How Congress Secured Peace Without a Treaty

The "Big Four" at the World War I Paris peace conference, May 27, 1919. (L–R) Prime Minister David Lloyd George (Great Britain), Prime Minister Vittorio Emanuele Orlando (Italy), Premier Georges Clémenceau (France), President Woodrow Wilson (USA). (Public Domain)

Before, during, and after World War I, President Woodrow Wilson believed it was his and America’s destiny to lead Europe to lasting peace. When he stood before Congress on Jan. 8, 1918, he presented his now famous “Fourteen Points.” Among those points, he called for the self-determination of individual nations and the “general association of nations.” It was this latter proposition—his 14th point—that proved to be the demise of Wilson’s vision.

A month after the armistice was signed on Nov. 11, 1918, which ended hostilities, Wilson arrived in France. He had committed himself to the unprecedented act of spending more than six months abroad. He, along with British Prime Minister David Lloyd George, French Prime Minister George Clémenceau, and Italian Prime Minister Vittorio Emanuele Orlando (who would resign during the peace process), would lead the Paris Peace Conference that ultimately culminated in the Treaty of Versailles.

U.S. President Woodrow Wilson (R) attends the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 where the League of Nations was born. Other members are from (L-R): Italian Premier Vittorio Orlando, British Prime Minister David Lloyd George and French Premier Georges Clémenceau. (AP Photo)

Wilson’s Return

The Treaty of Versailles was signed on June 28, 1919 in the Palace of Versailles’s Hall of Mirrors. The nations of the world came to an agreement on peace terms, though many were skeptical of how enduring it would be. One nation—America—was still technically at war with Germany and the newly separated empire of Austria and Hungary.

President Woodrow Wilson in 1919. (Public Domain)

When Wilson returned to America, he personally delivered the treaty to the Senate, which had not been done since 1789. He concluded, ​​“The stage is set, the destiny disclosed. It has come about by no plan of our conceiving, but by the hand of God. We cannot turn back. The light streams on the path ahead, and nowhere else.”

Wilson, however, faced fierce opposition to the treaty from a Republican-led Senate. The primary sticking point was his “general association of nations,” which had become known as the League of Nations. Wilson was adamant that America join the League of Nations for a global collective security. He believed the League would stave off war in Europe. Meanwhile, Republican senators believed the League would undermine America’s sovereignty and automatically drag the United States into another European war. They began creating opposition camps.

One camp, the Reservationists, led by Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Henry Cabot Lodge, was willing to accept the Treaty of Versailles, but with amendments; the second camp, the Irreconcilables, refused to budge.

Senator Philander Knox (R-Pa.) believed Wilson was attempting to use the “alleged state of war in order to coerce the Senate into accepting the Versailles Treaty.” The Senate Republicans, however, weren’t too worried about ratification of the treaty, leading Knox to suggest that the 1918 armistice was enough, stating that “our Government is committed to the principle that war may come to an end by the silent cessation of hostilities.”

A Political Failure

Wilson believed that if he could convince Americans that joining the League of Nations was necessary, then public sentiment would influence the Senate. He embarked on a U.S. tour on Sept. 3, 1919. After 22 days and 8,000 miles, Wilson suffered a severe stroke that nearly killed him. He returned to Washington on Oct. 2 to recover.

Wilson practically remained in the shadows, as his wife, Edith, became the president’s go-between with his cabinet, members of Congress, and other diplomats. While Wilson recovered, the Senate voted on the treaty in November. It failed to pass. Wilson, nonetheless, continued to encourage ratification and joining the League of Nations without amendments. On March 19, 1920, the Senate took another vote. Ratification of the Treaty of Versailles was closer to passing, but still fell short by seven votes.

The Constitution requires that it is Congress’s duty to declare war, but it is the duty of the executive branch to negotiate peace treaties—treaties, in general—with the power of ratification falling to the Senate, as made clear with the failures of the Versailles treaty. Since the Constitution doesn’t explicitly state that peace be settled by the executive branch, two Republican congressmen from Pennsylvania had similar ideas about how to broach the issue and bring resolution to a problem long overdue.

No Easy Resolution

After the failures of the Senate, Rep. Stephen Porter, the chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, presented a resolution on April 9, 1920, that would “terminat[e] the state of war declared to exist April 6, 1917, between the Imperial German Government and the United States, permitting on conditions the resumption of reciprocal trade, and for other purposes.” The resolution was passed 242 to 150. The Senate amended the resolution to include ending the state of war with Austria and Hungary. The amendments were passed by the House on May 21 by a vote of 226 to 139.

Member of the U.S. House of Representatives from Pennsylvania. (Public Domain)

Wilson may have been defeated, but he refused to let go of his Versailles vision. On May 27, he vetoed the resolution. When the resolution returned to the House, it failed to receive enough votes to override the veto. It was a small victory for the president, but his political war would ultimately end in defeat.

Despite ill health and a Congress that refused to buy into his vision, Wilson pursued reelection. His effort was for naught. He lost the 1920 election to Republican senator, Warren G. Harding. Harding’s secretary of state, Charles Evans Hughes, was in favor of joining the League of Nations, yet the very possibility of the treaty being ratified had long become a pipe dream.

Nonetheless, Representative Ross Collins (D-Miss.) declared action needed to be taken to resolve the issue, adding that “the people in all parts of our Nation are hungry for actual peace.”

The Need for Peace

Indeed, Americans were “hungry for actual peace,” but the Treaty of Versailles lacked public support. Hughes informed René Viviani, the former premier of France, that “there was today in the United States greater opposition to the Treaty of Versailles than at the time of the last election even.” Considering public opinion regarding the Treaty and the League of Nations, Hughes believed that “a separate peace might be the only course left open to us.”

Harding believed the need for peace—even a separate one—had become paramount. On April 12, 1921, the new president sent a message to Congress requesting a resolution that would “declare the state of peace, which all America craves.” His message highlighted how America was the only country still “in a technical state of war against the Central Powers of Europe” and that “this anomalous condition ought not to be permitted to continue. To establish the state of technical peace without further delay, [the president] should approve a declaratory resolution by Congress to that effect, with the qualifications essential to protect all our rights. Such action would be the simplest keeping of faith with ourselves, and could in no sense be construed as a desertion of those with whom we shared our sacrifices in war, for these powers are already at peace.”

Warren Harding at Elks National Home in Bedford, Va., in 1920. (Public Domain)

Luckily, such a “declaratory resolution” had already been assembled. The day following Harding’s message, Sen. Knox reissued the 1920 resolution. The Senate passed the resolution with amendments on April 30. It was then sent for consideration to the Porter-led House Committee on Foreign Affairs. The Committee made further amendments, and released a “complete substitute” of the resolution. The House passed the substitute resolution 304 to 61 on June 13. The Senate, however, disagreed with the substitute and requested a conference with House members. After long debate, Congress finally came to a solution which became known as the Knox-Porter Resolution. The House passed the resolution 263 to 59 and the Senate passed it by a vote of 38 to 19, officially “repealing the joint resolution of April 6, 1917, declaring a state of war to exist between the United States and Germany, and the joint resolution of December 7, 1917, declaring that a state of war to exist between the United States and the Austro-Hungarian Government.”

It was during this week in history, on June 30, July 1, and July 2, 1921, that the House and Senate passed the resolution, and President Harding signed it into law, respectively.

Securing Peace Treaties

Peace was secured rather unconventionally, sans an official treaty between nations. Not until August of that year did the United Stated sign separate peace treaties with Austria, Hungary, and Germany—the latter and most significant known as the Treaty of Berlin. Upon hearing this, Wilson and Sen. Carter Glass reiterated the Democratic platform of 1920 regarding peace that stated, “We cannot make peace except in company with our allies. It would brand us with everlasting dishonor and bring ruin to us also if we undertook to make a separate peace.”

Senate debate continued and Democratic resistance mounted. Republican senators were naturally concerned about passage of the treaties, and even more so when Sen. Knox died on Oct. 12, 1921, just before a vote was to take place. On Oct. 18, the Senate voted on the Treaty of Berlin. It passed 66 to 20 with 14 Democrats voting in favor of it.

Never miss a This Week in History story! Sign up for the American History newsletter here.

Would you like to see other kinds of arts and culture articles? Please email us your story ideas or feedback at [email protected]