How a USAF Simulation Nearly Resulted in Nuclear Disaster

Ivy Mike, the first full test of the Teller–Ulam design (a staged fusion bomb), with a yield of 10.4 megatons on Nov. 1, 1952. National Nuclear Security Administration. Public Domain

Dropping of the atomic bomb twice on Japan in August of 1945 effectively ended World War II. The bombs possessed a power unknown to mankind until the moment its blast radius was made abundantly clear to the world. Japan’s emperor, Hirohito, accurately described it as “a new and most cruel bomb, the power of which to damage is, indeed, incalculable.”

With the war over and the Axis powers defeated, a new war had begun. A cold one.

After the Atom Bomb

During the years leading up to the war’s nuclear climax, mathematicians and physicists had assembled in a secretly constructed city called Los Alamos in north central New Mexico. It was a pivotal part of the Manhattan Project. There they created the atomic bomb. Although history’s greatest conflict had ended, the research into nuclear weapons continued.

Emil Klaus Fuchs's Los Alamos ID badge. Los Alamos National Laboratory

One of the physicists working within the Manhattan Project was the German-born Emil Klaus Fuchs. In the 1930s, he joined the German Communist Party. When he fled Germany to Great Britain, he retained those communist sympathies―sympathies that would prove detrimental to the West once the war was over. It was later discovered that Fuchs had been sending top secret nuclear information to the Soviets. This information accelerated the Soviets’ ability to develop their own nuclear weapon, and on Aug. 29, 1949, the Soviets detonated their first atomic bomb.

With most of Eastern Europe and China under communism, the scientific debate raged on whether a more powerful weapon should be developed. A weapon that physicists called the “Super.” This “Super” weapon was based on the design concepts of Los Alamos Laboratory physicist Edward Teller and mathematician Stanislaw Ulam.

Stanslaw Ulam's Los Alamos ID badge. Los Alamos National Laboratory

Two months after the Soviets had detonated their bomb, the General Advisory Committee (GAC) of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) assembled to discuss the future of thermonuclear weapons. The GAC was chaired by Robert Oppenheimer, the director of the Los Alamos Laboratory and who is known as the Father of the Atomic Bomb. The GAC issued its report, concluding, “We all hope that by one means or another, the development of these weapons can be avoided. We are all reluctant to see the United States take the initiative in precipitating this development. We are all agreed that it would be wrong at the present moment to commit ourselves to an all out effort towards its development.”

Edward Teller pointing at a formula on a blackboard. STF/AFP via Getty Images

The ‘Super’ Green Light

By the end of January 1950, President Harry Truman gave the green light to pursue the super weapon. Teller’s and Ulam’s theory would be put to the test. On May 9, 1951, on Eniwetok Atoll in Marshall Islands, a test was conducted that exploded less than an ounce of deuterium and tritium. The explosion was equivalent to 25 kilotons of TNT, which was twice as powerful as the Hiroshima bomb. Over the next year and a half, research into a hydrogen bomb continued. On Nov. 1, 1952, the hydrogen bomb was detonated, completely obliterating the island Elugelab from the earth.

“It seemed we had learned how to … build bombs whose power was boundless,” recalled physicist Herbert York.

The bomb proved more powerful than initially conceived but far from as powerful as what was detonated in 1954. On March 1, the H-bomb yielded an explosion of 15 megatons of TNT, which was 1,000 times more powerful than the Hiroshima bomb. The fallout along the Marshall Islands was extensive, resulting in radiation exposure, deaths, and eventually class-action lawsuits.

Another Soviet Deterrent

While the power of the H-bomb was being discovered, Boeing was busy building their own deterrent to Soviet power. The aerospace company had been tasked with building a plane that could successfully conduct “ferret” missions. These covert aerial missions were part of the U.S. Air Force’s Strategic Air Command (SAC) to collect data on the Soviet’s and other communist nations’ radar capabilities.

The Boeing B-47 Stratojet, Strategic Air Command's primary medium bomber, was among the aircraft participating in the nuclear test series at the Nevada Test Site. Public Domain

The RB-47H was a jet-propelled bomber plane with a range capacity of 3,935 miles, a max speed of 602 mph, and an elevation of 38,850 feet. During the same time as the Eniwetok Atoll bomb test, the B-47 began replacing the propeller powered B-27s and B-50s. The immediate difference between the B-47 and the World War II-era bombers was that it could carry the same bomb tonnage yet fly 200 mph faster. By August 1955, the B-47 Stratojet had become SAC’s nuclear strike bomber, capable of delivering the H-bomb.

Just a Simulation

Maj. Howard Richardson piloted the B-47 Stratojet “Ivory Two.” The three-man crew, which included copilot 1st Lt. Bob Lagerstrom and radar navigator Capt. Leland Woolard, conducted a simulated bomber mission along with another B-47 Stratojet called “Ivory One.” The two bombers left Homestead Air Force Base near Miami for New Orleans, then flew toward the Canadian border, and finally turned south back to Homestead. The pilots had been told they would be clear of “enemy” territory once they reached south of Virginia. The fighter pilots at Charleston Air Force Base, however, were told something very different.

As the B-47s flew along South Carolina, three F-86 Sabres took off toward them. The Sabre possessed a max speed of 695 mph and could reach heights of nearly 50,000 feet. Following radar, the Sabre pilots rushed toward their target. The three Sabres intercepted Ivory One in a simulated attack. Ivory Two, however, was a mile behind and neither the Sabres’s radar nor the base’s air defense radar picked up the bomber.

At approximately 38,000 feet with both bombers and jet fighters flying at 500 mph, 1st Lt. Clarence Stewart, the pilot of one of the Sabres, was focused on his radar. Unexpected turbulence caused his attention to look up from his radar. His immediate reaction was to roll his jet to the right in order to miss Richardson’s B-47. He did not miss it altogether.

The Sabre crashed into the Stratojet’s right wing. Stewart immediately came to the realization he would have to bail: His jet was now wingless. Stewart ejected into the freezing stratosphere. By the time he reached land (actually, a swamp), he had spent more than 20 minutes descending and was frostbitten.

For Richardson and his crew, they struggled to control the massive B-47. The bomber finally came under control at 20,000 feet. Flying at nearly 250 mph, Richardson decided to make an emergency landing at Hunter Air Force Base near Savannah. He was advised to use caution as the landing strip was being repaired. For Richardson and co-pilot Laegerstrom, the risks were minimal. They were two of SACs best pilots. The risk, however, was too great for their payload. Ivory Two was carrying a 7,600 pound Mark 15 thermonuclear H-bomb―about 60 times more powerful than the Hiroshima bomb.

Mark 15 thermonuclear bomb. U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. Public Domain

Richardson made the decision to jettison the bomb. It was during this week in history, on Feb. 5, 1958, that an H-bomb was delivered to the relatively shallow waters near Tybee Island just east of Savannah. Upon its impact with the water, the crew was relieved to see no explosion.

A recovery effort was quickly conducted, but the bomb was never recovered.

All four crew members between the two planes survived the ordeal. Richardson was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross for his valiant efforts. There have been rumors that if the bomb was somehow recovered, it could be used; or that if it is not recovered, it could somehow detonate on its own. The U.S. Air Force denies both possibilities, and if the latter somehow did take place, it could only explode the 400 pounds of conventional explosives. Richardson maintained that he was never given a capsule to activate the bomb. In 2008, he wrote a thorough article in a Savannah newspaper, explaining the event and that the long-submerged bomb is not a threat.

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