High Turnover in Xi’s Political Faction Signals Heightened Infighting in Beijing, Experts Say

A Chinese policeman stands guard outside Zhongnanhai, which serves as the central headquarters for the Chinese Communist Party, after the sacking of politician Bo Xilai from the country's powerful Politburo, in Beijing on April 11, 2012. Mark Ralston/AFP via Getty Images

The frequent personnel changes within Xi Jinping’s faction indicate a tacit balancing act employed by the top echelons to alleviate internal dissatisfaction with the Chinese leader’s governance, according to analysts.

Within two weeks, from the end of September to early October, at least three confidants of Xi, including one military disciplinary official, were removed from their key positions or placed under investigation.

China watchers say Xi’s policies—such as the extreme COVID-19 lockdown measures, crackdown on private enterprises, and wolf-warrior diplomacy—have created a gloomy economic climate and strained relations with the West.

The change in geopolitical and business environments has caused less profit for other factions within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). China’s economic downturn also diminishes a key justification for the CCP’s rule.

Top Chinese officials, especially the Party elders, have made compromises within the Party in a bid to sustain its totalitarian rule, according to experts.

Resorting to Party Elders Again

On Sept. 30, at the high-ranking CCP meeting to mark the 75th anniversary of the founding of communist China, two former leaders—Wen Jiabao and Li Ruihuan—sat to the immediate left and right of Xi, which attracted many political interpretations.

In his speech, Xi expressed gratitude “to the past leaders of the older generation.” This is a rare move from the regime’s top helmsman.

Xi needs the help of Party elders to survive the ongoing political troubles, said Wang He, a political commentator, in an interview with the  “Pinnacle View,” a Chinese-language program of The Epoch Times’ sister media outlet, NTD.

Wang noted that the last time Xi said similar words was in 2014, during the early years of his reign. Xi faced various hurdles from the corruption-riddled bloc led by the late former CCP leader Jiang Zemin. Later, relying on the Party elders’ support, Xi consolidated his power and arrested Jiang’s henchman, Zhou Yongkang, the former secretary of the Political and Legal Affairs Committee.

After a decade, Xi has come to another crossroads.

“The economy is in shambles, and Xi has no way out. Therefore, he has to appease the patriarchs and draw on their strength,” Wang said.

Wang added that Xi’s extreme left-leaning policies and one-man dictatorship have displeased the Party’s most powerful political families that monopolize state assets—patriarchs within are potentially influential.

Shi Shan, a China expert and contributor to The Epoch Times, said that the CCP system determines that the patriarchs become the spokesmen and mainstays in power-sharing, so their appearance at a significant event suggests unusual political signals.

In Shi’s view, Xi faces a partial decentralization of power.

“It is likely that certain tacit agreements and compromises are reached within this particular elite group,” he said.

Xi’s Weakening Power

All of the members of Xi’s camp who had job changes are younger than 65, which is around the peak years of political careers in China. They used to work in areas related to implementing Xi’s anti-corruption campaign.

On Sept. 30, Chen Guoqiang, 61, a former disciplinary supervisor in the Central Committee and Central Military Committee, was reassigned to the National University of Defence Technology.

Chen played a crucial role in Xi’s fight against his political rivals. Chen is the “key executor” behind major military purges, according to commentator Xiang Yang.

“It is actually a demotion,” said U.S.-based political analyst Chen Pokong. He posited that Chen’s shift from the graft department may be a counteract from anti-Xi factions against Xi.

Since last year, Xi’s anti-corruption campaign has swept through the entire military system. An array of bigwigs have been detained, expelled from the Party, or faced military prosecution, including former Defense Ministers Li Shangfu and Wei Fenghe, as well as several Rocket Force generals such as former Commander Li Yuchao.

Xi’s loss of confidants also occurred in the business sector.

Cao Xingxin, the deputy general manager of China Unicom, has been placed under investigation, according to an official notice on Sept. 28. China Unicom has been the target of Xi’s purges over the past decade due to its alleged corrupt activities and close ties to Jiang Mianheng, the son of Jiang Zemin.

The 58-year-old Cao had just transferred to the company in early 2023. He previously served as the deputy director of the cadre division of the Organization Department, a supervisor body overseeing Party staffing positions.

According to Chen, all those dynamics won’t be what Xi is willing to see, but he might not have been able to prevent them from unfolding for some reason. Since the Third Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee in July, rumors surfaced that Xi had suffered a stroke or was seriously ill. Opponents may view this as an opportunity to subdue Xi’s power by removing his cronies, Chen said.

The power struggle within the Party has resulted in political instability, said Wang. China may enter a stage where sudden changes could happen at any time because “the ruling party is trapped in double-fold fatal crises—Xi’s leadership and the CCP’s survival,” he said.

“Both cannot be easily mitigated.”

Xin Ning contributed to this report.