An Absorbing Account of the Pacific War’s Most Famous Battle

Insightful and highly readable, Mark Stille’s ‘Midway’ is a detailed analysis of the naval battle and is certain to become an authoritative work.

Mark E. Stille's latest book is the authoritative work on the Battle of Midway.

The Battle of Midway is one of the most famous battles of World War II and one of the most famous naval battles in history. It was a turning point in the Pacific War between America and Japan. Most people know of the battle and that it was an overwhelming victory for the United States. Perhaps some even know the general score of the battle: four Japanese carriers destroyed to one American carrier. Some may even know a few of the major characters, like Adm. Chester Nimitz and Adm. Yamamoto Isoroku. But there is so much more to the Battle of Midway once one goes below the surface, and Mark E. Stille in his new work, “Midway: The Pacific War’s Most Famous Battle,” has gone very deep indeed.

Stille has written a masterful account of the major battle. To begin, in his prologue, he cleverly utilizes an early encounter in April 1942 between the Japanese and British navies, which provides a peek into the tactical considerations of the Japanese and how those same considerations, or lack thereof, led to pivotal mistakes during Midway. The author also retraces the historical record of the months and weeks leading to the attack on Pearl Harbor.

USN Versus IJN

USS Yorktown (CV-5) is hit on the port side, by a Japanese Type 91 aerial torpedo during the mid-afternoon attack by planes from the carrier Hiryu, in the Battle of Midway, on June 4, 1942. This is the second of the two torpedo hits it received. Note very heavy antiaircraft fire. Public Domain

“Midway” demonstrates the differences between the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) and the United States Navy (USN). The USN had to catch up quickly to the IJN for several reasons. One reason was that the USN had adhered to international naval treaties, which implemented restrictions on the construction of certain naval vessels. The IJN, on the other hand, eyeing imperial expansion, soon ignored those treaties and began construction of superior vessels.

Additionally, the Japanese had been at war since 1937, and had therefore begun its open expansion. By the time America entered World War II in December 1941, the IJN was the world’s most powerful navy by some lengths, and this was specifically due to its number of carriers: 10. The Allies only possessed three, and those three belonged to the USN’s Pacific Fleet.

It is from here that Stille guides his readers, taking them through the successful attack and sinking of the IJN carrier Shoho, during the Battle of the Coral Sea in May 1942 (history’s first carrier battle), and into the preparations for what became the Battle of Midway a month later.

From early into the account and throughout the book, there are three elements that Stille indicates were fatal shortcomings for the IJN. One, the IJN lacked radar, relying solely on scouts to fly large areas ahead of the carriers.

Two, the IJN, and the Japanese military in general, did not hold intelligence gathering in the same regard as did, say, the British, Germans, and the Americans. In fact, as Stille denotes, the IJN “failed to gain entry into any American naval codes during the war.”

And three, the IJN believed in their superiority to such an extent that it blinded them to their opponent’s capabilities.

The USN, on the other hand, did possess radar, though in its early stages of technology; it proved invaluable. Secondly, intelligence gathering was relied upon heavily. Stille notes that there were two sources of intelligence: one coming from Washington and the other from Pearl Harbor (led by Cmdr. Joseph Rochefort).

Third, the USN respected their opponent. These three factors enabled Nimitz to surprise the IJN at Midway. This surprise, as Stille notes, took the IJN admirals off guard and highlighted another failure in the IJN structure. Improvising in the moment was frowned upon, if not openly condemned. The Americans had a long history of encouraging military leaders to make adjustments when the situation called for them.

A Wealth of Detailed Information

Stille determines that one of the crucial decisions by the IJN was to accomplish too many objectives, specifically trying to take the islands of Midway and also sending 43 ships to the Aleutian Islands. He further explains why the attack of the Aleutians was not a planned distraction by the IJN, which apparently is often theorized.

It is not just the planning stages, naval doctrines, and the admiralty that Stille presents. The author showcases his extensive knowledge of the naval vessels, aircraft, artillery, protocols for ship damage control, all the way down to the pilots from both navies.

The book presents some of the most famous moments, like when Nimitz demanded that the Yorktown carrier, which had been damaged at Coral Sea, be ready in two and a half days rather than the assessed 90 days (it was repaired in two and one half days), the intelligence breakthrough that the IJN’s codeword “AF” stood for Midway, or the wildly gutsy dive-bombing practices of USN dive-bomber Dick Best.

In addition to these moments, Stille provides highly detailed information, such as the “heavy weather” that affected the IJN scouting, that an IJN vice admiral didn’t show up for the Midway planning session, that boats assigned to the IJN Sixth Fleet Submarine Squadron 3 arrived on site two days behind schedule, or that Nimitz was willing to go to battle even if the carrier ratio was two-to-five in favor of the IJN (it was ultimately three-to-four).

An Honest Assessment

Certainly, what matters most is what happens when the firing starts, but Stille demonstrates in no uncertain terms the absolute necessity of knowing one’s capabilities, knowing the opponent’s capabilities, and planning accordingly. Despite mistakes and miscalculations on the part of the USN, it was still the Americans who planned and reacted to the situation best, leading to a lopsided U.S. victory, and a turning point in the Pacific War.

Indeed, pointing out the mistakes of the Americans was one of the things I appreciated most in the book. It pinpointed the near colossal mistake by Adm. Raymond Spruance to not immediately attack the fourth and final IJN carrier. From Stille’s analysis, the fact that the carrier was nearby could hardly have been more obvious, and it was only after the incidental discovery of the carrier’s location by a USN pilot that the decision was made.

“Midway” is not a work that places the USN of WWII beyond reproach. No, the work is an honest assessment regarding the positives and negatives of both the IJN and USN. In practically every conceivable aspect, Stille has dug into the details and produced a magnificently insightful work on one of history’s great battles.

Despite the exhaustive nature of the work, it’s not exhausting to read. It reads smoothly and, perhaps due to the subject of the book, is a very entertaining read. I can hardly recommend “Midway” enough. I believe it will be held in the highest regard in the years, and perhaps decades, to come as an authoritative work on the battle.

’Midway: The Pacific War’s Most Famous Battle‘ By Mark E. Stille Osprey Publishing, Oct. 1, 2024 Hardcover: 400 pages

What arts and culture topics would you like us to cover? Please email ideas or feedback to [email protected]