CCP Dissolves Strategic Support Force, Establishes New Military Branch: Expert Analysis

CCP Dissolves Strategic Support Force, Establishes New Military Branch: Expert Analysis
Military delegates arrive for the closing ceremony of the Chinese National People's Congress (NPC) at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on March 13, 2024. Goh Chai Hin/AFP/Getty Images
Jessica Mao
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On April 19, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) dissolved the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) Strategic Support Force, which had been operating for over eight years, and the regime created a new Information Support Force. This follows a series of restructuring within the PLA.

The new arm of the PLA is directly headed by the CCP’s Central Military Commission, with a special focus on command and control, information security, and intelligence dissemination. Chinese leader Xi Jinping claimed at the ceremony for the new military branch that the new Information Support Force would play a crucial role in advancing the so-called “high-quality development” of the CCP’s military and in winning modern warfare.

China’s Ministry of National Defense spokesperson Wu Qian stated that after this reform, the overall structure of the PLA has formed a new type of military branch layout under the leadership and command of the Central Military Commission, including the People’s Liberation Army’s Ground Force, Navy, Air Force, Rocket Force, as well as the new Aerospace Force, Cyberspace Force, Information Support Force, and Joint Logistic Support Force.

The Strategic Support Force, established in December 2015 during the CCP military reform, was China’s fifth-largest military branch. Its main responsibilities included intelligence gathering, technical reconnaissance, electronic warfare, cyber defense and offense, psychological warfare, and other areas.

Corruption and Purge

The original intention of establishing the Strategic Support Force was to integrate the so-called “new combat capabilities” into modern warfare. However, the outcome has not been significant over the past eight years.

Su Tzu-yun, director of Taiwan’s Institute of National Defense and Security Research, believes that the establishment of the Information Support Force by the CCP and the dissolution of the Strategic Support Force can be viewed as an adjustment made by Mr. Xi after promoting military reforms in 2017.

On April 21, Mr. Su Ziyun said in an interview with The Epoch Times that the CCP might have made wrong arrangements during the first military reform by creating the Strategic Support Force since it became a hotspot for corruption. Therefore, he believes that this restructuring is primarily aimed at improving professionalism and reducing corruption within the forces.

“The biggest problem with the CCP’s military is not the branch or type of forces but rather that it has evolved into a ‘Party-army’ model,” he said, “This culture of loyalty to the [Communist] Party and an individual is the biggest problem the CCP’s military faces.”

Yuan Hongbing, the former head of the law school at Peking University and renowned Chinese dissident based in Australia, believes that the essence of this move by the CCP authorities is not military reform but a major political and new maneuver within the military for political purification.

On April 22, Mr. Yuan said in an interview with The Epoch Times that shortly after the CCP’s 20th National Congress in October 2022, the Rocket Force scandal broke out, which extended to the Strategic Support Force of the CCP. In this process, the leadership of the Rocket Force and the Strategic Support Force were both purged by the regime.

It is worth noting that the former commander of the Strategic Support Force, Gen. Ju Qiansheng, had appeared last year. Although he did reappear recently, the Chinese state media has not disclosed his position.
According to Mr. Yuan, during this military purge, Gen. Ju likely confessed and exposed the deeply entrenched corruption within the entire Strategic Support Force to Mr. Xi.

Challenges to Xi Within the Military 

Since July 2023, Mr. Xi has started to purge the leadership of the PLA, especially focusing on the Rocket Force. He has promoted new officers and generals who were deemed as “loyal” to him personally, according to Mr. Yuan, and the purge is likely still ongoing.

“This precisely shows that Xi Jinping’s position is extremely unstable,” Mr. Yuan said. “The Rocket Force and the Strategic Support Force scandals have involved more than 170 officers of the rank of major general or above. Allegedly, these military leaders face two charges. One is political disloyalty, which actually refers to disloyalty to Xi Jinping, and the other is corruption.”

He explained that the so-called “disloyalty” to Mr. Xi mainly manifests in two aspects. On the one hand, senior officers of the Rocket Force and the Strategic Support Force sympathized with former Gen. Liu Yazhou of the PLA Air Force, who was purged. They agreed with Mr. Liu’s views on a potential war against Taiwan, believing that Mr Xi’s dream of a Taiwan invasion would lead to a military showdown between China and the United States in the Taiwan Strait, which would lead to a major defeat for the PLA. On the other hand, Mr. Xi found out that former CCP leader Jiang Zemin’s faction still maintained significant influence in China’s defense industries, which is viewed as adversarial to Mr. Xi.

“Senior executives of China’s defense industry, as well as the high-level leaders of the Rocket Force and the Strategic Support Force, had close ties with Jiang Zemin’s family. They not only had corrupt financial interests but also had political disagreements. They ridiculed Xi Jinping’s incompetence in governing the country. Therefore, from the purge of the Rocket Force and the Strategic Support Force, we can see that Xi Jinping’s position in the military is not only unstable but he must constantly maintain control over the military through such purges,” Mr. Yuan said.

Xin Ning contributed to this report. 
Jessica Mao is a writer for The Epoch Times with a focus on China-related topics. She began writing for the Chinese-language edition in 2009.