The Chinese military’s second-in-command’s visit to Vietnam has again raised questions about the power balance tilting away from Xi Jinping, the chief of the Chinese Military Commission. Such a visit is typically Xi’s responsibility.
In addition, according to Vietnamese state media reports, Zhang Youxia, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), didn’t mention Xi’s name even when Vietnamese senior officials asked Zhang to relay greetings to Xi.
At the same time, Zhang’s trip received little propaganda coverage in China. The visit could serve as a subtle heads-up from China to the outside world indicating that Xi no longer has full military power.
If so, U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan’s meeting with both Zhang and Xi in Beijing would make sense, as in Chinese communist culture, a second-in-command is not supposed to share the limelight with the top boss.
During his visit to Vietnam from Oct. 24 to Oct. 26, Zhang met with Vietnamese Communist Party chief To Lam, who is also chairman of the country’s CMC, as well as Vietnamese leader Luong Cuong and several high-ranking military officials.
Vietnamese media reported that while Lam asked Zhang to convey greetings and good wishes to Xi, Zhang did not reference Xi in their discussion. In his meeting with Luong, Luong mentioned Xi by name, but Zhang chose not to respond directly. Instead, he expressed his pleasure at visiting Vietnam for the first time as vice chairman of the CMC. He congratulated Luong on his new position as president, according to Vietnamese media.
Chen Pokong, a U.S.-based China expert, told The Epoch Times that some influential party cadres must have called for Xi to relinquish part of his power due to his failures in economic and foreign policy.
“The leaders of both Vietnam and Russia are particularly sensitive to shifts in the power dynamics of the Chinese Communist Party. This time, both the Vietnamese Party chief and the president made a point of greeting Zhang personally. They wanted to establish rapport with China’s new man in power,” Jiang said.
Xi attended the BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia, from Oct. 22 to 24, returning to Beijing at midnight on Oct. 24. His next public appearance was on Oct. 28, when he convened a meeting of the Politburo.
Before Zhang visited Vietnam, there were already notable signs that Zhang was taking over Xi’s military power.
Xi was absent from two significant military events in Beijing on Oct. 14 and 15: a key conference and a meeting with Russian Defense Minister Andrey Belousov—an unusual occurrence considering his position as chairman of the CMC.
Zhang chaired the conference and met with Belousov in Xi’s absence.
While these events occurred, Xi was on an inspection tour in distant Fujian Province and had no pressing business to attend to.
It is worth noting that while Vietnamese media reported extensively on Zhang’s visit, the Chinese propaganda apparatus, overseen by Cai Qi, a close ally of Xi, remained silent on the trip until Oct. 26, with no reports appearing before that date. In contrast, other officials of the same or lower rank received considerable coverage.
In a recent interview with The Epoch Times, Tang Jingyuan, a U.S.-based current affairs commentator, said that Zhang’s visit to Vietnam implied a significant shift in the Chinese military’s power structure. Tang sees the visit as a calculated move by the Chinese Communist Party to give the international world a subtle heads-up.
“Xi’s loss of absolute power could create a political vacuum that would spark infighting among top leaders,” Tang said. “To mitigate such risks, China’s top leaders who forced Xi Jinping to cede some power may have strategically orchestrated Zhang’s trip first to send a message abroad that will eventually reach the Chinese people.”
