First, Beijing has refused to curb the flow of fentanyl into the United States. For years, the precursors used to manufacture the deadly drug have originated in China. While the Chinese regime could have intervened to stop the exports, it has chosen not to. Why?
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is using fentanyl as a bargaining chip to pressure Washington. But the Trump administration decided that enough was enough, so it significantly increased the tariff rate on Chinese goods. The 145 percent tariff includes the previous 20 percent related to fentanyl trafficking into the United States.
Second, Beijing has so far refused to negotiate with Washington on reciprocal tariffs. On April 2, Trump invoked the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), a 1977 law authorizing the president to impose trade restrictions on foreign countries, and introduced reciprocal tariff measures against dozens of countries, setting China’s reciprocal rate at 34 percent, which was not the highest.
These tariffs were not intended as an ultimate solution; instead, they served as a tool to encourage trading partners to come to the negotiating table in order to eliminate tariffs and non-tariff barriers against the United States.
These developments illustrate how the CCP has repeatedly dismissed Washington’s core concerns, rejected invitations to negotiate, and remained committed to a combative, “wolf warrior” posture—risking a full-blown trade war with the Trump administration.
Beijing’s strategic thinking, in my view, seems to be as follows.
First, Beijing views the United States, particularly the Trump administration, as the main obstacle to achieving its global ambitions, and believes this administration understands the true nature of the CCP. Consequently, Beijing is determined to disrupt, weaken, and undermine the Trump presidency. The Chinese regime hopes that after four years, when Trump’s term ends, a new U.S. administration might take a more conciliatory approach, allowing the CCP to adjust its strategy accordingly.
Meanwhile, Trump’s sweeping policies have faced criticisms and challenges—conditions that Beijing believes could severely limit his effectiveness.
Third, Trump’s broad-based policy on reciprocal tariffs is designed to reset the global economic order, dismantle entrenched trade norms, and put pressure even on close allies, which could leave many countries alienated. The CCP sees this as an opportunity to garner support. It seems to believe that taking a hardline stance against the United States can rally other countries into a broader international “united front” against Washington, chip away at American influence, and further isolate the United States. But this geopolitical gamble is unrealistic—wishful thinking at best.
Meanwhile, the United States, the world’s top consumer market, imported around $3.29 trillion worth of goods in 2024—accounting for about 15 percent of global imports—despite a record $1.21 trillion trade deficit, making it an economy no nation can afford to decouple from.
Against this backdrop, the CCP’s push for an anti-U.S. international coalition seems absurd. When asked during his meeting with Netanyahu whether U.S. tariffs might drive trade partners toward China, Trump shrugged it off, saying: “I am not worried about it. They want to be in the hands of the U.S. They don’t want to be in the hands of the Chinese.”
Although the United States has its own issues to address, its economic foundations remain strong. Trump’s economic reforms may be difficult in the short term, but they are intended to promote long-term growth. In contrast, China’s economy has significantly declined since 2022, and with Beijing’s unpredictable policies, it is likely to deteriorate even further. A trade war with the United States will only exacerbate the situation.
The Chinese regime has focused on America’s vulnerabilities while neglecting its own critical weaknesses. By choosing to escalate a trade conflict, the CCP is not acting strategically—it is courting disaster.
