He Weidong ‘Disappears’: Is Xi Jinping in Danger?

The Chinese official’s fall could be the result of anti-Xi forces taking action, causing Xi Jinping to lose control.

Gen. He Weidong, vice chairman of China's Central Military Commission (CMC), attends the opening ceremony of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in Beijing on March 4, 2025. Pedro Pardo/AFP via Getty Images

Commentary

Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s close ally and vice chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), He Weidong, has not been seen since his last public appearance on March 11 at the closing ceremony of the National People’s Congress. On March 13, independent journalist Zhao Lanjian revealed that He had been arrested, sparking widespread attention.

On March 25, The Washington Times reported that U.S. intelligence agencies believe that He, the third-ranking figure in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s military, has been dismissed from his position, citing U.S. defense officials. This was the first sign of confirmation from the U.S. government.

What is absurd is that on March 27, during a routine press briefing, a spokesperson for the Chinese Ministry of Defense, when asked about the matter, responded, “There is no such information; we are not aware of the situation.” Such a clumsy denial is very telling.

In comparison, on Nov. 27, 2024, the same spokesperson responded to foreign media outlets about the investigation of Chinese Defense Minister Dong Jun, stating that the reports were “purely fabricated, with malicious intent, and China strongly disagrees with such slanderous actions.”

Based on the report of He Weidong’s “disappearance,” and by comparing the related revelations and the CCP’s response, I estimate, based on my understanding of China’s political situation, that it’s almost certain that He Weidong has encountered trouble.

The core issue now is whether He’s downfall is due to Xi’s suspicion of his loyalty, leading to a ruthless move, or whether it’s the result of anti-Xi forces taking action, causing Xi to lose control?

I lean toward the latter, supported by the following three phenomena.

Xi’s Trusted Aide in Military Removed

As for military personnel, Xi has been in control of the military for ten years, and the current senior generals in office are all individuals he personally promoted. However, Xi’s level of trust within the military is relatively low, given that he is not from a military background and lacks deep roots within the armed forces.

For example, in the 19th Central Committee, there were 41 members from the military and the armed police forces, but only 11 remained from the “20th National Congress,” with 30 being replaced. This replacement rate is much higher than that of the Politburo, where 13 of the 25 members were replaced, with about half remaining. The 72-year-old Zhang Youxia was retained as vice chairman of the CMC, as a buffer against fears that the newly promoted younger generals may be disloyal.

However, since the “Two Sessions” in March 2023, a large number of senior military and military-industrial figures have been purged, most of whom were subordinates of Zhang Youxia, leaving Zhang in a precarious position. In order to protect himself, Zhang turned against Xi, and the situation in the military changed dramatically, with Xi’s trusted aides being removed one by one. Three key figures can be cited as examples.

Zhong Shaojun

In 2002, Xi was transferred from Fujian Province to Zhejiang Province, and Zhong became Xi’s close aide. After Xi came to power, he appointed Zhong to the CMC’s General Office to oversee the military. In 2017, Zhong was made director of the CMC’s General Office and promoted to major general by the end of 2019.

However, on April 23, 2024, when Xi inspected the Army Medical University in Chongqing, Zhong was absent. Instead, he was replaced by Major General Fang Yongxiang, deputy minister of the Ministry of Veterans Affairs. The footage showed that in addition to Vice Chairman of the CMC He Weidong, Fang accompanied Xi, while Zhong, the usually accompanying director of the CMC General Office, was nowhere to be seen.

Previous reports indicated that the 55-year-old Zhong had been assigned to the position of political commissar at the National Defense University of China on April 3. Being transferred from a pivotal role to a lesser position is not just the end of Zhong’s career; it also signifies that Xi’s control over the military has been weakened.

Miao Hua

During Xi’s time in Fujian, he had a close relationship with the 31st Group Army stationed there. Miao, two years younger than Xi, had long been engaged in political work with the 31st Group Army.

After Xi came to power, Miao quickly rose through the ranks. In December 2014, he was appointed political commissar of the Navy; in August 2017, he became the director of the CMC’s Political Work Department and was later re-elected as a CMC member in both the 19th and 20th National Congresses, holding significant power over military personnel decisions for Xi. Miao promoted a large number of military officers from the 31st Group Army and the Navy.

Adm. Miao Hua (C), China's director of the political affairs department of the Central Military Commission, disembarks his aircraft after arriving at Pyongyang International Airport on Oct. 14, 2019. Kim Won Jin/AFP via Getty Images

However, on Nov. 28, 2024, a spokesperson for the Chinese Ministry of Defense announced at a routine press conference that Miao had been “suspended for investigation” due to serious disciplinary violations.

He Weidong

Also two years younger than Xi, He comes from the 31st Group Army. After Xi came to power, He served in various key military positions, including deputy chief of staff of the Nanjing Military Region, commander of the Jiangsu Provincial Military District, commander of the Shanghai Garrison, deputy commander of the Western Theater, commander of the Army, and commander of the Eastern Theater.

At the 20th National Congress, he was promoted to a member of the Central Politburo and vice chairman of the CMC. It can be said that without Xi, He would have almost no chance of reaching such a high position. Moreover, there is no indication that Xi has ever doubted He’s loyalty.

If only one of these three individuals encountered trouble, it might be due to personal reasons; however, with all three of them facing issues, it’s no coincidence. This indicates a carefully designed strategy to purge Xi’s influence within the military.

Major Reshuffling of CMCCDI

The task of directly carrying out Xi’s military purge is entrusted to the Commission for Discipline Inspection of the Central Military Commission (CMCCDI). After Xi took office, the position of Discipline Inspection Secretary remained relatively stable, with General Du Jincai serving from November 2012 to January 2017, followed by General Zhang Shengmin from January 2017 to the present.

Xi elevated the status of the Military Discipline Commission by promoting Zhang to a member of the CMC (a position Du did not hold). Within the Military Discipline Commission, the first-ranked official is the secretary, while the second-ranked one is the full-time deputy secretary, who is responsible for handling specific cases.

After the 20th National Congress, the person responsible for executing the purge of two defense ministers, three rocket force commanders, and others was Chen Guoqiang, who was appointed as the full-time Deputy Secretary of the CMCCDI in August 2021.

Born in 1963, Chen was a general in the Air Force and made significant contributions to Xi’s leadership. However, in September 2024, he was unexpectedly reassigned to the position of political commissar at the National Defense University of Science and Technology, effectively being sidelined. There must be something unusual behind this.

Other than that, Tang Yong, who was transferred from the position of Deputy Political Commissar of the Armed Police Forces to Deputy Secretary of the CMCCDI in December 2023, was suddenly stripped of his qualifications as a member of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) on March 26, 2025.

According to CCP practices, being stripped of CPPCC membership signifies that the person is in trouble. Public records show that Tang had long-standing connections with He Weidong and Miao Hua in the Nanjing Military Region. During Miao’s tenure as a member of the Central Military Commission and Director of the Political Work Department, Tang was repeatedly promoted and held key positions.

The military’s Discipline Inspection Commission, which has been leading the military purge, has experienced continuous upheaval and become a target of the purge itself. Meanwhile, the focus of the military purge has shifted from Zhang Youxia’s faction to Xi’s close allies. The two are clearly linked, suggesting that anti-Xi forces within the military have already gained control over the military.

A Series of Abnormal Phenomena

On March 20, while Xi was inspecting the southwestern Yunnan Province, he met with senior leaders of Kunming-based troops, including officers above the rank of colonel, as well as representatives of grassroots advanced models and civilian personnel. What was surprising was that neither of the two vice chairmen of the Central Military Commission (CMC), Zhang Youxia and He Weidong, made an appearance.

China’s Central Television footage showed that Wu Yanan, the commander of the Southern Theater Command, participated in the meeting. The only person accompanying Xi was Major General Fang Yongxiang, who is believed to have replaced Zhong Shaojun as the director of the CMC Office. Reviewing past official CCP reports, Xi almost always visited military camps during his domestic trips, with at least one vice chairman of the CMC present.

Even more surprising is that on March 11, when the National People’s Congress concluded and Xi was leaving, the footage showed that many members of the Politburo turned around and stood by their seats to see him off. However, Zhang Youxia remained facing forward, and even when Xi walked past him, he did not turn around.

Zhang Youxia remained facing forward and did not turn around when Xi Jinping walked past him at the National People’s Congress on March 11, 2025. Screenshot via The Epoch Times

In addition, on March 14, Defense Minister Dong Jun was unusually absent from the State Council’s plenary meeting and has not appeared in any public activities since. On the afternoon of March 7, Xi attended the plenary meeting of the military and armed police forces’ delegation at the 14th National People’s Congress and gave a speech, but Navy Political Commissar Yuan Huazhi and Armed Police Commander Wang Chunning were absent.

Furthermore, Rocket Force Commander Wang Houbin, Eastern Theater Commander Lin Xiangyang, and former Army Political Commissar Qin Shutong, among others—these members of Xi’s inner circle—have all been rumored to be under investigation.

Meanwhile, reports involving Xi and the military have undergone significant changes. Not only has Xi’s signature slogan, “CMC Chairman Responsibility System,” not been mentioned, but reports specifically about Xi have also been decreasing.

Conclusion

The CCP has always proclaimed that “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.” Only by truly controlling the military can Xi secure his position. From a series of abnormal phenomena, it seems that Xi has already lost his military power. The reason he is still able to perform on stage may be that the various factions within the CCP have yet to reach a consensus on his successor.

However, whoever ascends to power should recognize the current trend and understand that the CCP is beyond saving. They should follow the heavenly mandate and comply with the people’s will, promoting China’s peaceful transformation. Otherwise, history will repeat itself.