Sometimes it’s good to get out of town and gain a new perspective on things. In my case, I got out of the United States entirely—to Singapore, in fact, where I recently attended a conference addressing the “lessons of the Russia-Ukraine war.”
From the standpoint of Southeast Asia, the war has had several ramifications. In the first place, it demonstrates the reality that conventional conflict is not beyond the realm of impossibility. This is a particularly important point as policy elites in many Southeast Asian nations had come to believe that wars—or at least large-scale conventional wars—were no longer fought between civilized nations. There was always the expectation that diplomacy and rationality in international relations would ultimately prevail.
The Russian-Ukraine war has exploded this complacency, awakening Southeast Asian nations to the need to prepare for possible conflict. This is particularly critical since the chances of a regional war—over competing geographic claims in the South China Sea or involving a spillover from a Chinese invasion of Taiwan—increasingly appear to be more, rather than less, likely.
Correspondingly, the war has direct repercussions on how regional militaries might pursue war planning, military missions, and procurement. In particular, the Russia-Ukraine conflict could spur increased defense spending and accelerate and expand procurement plans—from fighter jets to missile defense.
For example, given the effectiveness (on both the Russian and Ukrainian sides) of armed drones, regional militaries should pay special consideration to expanding their use of such weapons in future wars, as well as developing doctrines, training, and tactical capabilities to counter unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and other unmanned aircraft systems (UAS).
Other game-changing weaponry worth considering include smart weapons (powered by artificial intelligence), cyberwar capabilities, and perhaps even hypersonic weapons. Such acquisitions, of course, are subject to enduring budget constraints, shortfalls in training and staff proficiencies, and the need to rethink doctrine and strategy.
Second, the Russia-Ukraine war demonstrates the importance of possessing more flexible command and control structures, particularly when future forces are likely to be operationally more mobile, agile, and rapidly deployable. This is a particular challenge for Southeast Asian militaries, which tend to be dominated by maneuver-based ground forces and still lack jointness and agility. The over-centralization of command and control on the Russian side proved to be disastrous, while Ukraine’s successful efforts to blunt the Russian offensive and then mount its own counteroffensive were empowered by the ability of Ukrainian commanders on the ground to make quick and independent decisions that would best achieve mission objectives.
At the same time, Southeast Asian nations have learned to be wary of Russian armaments. The Russia-Ukraine war has undercut Russian arms exports to Southeast Asia. Moscow used to be a leading arms seller to the region, and Russia filled critical defense needs for many regional militaries. It sold fighter aircraft, man-portable air defense and anti-tank missiles to Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia; submarines to Vietnam; and helicopters to the Philippines and Thailand.
In the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Moscow has become a pariah among arms exporters. At the same time, the poor performance of Russian weaponry in the war has raised concerns in many Southeast Asian nations over the quality and effectiveness of Russian weapons.
Many Southeast Asian countries have canceled their planned purchases of Russian arms. Indonesia rescinded a planned purchase of Su-35 fighter jets worth $1.14 billion, while the Philippines withdrew from a $250 million contract to acquire MI-171 military helicopters. Hanoi, increasingly concerned about Moscow’s ability to fulfill orders amid international sanctions, has also paused new arms purchases from Russia. At the same time, Southeast Asian militaries are looking to diversify their arms imports, buying weaponry from not only the West but also China, Israel, and South Korea.
Nevertheless, it may be difficult for Southeast Asian nations to stalwartly oppose Russian aggression against Ukraine. Most countries in the region voted in favor of United Nations resolutions condemning Moscow for its invasion, but at the same time few have signed onto any sanctions against Russia. Vietnamese political elites, grateful for the Soviet Union’s assistance to North Vietnam during the war against America, still see Russia as a longstanding and trusted friend of Vietnam. In some Southeast Asian Muslim-majority countries, continued anti-Western sentiments have blunted criticisms of Moscow.
Finally, when it comes to weapons procurement, Southeast Asian nations may find it hard over the long run to resist the appeal of Russian arms deals, which often come without political strings and with innovative payment schemes. Some, such as Vietnam, may find it impossible to replace Russia as an important, even essential, arms supplier. Moreover, the refusal by Western countries to sell certain types of advanced weapons systems (such as the US F-35 fifth-generation fighter jet) may drive Southeast Asian nations back into Moscow’s arms. In addition, Russia has been willing to allow countries to barter for major arms purchases with commodities (such as Malaysia has done, using palm oil to pay for Russian fighters), a mode of payment very few other sellers are prepared to consider.
Overall, a quite different view of the war than from the West. The Russia-Ukraine war is a clear indicator of the need for Southeast Asian militaries to reform their doctrine, strategies, and force structure. In addition, many are reassessing their buys of Russian weaponry. On the other hand, it is equally clear that most countries in the region will be reluctant to stand up fully to Russian aggression. One thing is for certain, travel is broadening.
