Furthermore, fixed asset investment from the private sector increased 1.6 percent from a year earlier to 25.84 trillion yuan (about $3.71 trillion).
At first glance, a growth rate of 5.8 percent for fixed asset investment is not alarming.
According to official data, the growth rates from 2018 to 2021 are 5.9 percent, 5.4 percent, 2.9 percent, and 4.9 percent, respectively, declining yearly. Compared with the double-digit annual growth rates that have lasted for many years, the last few years paint a different picture.
Beijing hoped that local government investment would help to leverage private investment and fuel economic growth. However, private fixed asset investment growth for the first 10 months this year was sluggish—only 1.6 percent.
In fact, the growth of private fixed assets investment has been weak in recent years. According to official data, the growth rates from 2018 to 2021 are 8.7 percent, 4.7 percent, 1.0 percent, and 7.0 percent, respectively.
However, after a close look at the data released by the NBS, the growth rates seem to be largely misrepresented.
As far as the national fixed asset investment is concerned, it was 63,563.6 billion yuan in 2018 and dropped to 55,147.8 billion yuan in 2019. Where did the growth rate of 5.4 percent in 2019 come from?
Fixed asset investment went down to 51,890.7 billion yuan in 2020, and the growth rate for that year should also be negative. How could it be 2.9 percent?
In 2021, it rose to 54,454.7 billion yuan, with a growth rate of 4.9 percent. Beijing’s calculation for 2021 is correct.
However, the investment in 2021 is still lower than that in 2019. But the NBS claimed that national fixed asset investment saw an increase of 8.0 percent in 2019, “with an average increase of 3.9 percent in two years.”
The growth rate of private fixed asset investment was also miscalculated. In 2019 and 2020, investment declined for two consecutive years, and the growth rate should be negative.
In 2021, it rose to 30,765.9 billion yuan, and the growth rate should have become positive; however, it should have been 6.36 percent, not 7.0 percent.
It’s hard to imagine a state statistics bureau would make such mistakes, even though it’s been known for some time that Beijing’s data was never real.
Could it mean the Chinese economy has been hopelessly ill?