Beijing’s concern seems to center on how subsidies for semiconductor production in the United States will curtail Western investment flows. The funding is important to China, but so is the access to the Western technologies that investment brings. On both these points, Beijing has been exceptionally open about its dependence, stating that a domestic orientation for American-based producers will retard the Middle Kingdom’s efforts to build up its own semiconductor industry. It is a strange thing to say on the heels of Beijing’s innumerable boasts about China’s scientific and engineering prowess. Such utterances all but admit the country’s dependence on Western innovation. It also points up China’s urgent needs, for today, China’s chip manufacturing effort can only supply some 10-15 percent of the country’s demands.
Seemingly in response to the law, Intel and the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) have touted new domestic U.S. chip manufacturing facilities. Still, these projects were planned long before the legislation ever came near passage. Like several others, these firms responded less to prospective government support than to supply chain disruptions due to the pandemic and recovery. The new law encourages, of course, but these domestic efforts probably would have gone ahead without the CHIPS for America Act, except now they have access to taxpayer funding.
In the meantime, Beijing’s ire certainly carries considerable hypocrisy with it. The Chinese regime has long offered subsidies for domestic manufacturing and imposed domestic sourcing rules that dwarf anything Washington has done with this act or any other. Compare, for example, the $52 billion in subsidies for domestic U.S. manufacturing included in the CHIPS for America Act with Beijing’s $150 billion in subsidies aimed at building up Chinese chip manufacturing by 2030.
But then, as with so much else in Beijing (or Washington for that matter), differences have less to do with what is being done than with who is doing it. In this case, it is subsidies for me (China) but not for thee (America). Now the open question is how Beijing will retaliate and how Washington, in its turn, will respond.