For those interested in the minute details of how tank warfare was conducted during 1940 and 1941 in North Africa, Robert Forczyk has written an exhaustive work in his new “Desert Armour: Tank Warfare in North Africa: Beda Fomm to Operation Crusader, 1940–41.” Forczyk is not merely a military historian, but also served 18 years as an armor officer and intelligence officer in the U.S. Army, retiring as a lieutenant colonel. Forczyk pours a wealth of historical research and personal insight into his book.
The author takes the reader through numerous operations, including Compass, Battleaxe, and Crusader. Although the aforementioned are British operations, the author gives both Allied and Axis perspectives, which include the Italians, the Germans, and those of the British Commonwealth, like New Zealand and South Africa. Before presenting the launch of World War II hostilities in Europe and North Africa, however, Forczyk provides background on decisions in Europe’s national politics, geopolitical appeasements, and, most importantly, for this read, the armored warfare doctrines for each country.
He notes how militaries were still trying to figure out how tanks could and should be used in warfare. Interestingly, those tank warfare doctrines varied from country to country. As Forczyk indicates, tanks were still a relatively new military creation. It is during what is known as the Interwar Period (1918–1939) that militaries began tinkering with their doctrines, while at the same time Europe was politically moving toward disaster.
Forczyk suggests that the political maneuverings directly affected the military, and specifically the armored forces. He notes that “the situation for Britain’s armoured forces became even more dire in May 1937, when [Neville] Chamberlain replaced [Stanley] Baldwin as prime minister. Chamberlain was committed to a policy of appeasement and avoiding military action at any cost.”
This tendency to avoid military conflict, Forczyk indicates, fostered the military doctrine of “limited liability,” established by Liddel Hart, who was chosen as Chamberlain’s personal military advisor. This doctrine argued against having large expeditionary forces, argued for limiting military spending, and argued that the French Maginot Line could resist any German invasion.
Forczyk ties this doctrine of “limited liability” and its effects into the rest of the book, which I view as a very coherent and convincing argument. Parliament accepted the doctrine, forcing the British military to fall woefully behind a nation they, nor the rest of Europe, could afford to trail: Germany.
Forczyk further explains how Britain and Europe fell so far behind Germany, despite the latter remaining under the constraint of the Treaty of Versailles, stating “the situation changed on 8 June 1933, when Hitler’s regime approved 35 billion Reichsmarks to be spent on the rearmament over the next eight years” (contractors were paid not so much with money, but with government-approved “promissory notes”).
Tank Successes and Failures
In various ways, the author identifies precisely what led to either the success or failure of the armored divisions within specific militaries. The British, before the North Africa campaign, had its 1st Armoured Division annihilated due to its obsolete tanks, losing “a majority of its tank force” in just “three weeks of fighting in Belgium and France.” The British in 1939 were “ill-equipped, ill-organized, and ill-trained,” which led to crushing defeats.Interestingly, the Italian armored divisions seemed to copy the British, as tank battalions were sent to North Africa with tank operators and commanders who knew how to drive the tanks, but couldn’t maneuver them tactically. Forczyk states that Italy’s Benito Mussolini was more interested in the quantity of tanks over their quality, which led to them being overrun by the British in 1940.
By 1940, the British had made strides in tank warfare, and were at least well ahead of the Italians. This was proven during Operation Compass at the battles of Ghirba and Beda Fomm. Although the British tanks ran on gasoline rather than diesel, as the Italians’ did, they did have the upper hand in communication, as the Italian tanks did not possess radios, which led to disorganization and defeat.
Mistakes and Poor Command
Forczyk works to correct a number of misinterpreted histories, including British propagandistic history that inflates its enemy casualty numbers. He specifically discusses how various commanders―British, German, and others―proved incapable of succeeding, whether because of inexperience in tank warfare, underestimating or ignoring the desert conditions and the toll they took on the tanks, or hubris (something he accuses Rommel of throughout the book). He concludes that “after 18 months of armoured combat in North Africa, it was clear that both sides suffered from limitations, although neither side was eager to correct their own deficiencies.”
Although Forczyk is critical across the board, and rightfully so, concerning the devastating errors made by commanders, the criticism seems to be asserted without taking into account his earlier statements about how tank usage and armored warfare doctrines were still being ironed out. This is not to excuse poor leadership, but it should lend some leeway to those early commanders, especially in a place with a landscape vastly different from Europe. If there were commanders, regardless of nationality, who could have done a better job, it would have been nice to see the suggestions and why.
Otherwise, it appears that everyone was learning on the fly and that there were actually no alternatives (which may have been the case). Furthermore, there are times where the author criticizes leaders, and none more than Rommel, with the use of unnecessary adjectives, which makes him appear less than objective to his historical subjects.
Those slight criticisms aside, “Desert Armour” is an exceptional work that I recommend to be read slowly, as there is so much information to pore over. For World War II or tank warfare enthusiasts, this is a great addition to personal libraries and for research in this era of tank warfare.
