It seems that China has been able to accomplish something that 70 years of U.S. diplomacy could never achieve: push Japan and South Korea closer toward something like a strategic partnership. Earlier this month, South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol flew to Tokyo to meet with his Japanese counterpart, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida—the first official visit of a South Korean president to Tokyo in twelve years.
This summit was no small thing, given long-standing chilly relations between Tokyo and Seoul. If Japan and the United States see themselves in “strategic competition” with China, South Korea has historically viewed Japan as its main competitor. Korean animosity toward Tokyo is rooted in Japan’s brutal occupation of the Korean peninsula from 1910 to 1945, when Korean culture and language were suppressed and Japan used Koreans as a source of slave labor (and worse).
South Korea’s postwar economic miracle was partly motivated by its desire to outperform Japan in the latter’s traditional industrial bulwarks; hence, South Korea’s drive to excel in automobiles, shipbuilding, and electronics.
At the same time, Seoul did not generally view China as an aggressor. The Chinese and the Koreans have much in common culturally and historically; China traditionally acted as Korea’s protector against the Japanese. After the two countries normalized relations in the early 1980s, trade and other economic relations bloomed.
Despite having a close military alliance with the United States, Seoul always shied away from widening this into a trilateral security pact with Tokyo.
This could be changing and, if so, it will be Beijing’s own fault. China’s growing aggressiveness in Asia is worrying even the normally blasé South Koreans. Claims of illegal fishing in Korean waters by Chinese vessels, and Beijing’s ham-fisted response to Seoul permitting the United States to deploy THAAD air-defense systems to Korea, have soured relations between the two countries.
This Seoul-Tokyo rapprochement could presage the kind of multinational Asian security alliance that Washington has long coveted. Japan has been rapidly jettisoning much of its postwar pacifism (although not without protest), announcing its intentions to double defense spending over the next five years and buy new offensive weapons.
In addition, Britain and the United States will rotate the deployment of nuclear-powered submarines to HMAS Stirling, located near Perth on Australia’s west coast. International crewing of these boats is also possible.
Southeast Asia, however, is a bit more porous, as many states in the region—while wary of Chinese intentions—are not prepared to confront Beijing head-on. Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, and even U.S. treaty ally Thailand would prefer to deal with China through regional multilateral forums, and particularly those centered around the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
Even Singapore, which has a Strategic Framework Agreement with the United States, and which permits American warships and warplanes to use Singaporean military bases, has stressed that it is not an ally of the United States.
Beijing, like Moscow, is learning the hard way the law of unintended consequences. Its belligerence is pushing traditionally tolerant countries like South Korea and the Philippines toward a more counter-China stance. While not crafting a multilateral military alliance, the United States is certainly reaping the benefits.