An ancient adage suggests that all warfare is based on deception. Robert Verkaik’s new work, “The Traitor of Arnhem: The Untold Story of WWII’s Greatest Betrayal and the Moment that Changed History Forever,” demonstrates just how true that statement is.
Verkaik’s book is broken into three sections that dive into the sordid details of espionage during World War II. His true tale of intrigue and betrayal follows the numerous paths of British, American, Russian, German, and Dutch spies that lead, ultimately, to one man.
Verkaik places the reader within the Dutch resistance, following one of the movement’s most famous and charismatic leaders, Christiaan Lindemans. This hulking and powerful young man, nicknamed “King Kong,” displays courage under fire; an ability to seduce women, no matter their ideological affiliation; and a ruthlessness against his enemies. Unfortunately, some of his enemies were his allies. For a man who had all the traits of a hero, it’s unsettling to discover he was, in fact, a villain.
Lindemans, as the author reveals, proved practically psychotic, incapable of caring who he worked for or whom he betrayed. That included those who suffered defeat by the Germans at the Battle of Arnhem—more commonly known as Operation Market Garden.
Regarding Operation Market Garden, Verkaik asks the question that has long bothered many historians and WWII enthusiasts alike. Verkaik writes:
“Until Arnhem, the Allies had almost uninterrupted success in vanquishing the German armies. The Allies enjoyed superior manpower and firepower as well as complete dominance in the air. After sweeping the Germans aside in Normandy and then chasing them through Belgium back to Holland, it seemed unthinkable that the Nazis would be able to reverse these setbacks by defeating a combined airborne and land force of almost 100,000 men supported by hundreds of tanks and artillery.”
Enter the Cambridge Spies
Verkaik presents the disaster at Arnhem through a lens that is typically ignored. This lens suggests that the failure of Operation Market Garden (a battle famously chronicled in the book and movie “A Bridge Too Far”) was less about poor weather, bad timing, or British Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery’s overly optimistic belief in the operation. It was more about intelligence leaks that enabled the Nazis to conduct a well-ordered counterattack that reversed the Allies’ fortunes. This reversal of fortune didn’t simply affect the specific battle in Holland, but also impacted the outcome of WWII and the post-war world.Verkaik demonstrates that the Germans relied upon two primary sources: Lindemans and Karl Heinz Kraemer. Though the subject, Lindemans, makes up a vast portion of the book, Kraemer is ultimately the crux of Verkaik’s investigation.
Kraemer proved to be an intelligence source who was simultaneously reliable and unreliable. He'd been proven incorrect in his intelligence information about the D-Day attack, but was highly accurate in his information about Operation Market Garden. Verkaik posits that this was no mistake. Kraemer was simply passing information from his source, and the author strongly suggests that source was British.
But why would that source provide accurate intelligence regarding Arnhem—a battle that was merely a stalling effort against an inevitable overall Allied victory—and incorrect information regarding the largest amphibious invasion in history that indeed changed the outcome of the war in the Allies’ favor?
To answer this question, Verkaik nominates a group that has become arguably the most famous collection of traitors in history: the Cambridge Spies. For anyone who has at least glimpsed at the history of espionage, the name Kim Philby rings familiar. He’s considered Great Britain’s most successful and destructive traitor, though it’s his treachery during the Cold War that’s typically highlighted. Verkaik, however, suggests that the most successful and destructive traitor may have been another member of the Cambridge Spies: Anthony Blunt.
Philby and Blunt had become communists before the outbreak of WWII and served two masters: London and Moscow. Despite being British, their ideological hearts belonged to Joseph Stalin. For this reason that, according to Verkaik, Arnhem was betrayed to the Germans.
The Great Chess Match
The author orchestrates a thorough and fascinating narrative. Among the incredibly sinister motives behind WWII and all that transpired during those six years, one other motivation has been largely ignored. Indeed, it may be the most unsettling motive of the war—at least as regards what took place on the battlefield. It is the treachery against fellow Allies, and worse, treachery against one’s own people.Verkaik recreates this fascinating chess match between the West and the Soviets. The ultimate question Verkaik hopes to answer in his book was whether this battle was actually a chess match within the overall match of the war?
The author utilizes a vast trove of intelligence analyses, historical information, and interviews and confessions from the moment’s major players. But with necessary information and insight forever in the grave or just as permanently buried under lock and key by the British and Russians, the answer must rely on the available evidence and, therefore, reach a conclusion based on speculation.
A Warning
Although I found myself engrossed in this tale of espionage and betrayal, in much the same way one would be glued to the pages of, for instance, a John le Carré novel, I must warn readers: Without all the evidence (between the British, Americans, Dutch, Germans, and Russians, it’s a mountainous amount of information), and most certainly without a smoking gun, one should be wary about embracing the story as the absolute truth.“The Traitor of Arnhem” isn’t a book of absurd notions and overreaching theories, like, say, Robert Stinnett’s “Day of Deceit,” but it does require the reader to accept the puzzle’s solution without all the pieces.
Indeed, I don’t believe that Verkaik’s ultimate goal is to convince readers that this version is the truth absolute. It appears his efforts are to avoid readers disregarding this possibility altogether. Among the reasons claimed for the Allies’ failure at Arnhem, this one should undoubtedly be discussed. The author’s work should force historians and enthusiasts alike to drop their blinders.
By discussing Verkaik’s proposed possibilities, perhaps someday we'll discover precisely what led to the defeat at Arnhem, and the cascade of ideological defeats that resulted over the course of the following decades.
