The push for revolution during the 18th century, the scramble to expand territories in the 19th century, militarism in the first half of the 20th century, and the conflict of ideologies from the second half of the 20th century onward: There have been various reasons why the world has witnessed so much conflict over the past 200 years. According to Dale C. Copeland, professor of international relations at the University of Virginia, there is a singularity that connects nearly all conflicts: commercial expectations.
In his new book, “A World Safe for Commerce: American Foreign Policy from the Revolution to the Rise of China,” Mr. Copeland works to establish his geopolitical theory through the lens of American foreign policy and conflict. Part of this theory is what he calls “the three realms of great power commerce,” which begins with a nation’s “core economic ... sphere,” then extends to “the ‘middle area’ of neutral states willing to trade with all sides,” and ultimately the third realm (or sphere) in an “economic region another great power controls.” It is in this third realm, when commercially invaded, that can lead to strife.
Peace Turned Sour
Mr. Copeland argues that American leaders have always worked to extend the economic sphere into all three realms to “ensure access to key trading partners” and were “inclined to maintain peaceful relations … even when ideological and domestic variables were pushing for conflict.” He contends that it is when American “expectations of future trade turned sour” due to restricted trade access that leaders “turned nasty―and for national security reasons, not for fear of the loss of elite power and wealth as left-leaning revisionist scholars typically argue.”Underexplored History
As Mr. Copeland explores all of these conflicts, he presents underexplored information, which provides a fresh and important angle from which to view these conflicts and the reasons they arose. “In the vast majority of cases, it was declining trade expectations that propelled U.S. leaders into conflict,” he claims.As Mr. Copeland admits, his “intent is not to prove other theories wrong, but to show that by neglecting the commercial security-based drivers of U.S. behavior, their historical accounts are incomplete, or have only revealed the facilitating factors that allowed American leaders to act, leaving the true propelling reasons for their actions unexplored.” For instance, Mr. Copeland deemphasizes the “taxation without representation” reason for the American Revolution, and emphasizes Britain’s ongoing trade and commerce restrictions that seemed destined to push Americans toward a form of serfdom. The author suggests that this “alternative explanation …reveals the true tragedy of the conflict.”
As in his previous works, Mr. Copeland emphasizes the importance of trade, and therefore a nation’s or a “great power’s” absolute necessity for economic stability. He concludes that if he “can show that the theory of this book very often correctly identifies the main propelling factors of American foreign policy history, it will have made a contribution to understanding this history.”
The China Crux
From a historical perspective, Mr. Copeland’s work is enlightening. It is a book that should be read by those who seek to understand the multiplicity of foreign policy decisions. Of course, this work is, as Mr. Copeland admits, theoretical. But the theory works, at least in theory. It works because all that the author discusses is in retrospect. The vast majority of his book deals with history, but the ultimate crux of the book is how America should deal with the great power of today: China.“A World Safe for Commerce” is a discussion of how America―from a collection of colonies to the world’s dominant power―dealt with other global powers from Great Britain to Germany to Japan to the Soviet Union. The problem is that America never involved itself with these powers like it has with China: from major corporate investments in mainland China to the enabling of proprietary theft and Chinese companies (and, therefore, the Chinese Communist Party) to purchase large swaths of U.S. land.
American leaders have created a stickier situation than before. Each of Mr. Copeland’s historical moments and powers had their similarities, but more importantly they came with their own differences. Mr. Copeland is right to warn American leaders of how to deal with China based on a historically in-depth analysis. And as even Mr. Copeland’s treasure trove of historicity show, history doesn’t necessarily repeat itself.
As Mark Twain once noted, however, it does rhyme. Ultimately, America is in a struggle with another great power―common territory for the United States. It is due to this commonality that “A World Safe for Commerce” is worth reading and studying, especially with so much at stake.
