The Arctic: A New Military Domain?

The Russian "50 Years of Victory" nuclear-powered icebreaker is seen at the North Pole on Aug. 18, 2021. Ekaterina Anisimova/AFP via Getty Images

Commentary

The strategic environment of the Arctic has traditionally been dictated by its isolation and its extremely difficult climate: it was, quite simply, an extremely cold, distant, and generally desolate place for humans to operate in.

Global climate change, however, has begun to alter this general point of view. In particular, the extent and thickness of sea ice have declined significantly; in recent years, the extent of summer sea ice has been some 50 percent smaller than the preceding 30 years, a loss of ice-pack roughly equal to one-third of the landmass of the United States.

While still no tropical paradise, the Arctic has become much more accessible. Consequently, the reduction of Arctic ice has increased economic interests in the region. The first of these is the region’s reportedly abundant reserves of oil and natural gas. The Arctic is believed to contain up to 25 percent of the world’s remaining oil and gas reserves; a conservative estimate puts this at over 100 billion barrels of oil, estimated to be worth perhaps $20 trillion.

Just as important, the Arctic is being viewed as a possible alternate sea route for commercial shipping, potentially competing with the traditional trans-Suez/trans-Malacca Strait route used by most shipping when it comes to trade between Europe and the Asia-Pacific. The reduction in sea ice has meant that sea routes through the Arctic region are at least a commercial possibility.

Moscow is particularly interested in developing the so-called Northern Sea Route (NSR) along the northern coast of Russia. The passage is particularly attractive for shipping via Europe and Asia. The distance from Shanghai to Hamburg is 3,231 miles shorter, going by way of the Arctic route than via the Suez Canal and Straits of Malacca. With the Arctic both shrinking in extent and thickness, the National Intelligence Council believes continued global warming could permit the NSR to remain open for 110 days each year by 2030, “transforming global shipping patterns.”

Already, the number of ships using the NSR rose from 41 ships in 2011 to 92 in 2021; between 2010 and 2012, there was a tenfold increase in the number of vessels taking this route, and Russia expects a thirtyfold increase in the number of transits over the next few years.

Russia is not alone in wanting to further develop the NSR. China, which has dubbed itself a “near-Arctic” state, in 2018 released its official report outlining its Arctic policy. In it, Beijing laid out its plans to conduct research, develop infrastructure, and excavate resources within the Arctic Circle. China particularly sees the Arctic as a critical element of a “Polar Silk Road” to complement its Belt and Road Initiative.

China’s Icebreaker Xuelong, which voyaged to the Arctic, in Xiamen in Fujian Province, China, on June 27, 2010. STR/AFP/Getty Images

These economic and trade developments have significantly raised the strategic value of the Arctic, which is experiencing a bit of a comeback in terms of its salience as a military domain. Russia zealously guards the Arctic as “its zone,” and it possesses the largest military footprint in the region of all the Arctic states, with nearly a dozen ports and military bases located along its northern coast, from Murmansk to Petropavlovsk.

Moreover, no other country has invested more resources into its Arctic forces than Russia. After decades of neglect, Moscow is reconstituting and strengthening its military presence in the Arctic, particularly in the “High North” around the Kola Peninsula, home of the Russian Northern Fleet.

Since 2008, for example, Russia has established two Arctic-warfare brigades (consisting of approximately 9,000 troops), and reopened naval facilities, airbases, and radar sites in the Kola and along the Russian Arctic coast. Russia now operates around 100 long-range aircraft in the Kola, including Tu-22 long-range bombers and Tu-142 and Il-38 maritime reconnaissance aircraft. These assets run regular reconnaissance and bomb-test flights over the Arctic. Russia is also upgrading its airfield on Novaya Zemlya to accommodate modern fighter aircraft as well as deploy modern S400 air defense systems.

Russia has particularly invested heavily in upgrading its Northern Fleet, headquartered at Severomorsk, on the Kola Peninsula. The Northern Fleet is most critically the home for Russia’s ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) fleet, which is heavily dependent on the Arctic for its patrols. This flotilla includes several new Borei-class SSBNs, as well as the Belgorod submarine, which recently made headlines when it briefly “disappeared,” raising fears that it had gone on some kind of a doomsday mission.

China is not yet a military power in the region, but Beijing’s “no limits” partnership with Moscow makes the idea of Sino-Russian cooperation in the Arctic very conceivable. In particular, China has long-term military plans for the Arctic. In particular, the region is regarded as a future possible operating area for Chinese nuclear-powered missile-carrying submarines (SSBNs). For all these reasons, Beijing is currently planning to build a third icebreaker for the Chinese military.

This, in turn, would set up a NATO-Russia/China competition in the Arctic. With Sweden and Finland set to join the Atlantic Alliance, all members of the Arctic Council (the United States, Canada, Iceland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Finland) save Russia will be NATO members. The Arctic Ocean, together with the Nordic region’s Far North, will likely become a key military domain for a new Cold War. The need for expanded NATO cooperation in the Arctic is more necessary than ever.

Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.