US Needs G-7 Support to Defeat Communist China’s Aggression

US Needs G-7 Support to Defeat Communist China’s Aggression
Japanese Finance Minister Shunichi Suzuki (2nd R) delivers an opening speech at the start of the G-7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Meeting at the International Conference Room of Toki Messe in Niigata, Japan, on May 11, 2023. Kimimasa Mayama/Pool/AFP via Getty Images
Anders Corr
Updated:
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Commentary

Europe’s position on China has long been soft, which is a problem for U.S. foreign policy since channeling Beijing away from territorial aggression and human rights abuse requires coordinated action against China’s economy by as many as possible of the world’s largest economies. Recent moves by Germany, France, and Italy show progress in this regard.

If the United States sanctions and tariffs China without getting similar measures from other G-7 countries, for example, China could just shift its trade away from the United States toward Europe and Japan. That would isolate America economically and politically by giving Beijing increased economic influence among our allies.

The G-7—composed of the United States, Japan, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Canada—includes the world’s biggest democratic economies and will attempt to avoid that pitfall by more closely coordinating China policies at its current meeting of the finance ministers starting on May 19 in Japan.

Most G-7 countries currently send mixed signals to China by dangling the carrot of cooperation. This attempt at appeasing the Asian superpower satisfies domestic business interests, seeks Beijing’s assistance in curbing Moscow’s war against Ukraine, and attempts to create political capital to pressure the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) against an invasion of Taiwan.

French President Emmanuel Macron’s visit to Beijing last month and the statement that France wouldn’t be a “vassal” on China issues or overly dependent on the dollar was the most obvious example.
Chinese leader Xi Jinping and French President Emmanuel Macron visit the garden of the residence of the governor of Guangdong, in China, on April 7, 2023. (Jacques Witt/Pool/AFP via Getty Images)
Chinese leader Xi Jinping and French President Emmanuel Macron visit the garden of the residence of the governor of Guangdong, in China, on April 7, 2023. Jacques Witt/Pool/AFP via Getty Images
He’s attempting to make Europe strategically autonomous from the United States and into a “third pole” of the international system. But Brussels is arguably already a third pole, and Macron quickly retreated from his pro-China talking points after China’s ambassador to France embarrassed him by denying the sovereignty of Ukraine and other post-Soviet republics.
The foreign ministers of France and Germany jointly pressed Beijing on May 10 to use China’s prodigious influence with Moscow to encourage Russia’s withdrawal from Ukraine. They supported “de-risking” and “limiting excessive dependencies” on China but hastened to say this isn’t “decoupling.”
In early May, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni assured U.S. House Speaker Kevin McCarthy that she favors exiting China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). During her election campaign last year, she said Italy’s entry into the BRI was “a big mistake.”

Italy is the only G-7 member that’s also a member of the BRI. The prime minister said that withdrawing from the BRI is now on the table. She must make a decision before 2024, when the membership automatically renews without three months’ notice of withdrawal.

The relationship between Europe and China began to rupture in 2021 when Brussels decided against an investment pact with the country after tit-for-tat sanctions over the Uyghur genocide. The pact allegedly favored German manufacturers, including Volkswagen.
Last year, Beijing’s heavy-handed attempts at economic coercion against Lithuania for its support of Taiwan resulted in the European Union’s authorization of retaliation against any country, including the United States or Turkey, that attempts to use economic coercion against an EU member state.

Now, European countries are primarily upset with Beijing over its support of Moscow’s war against Ukraine. Leading EU members are tentatively starting measures to effectively decouple from China under the more palatable name of “smart de-risking” of trade. As decoupling happens gradually in any case, “de-risking” is a little different than decoupling in its practical next steps.

Those include restrictions on the export of Europe’s most powerful Dutch computer chips, which have dual military uses, including for artificial intelligence and supercomputing.

The dangers of economic dependency on aggressive autocrats were illustrated when Moscow canceled energy exports to Europe in an attempt at pressuring Brussels into not opposing the war in Ukraine. Moscow’s gambit failed but alerted Europe to the danger of trade dependency, including on China.

Countries and companies that have allowed themselves to support the CCP and its genocidal and territorially aggressive policies through trade in the past should be expected to pay the greatest costs from decoupling now. Trading with the adversaries of democracy should entail costs now to deter unethical trading in the future.

Italy and other NATO allies, friends, and partners should be expected to withdraw from all China-led organizations immediately, including not only the BRI but the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. India, South Korea, Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and New Zealand should take note.

Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.
Anders Corr
Anders Corr
Author
Anders Corr has a bachelor's/master's in political science from Yale University (2001) and a doctorate in government from Harvard University (2008). He is a principal at Corr Analytics Inc., publisher of the Journal of Political Risk, and has conducted extensive research in North America, Europe, and Asia. His latest books are “The Concentration of Power: Institutionalization, Hierarchy, and Hegemony” (2021) and “Great Powers, Grand Strategies: the New Game in the South China Sea" (2018).
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