Book Review: ‘Afghanistan 1979–88: Soviet Air Power Against the Mujahideen’

How air superiority could not conquer a terrain-experienced combatant

On Feb. 4, 2015, museum assistant and former Soviet soldier, Sheikh Abdullah stands alongside a Soviet helicopter at the Jihad Museum which has exhibits on the Soviet invasion of 1979. Aref Karimi/AFP via Getty Images

The aftermath of America’s disastrous and tragic withdrawal from Afghanistan in the summer of 2021 can never be forgotten. It is too cataclysmic to forget. But it should not be remembered solely because of what took place when the Americans left. What should be remembered, and it is arguable that this is more important, is why invading such a place (whether for reasons acceptable or not) was a militarily strategic mistake.

In the long run, it became an economic, social, and political mistake as well. Before the Americans invaded, the Soviets demonstrated the many problems that could arise from such an invasion.

Afghan fighters in the early '80s against the Soviets. AFP via Getty Images

Mark Galeotti, a geopolitical expert and the author of the new book “Afghanistan 1979–88: Soviet Air Power against the Mujahideen,” provides a thorough study of the many problems that transpired during Soviet Russia’s war in Afghanistan. Some of these problems stemmed from the obvious: overcoming rough terrain and the will of the people; the Soviet lack of commitment to the war; and the unknowns, including the provision of weapons to rebel groups by Western powers.

The Evolution of Soviet Weapons

Despite the Soviet’s lack of commitment in the war, due primarily to economic problems that would eventually lead to the end of the Soviet Union, their commitment to weapons development continued. The author dedicates his efforts to discuss Soviet air power, such as transport planes, fighter jets, and helicopters.

Mi’s, MiG’s, Su’s, Tu’s, Yak’s and many other forms of aircraft are presented by their ability to transport soldiers, their capacity for firepower, and their maneuverability. The helicopter, like the Mi-8s and Mi-24s, became a major contributor in transport and attack. Galeotti provides spreadsheet material to display the evolution of Soviet aircraft, like the helicopters advancing from its 1957 Mi-6 to its 1978 Mi-24P.

Although the firepower was greatly feared by rebel groups and ensured air superiority for the Soviets, the latter appeared less interested in victory and more interested in tactical prowess. The author quotes one Soviet officer as stating that “[w]hatever they may have done on the battlefield, the greatest value of our aircraft was in reminding everyone, friend and foe, what we could do.”

As the aircraft continued to progress, the war itself stalled into what could have become a “forever war.” The author presents these issues well, especially under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev. Gorbachev desired a withdrawal, but had to wait for his concerns to be proven on the battlefield. The Afghan terrain provided countless opportunities to prove his concerns.

Terrain and Rebels

Over time, the Afghan rebel groups, the mujahideen, became adept at combating Soviet air power. They adapted to Soviet attacks by instituting camouflage, breaking up into small groups, and moving at night. Generational understanding and experience with the mountainous and, as often described by the author, “monotonous” terrain was an underestimated asset to the Afghans. The mujahideen, via camouflage or hiding in caves, would set up ambushes, not only of ground forces, but also aircraft.

When the Americans began providing anti-aircraft weapons, like the Stinger, Soviet movements and attacks became even more risky. The author, however, corrects several narratives about the impact of the West supplying weapons, particularly the Stingers. They were impactful. But Galeotti presents the statistics, proving that their impact was not at the mythological level past military historians have purported.

Afghan National Army (ANA) Russian-made helicopters fly past during a ceremony to commemorate the anniversary of the fall of a Soviet-installed regime on April 28, 2010 in Kabul, Afghanistan. Majid Saeedi/Getty Images

Galeotti corrects a number of narratives, specifically that the Soviets were driven out of Afghanistan. He argues that the war itself became untenable based on the amount of ground forces and air forces required to win and how many the Soviets were willing to send.

The Soviet war in Afghanistan seemed more like an ongoing live operation for tactical training rather than a war with a specified goal in mind. With continual mass defections from its puppet government―the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA)―over to the rebel side, such as the DRAs 9th Infantry Division, the weapons provisions by the West, the tactical and strategic improvements of the mujahideen, and the lack of commitment by the Soviets, it became merely a war of attrition.

“It was never possible reliably to prevent the rebels from disengaging when they chose,” Galeotti states in his book. “And for all the sound and fury―and some thousand Soviet and DRA casualties―the offensive itself, much like the initial high-altitude raids, were impressive to the eye but strategically meaningless.”

An Unlearned Lesson

The war between the Soviets and the Afghan rebels was more about tactical maneuvers rather than strategic success, as Galeotti made mention. For the Soviets, they were maneuvers that seemed more about how to use new aircraft and weapons than how to defeat the enemy. It was as if they were used, referencing the aforementioned Soviet officer quote, to prove what they “could do” in the future. For the mujahideen, the war became a training ground for how to deal with invading forces, something that would transpire just a couple of decades later.

Galeotti shows the Gorbachev-led Soviets not so much withdrawing in defeat, but rather with an accepted view that it was not a war worth fighting and, therefore, not worth winning. It is an interesting comparison-contrast with the Americans that is impossible to miss, although that isn’t the purpose of the author’s work.

When it comes to warfare history in Afghanistan, a topic that has aroused controversy and interest of late, Galeotti’s book is a fine addition that will help average readers and military history enthusiasts understand the strategic and tactical difficulties in waging a war in Afghanistan and places like it, as well as providing interesting information on the growth and evolution of Soviet air power.

‘Afghanistan 1979–88: Soviet Air Power Against the Mujahideen’ By Mark Galeotti Osprey Publishing, Feb. 14, 2023 Paperback: 96 pages