An overestimation of the technical abilities of the Chinese police leads local activists to give up protecting themselves, including their electronic devices—putting themselves at even greater risks.
It’s shocking to many people outside of China that rights defenders will use China’s own—essentially police-run—WeChat for communication and to store their data unencrypted right on the desktop of their computer. It sounds unbelievable to some, but it’s very much a reality. Again, the people who do this have already gone through hell after being targeted by police and having such data used against them. In China, after all, a few tweets or even direct, one-on-one chats can be used as evidence for a conviction.
This fatalism is wrong. Yes, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has a cyber command division of great technological prowess and China’s feared Ministry of State Security (MSS) does, too. However, China’s law enforcement resources are stretched thin and even if it wasn’t, such resources wouldn’t be devoted to some local activist, a house church pastor, or a lawyer. If you were an Edward Snowden-type target, then yes, you should be in fear, and fatalism would be understandable—but rights defenders in China are not such targets.
The Chinese police, and even the MSS, lack the technical abilities to deploy advanced techniques to access data hidden from them—and hiding the data is surprisingly easy. Even higher-level police, and central MSS, have the same problem. And not only do they lack these technical abilities, but they also lack the information about such things or how they can be used. Instead, they rely on a set of fairly basic methods to scour phones, USBs, computers, and whatnot.
When I was in the hands of the MSS authorities—not because I was a target, but because of the information they thought I had on others—they were unusually thorough in their technical investigations of my devices. Yet they failed in almost every respect. A lot of my colleagues—who were targeted by local police, provincial MSS, or central police over the years—arrived at the very same conclusion.
A wide range of interviews conducted over the last two years with victims—who have been detained, interrogated, and had their devices pilfered—show that nothing much has changed. If you are not a high-profile target, the authorities’ abilities and what they can actually do is very limited; and the steps to protect yourself and others are surprisingly easy, and more about behavioral than technical solutions.
Countering this growing fatalism will be key to ensure that civil society activists can continue their work with fewer risks and with better results.