre acknowledges that his book is “primarily, though not exclusively, for those of us without religious affiliation.” He admits that traditional religious frameworks afford beliefs and practices that can foster community and meaning, without which human life can succumb to partiality, cynicism, rage, meaninglessness, entitlement, and a cascade of moral and psychological ailments that plague the modern age.
From Chapters 2 to 6, Mr. Lefebvre develops the claim that the same liberty and liberality that define political liberalism should inform—indeed, do inform—our private lives.
3 Spiritual Exercises for Moral Well-being
The most prominent criticism against liberalism as a moral compass is that it’s passive. It may be suitable as a political system, for it grants rights and freedoms essential to living a good life. However, it’s insufficient to provide constructive ethical prescriptions.Mr. Lefebvre counters this reasonable objection with a program of “spiritual exercises,” which he deems vital to take agency over our well-being—to use liberty productively.
The exercises are explained sequentially in Chapters 10, 11 and 12. They include “the original position,” “reflective equilibrium,” and “public reason”—all terms borrowed from Rawls’s influential “A Theory of Justice.”
The original position is a thought experiment meant to elucidate one’s reservations about which “principles of justice should regulate the fundamental institutions of a liberal democracy.” It involves imagining oneself as a member of a group of individuals with no identity whatsoever. Which principles of right and justice should regulate interactions between completely free and equal people?
Mr. Lefebvre suggests that this exercise would lead to a fairly similar answer for anyone who reflects earnestly: “Once you suspend knowledge of who you are, rights to equal liberty along with guarantees of fairness and reciprocity are a foregone conclusion.”
Reflective equilibrium involves calibrating general principles and particular judgments. Moral issues are rarely straightforward. One may hold the Bible as the highest source of guidance but find in it claims that defy one’s moral intuitions, or believe that the law should always be obeyed but find oneself in a situation where saving someone’s life requires doing something illegal.
Whatever the case, the tension between principle and particular must be resolved, when possible, through careful deliberation. The reflection’s conclusions may differ for different people. Yet the process requires of all willing participants patience, attention, and honesty; traits that can “bring about a transformation of the self.”
Public reason “directly concerns how we interact and engage with other people.” It’s the collectively oriented application of the principles we would discover in the previous two exercises.
Public reason demands we learn “how to dialogue, together with all the demands that this entails: recognizing the presence and the rights of one’s interlocutor, basing one’s replies on what the interlocutor admits he knows, and therefore agreeing with him at each stage of the discussion.” It requires submitting ourselves to the demands and norms of the collaborative search for truth.
Mr. Lefebvre hopes that these exercises, if practiced consciously and consistently, can help people to experience the benefits that liberalism affords. The lessons they can impart should structure political institutions, guide one’s private life and inform interpersonal relations.
We may challenge Mr. Lefebvre’s claims that it is possible to derive a fruitful moral system without religious foundations, or that a “liberal” society is sufficient for fostering a pluralistic but morally developed citizenry. Nevertheless, we can appreciate Mr. Lefebvre’s effort to reflect on the predicaments of Western democracies, and to propose, in cordial and lucid language, a hopeful possibility for the future.
