Japanese Prime Minister Kishida’s Resolute Stance Against the CCP in the Wake of the APEC Summit

Japanese Prime Minister Kishida’s Resolute Stance Against the CCP in the Wake of the APEC Summit
U.S. President Joe Biden, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol (L), and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida (R) stand for a photo ahead of a trilateral meeting at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders' Week in San Francisco, Calif., on Nov. 16, 2023. Brendan Smialowski / AFP via Getty Images
Sean Tseng
Updated:
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In the wake of the APEC Summit in the United States, it’s evident that Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida maintained a firm stance against the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), diverging from their expectations of improved bilateral relations. This shift aligns Japan more closely with allies such as the United States, emphasizing national security and global peace through a united military front. Consequently, the once amicable China-Japan relationship now teeters on the brink of permanent alteration.

Before the summit, Takeo Akiba, Japan’s National Security Bureau Chief, engaged in crucial talks with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Beijing on Nov. 9. Their conversation focused on a possible meeting between the Japanese and Chinese leaders during the APEC event. Japan firmly addressed concerns including China’s halt on Japanese seafood imports and the ongoing Senkaku Islands dispute. In response, Mr. Wang expressed a desire for Japan to take tangible steps towards better relations. The two sides consented to continue their dialogue about the prospective leaders’ meeting.

The public debate in Japan has been intensely concentrated on two pivotal issues in Japan-China relations: Japan’s discharge of treated nuclear water into the ocean and the Senkaku Islands dispute (referred to as the Diaoyu Islands in China). The CCP has criticized Japan’s decision to release treated nuclear water, labeling it as “nuclear-polluted water,” and consequently banned Japanese seafood imports. Japan, advocating for a resolution grounded in scientific evidence, hoped to address these concerns during a potential discussion between Mr. Kishida and the Chinese leadership at the summit.

A primary objective for Mr. Kishida, if such a meeting occurred, was to advocate for the revocation of the seafood import ban and to express apprehensions regarding the activities of Chinese Coast Guard vessels near the Senkaku Islands, underscoring the importance of maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.

Following the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s briefing on Nov. 9, and in light of the events at the APEC summit, the specific outcomes of these discussions and any high-level meetings between Japan and China remain a point of keen international interest.

Japan’s Strategic Maneuvers

In the lead-up to the APEC Summit, Mr. Kishida has markedly intensified Japan’s stance against the CCP despite the impending Japan-China leaders’ meeting. Contrary to the CCP’s expectations of a more conducive atmosphere, Mr. Kishida has escalated initiatives across various sectors.

On Nov. 10, Mr. Kishida held a pivotal meeting with Charles Brown, the U.S. military’s highest-ranking officer and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They discussed the military cooperation observed between China and Russia near Japan, agreeing to augment the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. alliance.

Mr. Kishida also outlined actions undertaken by his cabinet to bolster Japan’s defense, including a significant boost in defense spending. These measures, he emphasized, aim to secure peace and stability in the region, aligning with U.S. objectives for a free and open Indo-Pacific. Mr. Brown reciprocated with assurances of enhanced U.S. cooperation.

Minoru Kihara, Japan’s Minister of Defense, highlighted in a press conference the collaborative efforts of Japan, the United States, and South Korea in sharing intelligence on North Korean missile launches. This trilateral cooperation, which underwent a successful trial in August, includes a missile defense system in South Korea and a real-time intelligence-sharing mechanism. While these measures ostensibly target North Korea, their strategic focus is on monitoring Chinese missile activities and exerting a robust deterrence.

On Nov. 11, Mr. Kishida attended an Air Self-Defense Force aviation review, where he urged vigilance against joint Chinese-Russian bomber flights. He announced plans for Japan to equip long-range missiles and develop next-generation advanced fighter jets in collaboration with the United States, the UK, and Italy. This development is part of a broader strategy to enhance capabilities in intelligence, surveillance, communications, and space warfare.

Taro Aso, vice president of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and known for his hardline stance against the CCP, visited Australia. His agenda includes addressing a security conference, focusing on the CCP’s maritime expansion and the importance of bolstering Indo-Pacific security through enhanced military cooperation between Japan and Australia.

In a display of allied unity, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force commenced joint exercises with the United States, Australian, and Canadian navies in the Pacific. These exercises, occurring amidst the backdrop of the CCP’s maritime activities, underscore a deepening cooperative stance among the participating nations.

Moreover, during the APEC summit, Mr. Kishida and South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol delivered speeches at Stanford University, emphasizing economic security cooperation and regional collaboration with the United States. Mr. Kishida highlighted the development of resilient supply chains, especially for critical materials like semiconductors, and the advancement of technologies in quantum computing and AI. Mr. Yoon focused on North Korea’s cyber activities and the joint cyber defense strategies of South Korea, the United States, and Japan. These addresses underscored the deepening cooperation among these nations in addressing regional challenges and fostering technological and economic progress.

Japan-China Relations Unlikely to Return to Former State

Recent surveys by the Japanese non-profit Genron NPO highlight a significant shift in the Japan-China relationship. Conducted in August and September, the surveys reveal that 68.4 percent of Japanese respondents view the bilateral relationship negatively, a 12.2 percent increase from the previous year. In China, negative perceptions have also risen to 41.2 percent, up by 3.5 percent.

The surveys further indicate a growing rift in public sentiment: 62.9 percent of Chinese respondents harbor negative impressions of Japan, consistent with last year’s figures, whereas a stark 92.2 percent of Japanese respondents have an unfavorable view of China, marking a 4.9 percent increase from last year.

The root of this deterioration can largely be attributed to the CCP’s military expansion, especially in the Pacific. Its potential military actions against Taiwan, along with confrontational stances in the East China Sea and South China Sea, have escalated global concerns. Countries impacted by these developments, particularly Japan, are recalibrating their policies to counter the CCP’s assertiveness and unpredictability. Japan’s strategic focus is increasingly oriented toward countering CCP movements in the East China Sea and preparing for a potential Taiwan invasion scenario.

In 2022, the Institute for Peace Policies, a prominent Japanese think tank, released an updated report titled “Japan’s Comprehensive Strategy against China - 15 Strategies and 3 Reforms to Be Adopted.” This document comprehensively assesses Japan’s strategic environment and the CCP’s characteristics, highlighting the latter’s China-centric, hegemonic mindset, an authoritarian surveillance system, and a general disregard for universal values and international norms.

The report sets forth three strategic objectives against the CCP: resisting its tyrannical and intimidating tactics, opposing its totalitarian and oppressive regime, and demanding the CCP’s adherence to universal values like human rights and democracy, within an open international order.

It proposes a multifaceted approach encompassing political, military, economic, and technological strategies to effectively confront the CCP. This approach is rooted in empirical evidence and enjoys substantial public support. Japan’s key security documents, including the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, Defense Program Guidelines, and Defense White Paper, reflect these sentiments, focusing predominantly on countering the CCP’s influence.

In light of the evolving international landscape and potential regional conflicts in areas like the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea, high-level dialogues, including the Biden-CCP leadership talks, aim to restore military communication channels to prevent escalation. While Japan seeks to engage in high-level dialogue with China to mitigate tensions and collaborate on issues like climate change, it remains acutely aware of the CCP’s fundamental nature. Consequently, a return to the former state of Japan-China relations seems increasingly unlikely.