The Supreme Court decided this week to consider whether a retired Florida firefighter with Parkinson’s disease can sue her former employer for discrimination in the provision of post-employment benefits.
The case concerns Karyn Stanley, who had to accept disability retirement at the age of 47 after her Parkinson’s disease became so severe that she was unable to continue working as a firefighter in Sanford, Florida.
Parkinson’s is a chronic, progressive disorder that affects the nervous system. Patients can experience tremors, walking and balance issues, difficulty speaking, and other symptoms.
Ms. Stanley claimed that the city discriminates against disabled retirees by limiting when they become eligible for a health insurance subsidy.
The trial court said former employees such as Ms. Stanley have no legal standing to sue under the federal Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) because they’re no longer “qualified individuals” whom the law protects from being discriminated against.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit upheld the lower court’s ruling.
The petition states that the ADA allows plaintiffs, including former employees, to call upon the full “powers, remedies, and procedures” available under Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964, as the Supreme Court ruled in 1997 in Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.
Title VII provides protection to employees and job applicants from employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.
The ADA states that employers aren’t allowed to “discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to … terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.”
However, the federal courts of appeal are divided on whether the anti-discrimination provisions of the ADA cover disabled former employees asking for post-employment benefits, according to the petition.
Appellate courts, including the 11th Circuit, have instead focused on the definition of “qualified individual” as someone who “can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.”
In the case at hand, the 11th Circuit reaffirmed its position that former employees may not sue under the ADA “for discrimination in post-employment distribution of fringe benefits,” according to the petition, which urged the Supreme Court to take up Ms. Stanley’s case.
The Second Circuit and Third Circuit have embraced the opposite rule, which is that a former employee doesn’t lose the ability to sue her employer for discrimination that harms her just because she no longer works for the employer.
The text and structure of the ADA suggest the Second Circuit and Third Circuit are correct and the 11th Circuit is not, the petition states, adding that the latter circuit court “misunderstands” the role of the phrase “qualified individual” in the ADA.
The right to sue under an important federal civil rights law “should not turn entirely on geography and happenstance.”
“Only this Court can resolve the longstanding disagreement among the circuits on this fundamental question, and this case presents an ideal vehicle to do so,” the petition states.
In May, the city of Sanford urged the Supreme Court not to accept the case.
The issue is whether “a totally disabled, former employee—who did not earn a benefit during her employment and who concedes she could not perform the essential functions of her former job” at the time she was denied the benefit sought is a “qualified individual” entitled to sue under the ADA.
Ms. Stanley didn’t earn the benefit sought nor did she experience any discrimination based on her disability.
“She simply failed to satisfy the City’s service-based criteria for earning the subsidy to age 65,” the city said, adding that if she had served 25 years, she would have qualified for the benefit regardless of her disability.
The trial court determined that the city’s requirements for earning the subsidy drew “neutral lines that are rationally related to meet its legitimate goal.”
Ms. Stanley retired early with 20 years of service. Although her reason for early retirement was tragic, “it did not render the denial of the subsidy to age 65 unlawful or even unfair,” the court noted.
Non-disabled employees retiring with only 20 years of service also don’t receive the subsidy to age 65, “no matter how unfortunate their reasons for retiring early.”
In fact, the city said Ms. Stanley was treated better than non-disabled employees with an equal period of service, because while they received no subsidy, she received it for 24 months “out of compassion for her disability.”
The Supreme Court is expected to hear the case in its new term that begins in October.
