Xi Jinping Purges Party Veterans’ Influence When Determining Top Personnel

Xi Jinping Purges Party Veterans’ Influence When Determining Top Personnel
Chinese Leader Xi Jinping raises his hand as he votes during the closing session of the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party at The Great Hall of People in Beijing, on Oct. 22, 2022. Kevin Frayer/Getty Images
Jessica Mao
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Chinese state media recently released some details of the process of forming the new Central Committee leadership body, from which it can be seen that Chinese leader Xi Jinping did not seek any advice from the senior figures of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the process of preparing the top personnel of the 20th National Congress.

China’s state-run Xinhua News Agency stated in an Oct. 24 article that, starting from April 2022, Xi spoke with “the current members of the Political Bureau of the CCP Central Committee, the secretary of the Central Secretariat, the vice chairman of the state and members of the Central Military Commission—altogether 30 people—and listened fully to their views” when preparing the name list of top leadership.

In comparison, after the CCP’s 19th National Congress in 2017, Xinhua said in a similar article that from late April to June 2017, Xi spoke with “current party and state leaders, members of the Central Military Commission and senior comrades of the party—altogether 57 people, and listened fully to their views.”

The missing “senior comrades” in this year’s Congress showed that Xi did not talk to the senior members of the CCP and listen to their views when formulating the personnel list for the 20th National Congress.

“This showed that the party elders no longer have a say or any influence in the top-level personnel decisions,” said Zhang Tianliang, a U.S.-based China expert, in his YouTube program.

Party Elders Warned to Watch Their Words Before the Congress

In May, before the CCP’s 20th National Congress, the General Office of the CCP Central Committee issued a document entitled “Opinions on Strengthening the Party Building Work of Retired Cadres in the New Era,” a warning to senior members of the CCP to watch their words.

The General Office is led by Ding Xueliang, a close and trusted associate of Xi.

The document stated that the central authorities will strengthen the management and supervision of retired CCP cadres, and require them to “strictly abide by the relevant disciplinary rules.”

The “disciplinary rules” stipulate that the retired cadres should not “make irresponsible and improper remarks” on major policies of the CCP Central Committees, and are “forbidden to make any negative comments of a political nature,” according to a May 15 Xinhua News article.

Current affairs commentator Zhong Yuan pointed out that the General Office’s release of this document indicated that many retired cadres had made “irresponsible and improper remarks” on the Party’s central committee.

He also explained that the General Office supervises high-level senior officials who have served as standing committee members, members of the Politburo, vice premiers, and members of the State Council. Only this group of people has the ability to influence the personnel layout of the 20th National Congress. The Xi faction was definitely worried about their influence, Zhong said.

Party Elders’ Influence Has Been the Norm for Decades

Party elders refer to the retired top leaders of the CCP. After retirement, they maintain influence in politics through their own networks and cronies.

In an article published by Voice of America (VOA) in August 2017, U.S.-based Chinese economics and sociology scholar He Qinglian talked about the unspoken rule of the CCP’s retired elders meddling with political matters after the Mao Zedong era.

Before Mao’s death, he appointed Hua Guofeng as his successor, but a number of bigwigs in the CCP joined forces to remove Hua from office, and then created a collective leadership of Deng Xiaoping, Ye Jianying, Chen Yun, and several other Party elders. But these people were getting old, so they appointed Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang, and other middle-aged officials to handle executive work on the front lines.

The retired old officials no longer handled specific affairs, and on the surface, a set of retirement rules had been set up, but these officials still had room to intervene in politics. Even though the seniors were no longer on the Politburo Standing Committee and did not participate in specific policy discussions, important personnel decisions still needed their nomination or approval.

During Hu Jintao’s 10 years as head of the CCP, the cronies of his predecessor, Jiang Zemin, were everywhere within the party, and Jiang retained the position of military leader for two more years. Hu was therefore under Jiang’s control at all times.

When Jiang finally resigned from the military, the PLA army had already established a system whereby the generals only took orders from Jiang, treating Hu as their nominal military commander.

Xi Eliminates Influence of Jiang Faction

After taking power in 2012, Xi Jinping made it clear that he would not tolerate retired leaders interfering in politics, and has been purging the Jiang faction ever since.

In August 2015, Chinese state media People’s Daily published an article warning retired senior cadres that “if you are no longer in a certain position, don’t meddle in the affairs related to that position.”

Some analysts believe that this is a warning from Xi against interference from the veteran members of Jiang’s faction. The Xi faction has also been purging Jiang’s loyalists in the name of “anti-corruption.” The most prominent case was the fall of Zhou Yongkang, a former member of the Politburo Standing Committee and Jiang’s confidant.

In November 2015, Zhou was sentenced to life imprisonment for accepting bribes, abusing his power, and intentionally leaking state secrets. He was the first former member of the Politburo Standing Committee to be convicted since Xi took power.

Jessica Mao is a writer for The Epoch Times with a focus on China-related topics. She began writing for the Chinese-language edition in 2009.
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