One of China’s great economic advantages is going away. Relatively low-cost, reliable labor has been a mainstay of China’s economic engine for decades.
Manufacturers from Europe and North America for years rushed investments into China to produce their products at a lower cost than they could domestically, first simple, cheaper items and later more sophisticated, high-value items. This investment and the income it generated helped propel China’s fantastic pace of economic growth. But for some time, wages in China and Asia generally have been rising faster than wages in the West, so today, the allure of that low-cost advantage has all but disappeared.
But as more and more Western facilities located in China and that economy otherwise developed, wages began to rise much faster than in Europe or America. By 2011, the average Chinese worker commanded an annual wage of 41,799 yuan, the equivalent at the exchange rate of the day of $6,120. That year the average American worker still brought home considerably more, some $40,000, but the gap had shrunk. American wages were 6.5 times their Chinese equivalent.
By the time of COVID-19 and all the additional complexities it imposed on Western sourcing in China, the wage gap had shrunk almost to insignificance. In 2021, the last full year for which Beijing’s National Bureau of Statistics offers data, the average Chinese worker earned 105,000 yuan yearly, the equivalent of $16,153. The average American worker earned some $58,120 a year, only 3.5 times his or her Chinese counterpart.
To be sure, a gap remains, but it is no longer sufficient to extend the production location trends of the past. Consider that American workers still boast higher productivity rates than their Chinese counterparts, enough perhaps to erase the effects of the shrunken labor cost gap completely. And in recent years, another compelling matter has become clear. China is no longer as reliable for sourcing as was once thought. During COVID-19, Beijing halted the export of several important items, such as face masks. The reasons were easy to understand. China had an acute domestic need. But the move hardly encouraged foreign buyers or producers. Then, when Beijing’s zero-COVID policy blocked production for long periods, Western producers still found another reason to reconsider Chinese sourcing.
China’s economy has less need for this Western sourcing than it once did. It can continue to grow even as Western producers seek other venues for their production. But the shift ushered in by the shrinking wage gap, as well as these other considerations just alluded to, will slow the pace of China’s economic growth to rates well below those to which China and the world have once grown accustomed.