The Home Office has been fiercely criticised by an independent immigration watchdog over the redaction of over 100 pieces of information from a report on the risks of corrupt Border Force staff.
Of the 105 sections removed, one included a recommendation by Mr. Neal, who said the current state of the force was a “breeding ground” for corrupt officers.
He has now called on the Home Office and its ministers to “reflect” on the decision to omit the information in the interests of transparency and “independent scrutiny.”
His comments accompany a scathing report into “a dissatisfied workforce” where insider risk could grow to “become insider acts, enabled by privileged access.”
Eight recommendations were made, involving suggested improvements in processes, data sharing, and training.
Reputational Damage
Of the concerns raised by Mr. Neal, he said that Border Force—responsible for checks on people and goods at the UK’s borders—was at risk of facing a “damaging fallout,” similar to the Metropolitan Police, from corrupt officials.He found: “As a law enforcement agency, Border Force needs to be equipped for success.
“On the evidence of this inspection, it does not appear to be as well-equipped as it could or ought to be, which risks wider reputational consequence.”
From his inspection, carried out between January and March this year, he said that while the “overwhelming majority of the staff” perform their duties with “honesty and integrity,” privileged access to “data, property, and contraband” creates a risk that an “unscrupulous minority will abuse their position to commit criminal acts.”
The inspection also found that although Border Force can “make decisions and execute projects” to combat insider risk with positive results, its overall ability to implement further measures is hindered by its position within the Home Office and Civil Service.
One example related to how Border Force, whose staff are on the frontline battling the small boats crisis, wanted to make changes to drug and alcohol testing of staff.
This was unsuccessful, partly because of concerns on how it may impact the wider Home Office policy on drinking while on duty.
Mr. Neal also found leadership structures for addressing insider threats were “confused, with complex inter-relationships and unclear lines of accountability between numerous organisations and agencies.”
The ICIBI report added: “Border Force also suffers from limitations on its ability to access data that would allow it to identify and reduce risks. As a result, no one has the full picture of the insider threat risk across the organisation.”
‘Legitimate Concern’
Addressing the redactions made by the Home Office, Mr. Neal said: “This report has been extensively redacted prior to publication.“Redactions are quite proper if publication of the material in question is undesirable for reasons of national security or might jeopardise an individual’s safety, and the UK Borders Act 2007 provides that the Home Secretary may omit material from ICIBI reports in those circumstances.
“However, the redactions in this report raise questions regarding oversight of the decision to omit material from published ICIBI reports.”
The chief inspector said that while he understood the inclination on the part of ministers and officials to resist the release of information that they see as potentially useful to criminality, “this needs to be balanced against oversight and independent scrutiny.”
He added: “In this report, I consider that some of the redactions fail to meet the high ‘reasons of national security’ threshold set out in the Borders Act.
“I am not clear how that assertion is now tested, but it is certainly an issue on which the Home Office should reflect. I have raised this issue regularly with officials since my appointment.”
Mr. Neal, who sent the report to Home Secretary Suella Braverman in May, added that he was also faced with a “lack of regular access” to immigration minister Robert Jenrick.
He said the delay in publishing his finding, along with the extensive redactions, means that “the impact of my independent assessment of risk to the border is nowhere near as powerful as it should be.”
He said that this should be a matter of “legitimate concern,” citing the recommendations put forward on greater powers to self-publish reports from the Windrush Lessons Learned Review.
‘Breeding Ground’
The independent report also found the need for a “strong culture and clear identity” within Border Force. Mr. Neal said this was inconsistent.“I frequently meet Border Force staff who still identify themselves as either Customs Officers or Immigration Officers. In his comprehensive report from summer 2022, Alexander Downer reported similar issues.
“Additionally, the most recent Border Force People Survey signposts a dissatisfied workforce which is a breeding ground for insider risk to grow and become insider acts, enabled by privileged access.
“The provision of important data, such as on Human Resources related misconduct matters, and other potential indicators of insider threat, would allow Border Force to understand the behaviour of it staff and, therefore, identify and reduce risks through early interventions or supportive measures.”
He said that at present, “no one is able to see the full picture of insider threat across Border Force.”
Responding to the report, the Home Office said: “We do recognise there is more to do, and access to data has been a key issue in relation to developing and informing the overall approach. Our plan of work over the next six to twelve months will be informed and updated as we get access to that data and are able to review the overall risk as recommended within the inspection report.”
