When it comes to China trade, part of Europe clearly sees an opportunity, but it is having trouble grasping it. Washington’s efforts to decouple American trade links from China have tempted some European commercial interests to fill the resulting gap.
The Germans seem particularly eager to grasp the opportunity. But difficulties have arisen because Washington is leaning heavily on Europe to follow its lead and because many interests in Europe want to follow Washington for their own reasons. What has emerged is considerable ambiguity about where things will go and a likelihood that the ambiguity will last for quite a while to come.
Europe has ample reason to hesitate before embracing Washington’s lead. China is, after all, the most important source of imports to the European Union (EU). It is the third-largest market for EU products. Europe cannot easily cut itself off from China trade without doing itself considerable harm. National and EU leaderships also chafe at the subsidies for chip and EV manufacturing that the Biden administration has advanced, claiming that they violate World Trade Organization (WTO) rules.
But if such practical commercial considerations would otherwise make Europe turn away from American entreaties, other powerful interests in Europe are pushing in Washington’s direction. Security interests within Europe object to what they call Beijing’s “wolf warrior” diplomacy, especially in Asia. Human rights groups object to Beijing’s penchant for internal repression, most extremely against the Uyghurs. These groups preach a much more ‘hawkish” posture toward China and argue that some economic setbacks are worth taking to implement it.
Against this background, it is hardly surprising that the EU and other European countries have failed to form a concerted policy on China trade, at least for the time being. The visit to Beijing by European Council President Charles Michel aimed more at quieting the volume of rhetoric than at presenting a coherent policy. Some European leaders have had quite the opposite effect, increasing Beijing’s consternation by visiting Taiwan, perhaps at the behest of “hawkish” elements at home or in a protest of Beijing’s retaliation against Lithuania for accepting a Taiwanese representative office in Vilnius. French President Emmanuel Macron has tried to carve out for himself and France a position between Biden and what can only be described as an ill-defined middle point in elite European thinking. Meanwhile, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz has unilaterally carried a pro-China trade agenda on his visit to Beijing.
The Germans might carry Europe to stand against Washington and promote China trade, perhaps even capture the flows that might otherwise have gone to American interests. To get his, however, Scholz will have a tough row to hoe. EU Commissioner for Industry Thierry Breton has already criticized Scholz, describing him as naïve about China’s agenda. No doubt Washington will describe him that way as well. It seems then that the coming months will see Europe unable to reinforce the American position on China but also too vacillating to undermine Washington’s agenda or its impact on China.