Mid-February marked the resumption of what used to be the biannual European Union-China human rights dialogue. The Munich security conference also took place on Feb. 17–19, with China playing a key role.
These are but two of several steps being taken by Beijing to convince the EU and wider Europe that it is changing its foreign policy, seeking better and more stable ties with the EU, and all the while pretending to believe that the EU can and should be a major power on its own and should sever its ties with the United States. In fact, the Chinese delegation focused most of its time accusing the United States of jeopardizing European security, and seeking to drive a wedge between Washington and the EU, all under the euphemism of supporting European “strategic autonomy.”
It is not the first time we have seen such an almost schizophrenic shift in Chinese policy toward Europe.
Chinese foreign policy seems dependent on two key factors, which very much drives Chinese policy toward Europe. The first is how secure the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) feels in mainland China, as far as its grip on power appears. Protests, an economic downturn, internal market rumblings, or yet another policy mistake from Xi Jinping tend to lead Beijing to change its tone for the better. The other factor is international, and most often, the relationship with the United States. When things get rocky with the United States, and to a lesser extent, Japan or Australia, the tone in policy toward Europe, just as with the impact from the domestic situation, tends to improve.
This, of course, doesn’t mean that the actual policy changes, but rather how it’s presented. It rarely sees much change, as the CCP’s worldview is seemingly set in stone.
This isn’t the first time we’ve seen this switch between the aggressive and the more nuanced appeasing policy shifts. And it is unlikely to be the last.
Right now, both factors heavily favor appeasement and a friendly tone from the CCP. And even though we should, by this point, have learned enough not to have to ask this question, I am, as a European, afraid that we still have to: Will the EU fall for it again?
Domestically, China’s economy is in trouble, and ending the zero-COVID policy has not yielded the kind of bump Beijing hoped for. The demographic crisis is moving from a theoretical one to directly impacting the country’s current and future economic growth. Draconian COVID measures led to protests against Xi and the CCP, the departure of wealthy Chinese who took their money with them, and the rapid increase in asylum seekers–all are indicators of a grim domestic situation.
Internationally, things are not looking much better. Recently the United States has taken the lead against China’s establishment of informal police “service stations” and FoxHunt operation, which hunts down alleged fugitives on foreign soil. The United States has limited engagement with companies owned or related to China’s military. Furthermore, the United States is getting better at getting allies on board in all these areas and beyond, which is perhaps an even bigger threat to the CCP.
The CCP’s influence largely depends on playing a divided West against each other, and while still possible, it is by any metric becoming harder for the CCP to do so. Making matters worse, the near-total economic warfare against Australia has turned out to be a major failure, highlighting not just Chinese weakness, but that even smaller countries are far less vulnerable to Chinese threats than most of us thought. Lithuania and the Czech Republic are countries that have taken bold steps to displease the CCP—actions that were unthinkable just a few years ago.
With this in mind, it’s easy to see why China is again trying to woo the EU—its most important economic partner by far. Talks of restarting the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) are being touted. After refusing to engage with the EU via the EU-China human rights dialogue, the Chinese are suddenly now open, even keen, to do so. In an interview with Global Times in February, the Chinese ambassador to France discussed the prospects of strengthening EU-China relations amid the Russia-Ukraine war and the Taiwan issue. Behind the scenes, it’s hard not to think that various proposals, trade agreements, and state visits are being thrown around as ideas.
Now, the EU-China human rights dialogue is a process I am keenly aware of. Not only does it improve the treatment of political prisoners, but it can, and has, led to specific human rights defenders getting better treatment. Without a doubt, some would not be alive today if it weren’t for this dialogue. I know this first hand. Granted, the usefulness has diminished compared with a decade ago, as China feels less need to heed anyone’s calls. However, it’s still one of the few institutional dialogues with direct and positive outcomes for rights defenders. However, it is clear the CCP is using this as part of a broader attempt at re-engagement with the EU, which is being done to overcome China’s current domestic and international problems.
As before, once those situations have been dealt with, the CCP’s tone will change again, and it will, as it often does, revert to trying to enforce unequal treaties (the CAI being a key one, but one that no country would ever willingly enter into, due to its incredibly unequal nature), and start throwing threats around whenever the EU, or any EU member state, contemplates taking a policy decision that displeases China. Of course, all this is merely a matter of tone; Beijing will do these things regardless, but perhaps at a slower pace.
Nonetheless, all the appeasement and wooing is merely an exercise in tone, and even the tone will disappear once Xi feels he has enough control again, and it’s the EU, and in extension the free world, that will pay the price for falling for such an easy ruse.
Hopefully, this time, the EU is populated with politicians, officials, and advisers who are less gullible, less ignorant, and less naïve than in the past decade.
