There have arisen lately two rather interesting and contending schools of thought concerning China’s future as a great power. One says that China has reached its peak and is already settling into a slow process of possibly irrevocable decline. The other school takes the opposite stance, arguing that China’s rise is continuing and has not yet reached its prime.
A far more compelling argument, however, is that neither trend, even if true, really matters much in the long run, especially when it comes to China and global stability. What is more important is how Beijing perceives itself compared to other great powers, especially the United States. In particular, if China continues to see itself as the injured party in global affairs, it may act irresponsibly whether or not it is objectively rising or falling.
Making matters worse, Beijing’s belligerent behavior—such as in the South China Sea or toward Taiwan—has generated considerable pushback as countries near and far from China become increasingly hostile toward China and seek to “decouple” themselves, economically and technologically, from the Middle Kingdom.
Not surprisingly, the idea of China as a “peaked power” has sparked its own backlash. Another article in Foreign Affairs by Oriana Skylar Mastro and Derek Scissors claims that China is not done rising and that Beijing still has considerable time and resources it can devote to expanding its global power base, especially its military. In particular, they argue, “China will be more capable militarily in 2035 than it is today.”
Interestingly, neither argument should give the West, and particularly the United States, much cause for comfort. Whether China is a strong and self-confident state asserting its “proper” place in global affairs, or whether it is an insecure and declining country that may be tempted to act prematurely with aggression before it becomes too weak, neither outcome is desirable from the standpoint of other powers in Asia or the rest of the world.
This is because the real problem has little to do with whether or not China is a nation-state in its prime or past its peak. It has more to do with China’s belief that it is a victim who has been illegitimately denied its true place within the global power structure.
Under Mao, the emphasis was on “China as victor.” In 1949, the Chinese people had “stood up,” overthrowing the humiliations of the past and creating a new self-confident state. This triumphalism was actually quite common to communist regimes, and their establishment usually meant, in their eyes, at least, “the end of history.” The National Museum of China, for example, has few exhibitions dedicated to Chinese history past 1949, and it certainly does not cover such bothersome events (at least to the Chinese Communist Party) as the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, or the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989.
This stance began to change in the early 1990s. According to Wang, the CCP was becoming increasingly alarmed that the youth of China could be so “polluted” by such foreign ideas as democracy and freedom of thought and expression. Consequently, the “China as victim” motif—with its shameless appeal to nationalism and the subsequent manipulation of historical memory—increasingly became the dominant, CCP-led narrative.
This “us-against-them” theme can be seen everywhere, such as in the expansion of new monuments and museums observing Chinese suffering at the hands of the Japanese during World War II, or in conspiracy theories that the United States deliberately bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade during the 1999 Kosovo War.
All this is one thing, but this victimhood narrative takes a much darker turn when it begins to infect Chinese foreign and security policy. Here is the critical point: international relations is all about getting along—in other words, it is a process of negotiation, compromise, and concession. But victims, because they believe that they have suffered, feel that they should not have to concede or compromise, especially to their real or imagined bullies. Rather, victims are entitled to indulgence and privileged treatment.
This “entitled victimization,” driven by “populist nationalism” and fueled by an “official narrative of [Western] humiliation,” denotes a China that will likely be ever less willing to support the status quo or pursue peaceful routes to dispute resolution in the Asia-Pacific. Rather, it implies a great regional power increasingly willing to use force or the threat of force to support its national interests. This sense of victimhood will dominate CCP decision-making, whether or not Beijing has peaked or is on the rise.
