For 2023 this is the most crucial military question for the United States and the free world: when will the United States begin its nuclear breakout?
That Biden could even acknowledge this possibility means he must commit now to a larger strategic and theater nuclear arsenal sufficient to prevent Armageddon.
The administration’s refusal to do so in response to the “nuclear breakout” from China, Russia, and North Korea is rapidly undermining the credibility of the United States’ extended nuclear deterrent, increasing the risk of war and, yes, even making Armageddon possible.
In January 2021, the Biden administration extended to 2026 U.S. compliance with the 2010 New START nuclear limitation agreement with Russia, limiting U.S. deployed nuclear warheads to 1,550.
Then in its October 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), the Biden administration did not commit to increasing U.S. nuclear weapons. It even canceled the Trump administration’s decision to revive production of the tactical nuclear warhead armed sea-launched Tomahawk cruise missile (TLAM-N) that would have provided a much-needed survivable tactical nuclear weapon option.
This NPR was issued despite early-to-mid-2021 commercial satellite image revelations of communist China’s ongoing nuclear breakout, showing construction in China’s western deserts of up to 360 new silos for intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).
In early 2023, China may be close to completing the construction of these 360 ICBM silos. This, along with submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and existing weapons, could elevate China’s nuclear warhead levels from 400 to 1,500 by the early 2030s, according to the Pentagon.
However, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) could also be on its way to amassing 3,000 to 4,000 warheads if China puts 10 warheads on each of its new 360 silo-based ICBMs.
The difference depends on whether one assesses that a new silo-launched version of the PLA Rocket Force’s DF-41 ICBM that could fill most of these silos only carries three warheads, as the Pentagon stated in its latest November 2022 China Military Power Report, or whether it can carry 10 warheads, as suggested by Chinese sources.
During a press briefing on Aug. 11, 2022, the former commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, Adm. Charles Richard, even acknowledged that of the 360 new Chinese ICBMs, “each of those could have up to 10 warheads on top of it.”
In late November 2022, U.S. Navy Pacific Fleet Commander Adm. Sam Paparo disclosed that China had upgraded its six Type 094 nuclear ballistic missile submarines with the JL-3 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM).
It may be able to carry three to six warheads, adding 216 to 432 warheads, and the PLA Navy is now preparing to begin production of its more capable Type 096 SSBN.
Furthermore, the PLA Air Force has deployed its refuelable Xian H-6N bomber armed with a 1,864-mile range air-launched ballistic missile, which, with increasing numbers of Xian Y-20 aerial tankers, enables bomber-missile strikes against Hawaii. And the PLA Air Force may soon reveal its stealthy “H-20” flying wing strategic bomber.
And there is still more. In 2021, the PLA Rocket Force tested a Long March-2C space launch vehicle with a fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS) armed with hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) maneuverable warheads capable of a South Pole trajectory, which would evade most U.S. warning radar and missile defenses.
As Russia almost always cheats on nuclear reduction agreements, it likely has more than its 1,550 warheads permitted by New START. It is rapidly modernizing its nuclear arsenal, and in December 2022, the Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that its percentage of modern advanced nuclear weapons had risen from 89.1 percent to 91.3 percent.
Russia could soon be producing its new RS-28 Sarmat mobile heavy ICBM that can carry 10 to 15 warheads or the new Avangard HGV. It has completed 7 of 14 planned Borei class SSBNs, each armed with 16 Bulava SLBMs that can carry up to six warheads. It also has revived the production of the Tupolev Tu-160M supersonic intercontinental bomber.
Russia is also usually credited with deploying about 2,000 “non-strategic” or tactical/regional nuclear weapons, though some analysts estimate this may be closer to 10,000.
The PLA Rocket Force also deploys about 1,100 intermediate-, medium-, and short-range ballistic and cruise missiles, while the PLA Air Force could fire 2,250 cruise missiles with three full volleys from its some 125 H-6K/J/N bombers. Many of these are armed with small nuclear warheads.
For theater-level deterrents, the United States has only about 500 tactical nuclear bombs, which have to be delivered by vulnerable tactical aircraft, and perhaps 25 or more W-76-2 tactical nuclear weapons deployed on Trident SLBMs.
This imbalance of nuclear power is already emboldening Russia and China. Russian officials or propagandists threaten nuclear weapon use on an almost weekly basis. On Jan. 19, 2023, Dmitry Medvedev, the former Russian president and close ally of Vladimir Putin, threatened that nuclear war would follow a Russian defeat in Ukraine.
As Russia threatens nuclear war, whose casualties would far exceed the 100,000-plus it has killed in Ukraine, strategic partners China and Russia have increased their “nuclear defense” cooperation over the last decade, a strong indication they have preprepared for coordinated “nuclear offense” to deter the United States from defending Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion attempt.
China has even created a nuclear diversion by supplying copious technology to help advance North Korea’s nuclear missile arsenal, which could create a number of nuclear crises that tie down U.S. and Japanese military forces ahead of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.
On Jan. 19, the Seoul-based Korean Institute for Defense Analysis estimated North Korea was building up toward an arsenal of 300 nuclear weapons.
With looming strategic nuclear superiority, especially if combined, it is logical that Moscow and Beijing will increase their coercive nuclear threats, especially if it can deter the United States and its allies from intervening to save Ukraine or rushing to the defense of South Korea or Taiwan.
American allies already perceive vulnerability, which threatens the credibility of extended U.S. nuclear deterrent—just ask South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol. At an official policy briefing in Seoul on Jan. 11, he said of South Korean nuclear weapons, “It’s possible that the problem gets worse and our country will introduce tactical nuclear weapons or build them on our own.”
This is the strategic nuclear wake-up call for the Biden administration. We have returned to the 1950s; it is now necessary for the United States to build up to a new level of nuclear weapons that achieves complementary strategic and regional nuclear deterrence.
Right now, the United States does not have sufficient regional nuclear forces to deter a second Russian invasion of Ukraine or a Russian invasion of Poland and the Baltic states. It also lacks the regional nuclear forces to deter a North Korean assault on South Korea or a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.
In addition, China’s and Russia’s looming strategic nuclear superiority, especially if combined, could also deter the United States from using its regional nuclear deterrent, meaning Russia and China can get away with serial wars against American allies.
As such, the most important strategic military decision the United States can make in 2023 is to abandon the New START agreement and commit to an American nuclear breakout from 1,550 to 6,000 deployed strategic warheads. This move would assure Russia and China that their use of nuclear weapons will guarantee destruction.
This, in turn, must be reinforced by a new robust U.S. regional nuclear force that includes nuclear-armed intermediate-, medium-, and short-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and nuclear artillery shells.
This will not be cheap, but far less expensive than reviving the draft and sending countless thousands to die in serial wars that Beijing and Moscow will initiate to impose their hegemony and destroy freedom.
