US–China Relations: What to Expect From a New Administration in Washington

Cranes and shipping containers at the port in Lianyungang, Jiangsu Province, China, on July 16, 2023. STR/AFP via Getty Images

Commentary

Although vast differences separate Vice President Kamala Harris and former President Donald Trump, the similarities between them when it comes to China trade and investing are striking. Both show every indication of sustaining the existing adversarial tone. There are, however, differences in the tactics each would pursue from the White House.

Trump, of course, is renowned for hammering China during his time in office with tariffs and demands for policy changes from Beijing. He has made it clear that he intends to continue along these lines should he win another term in office.

Harris has shown every indication of continuing President Joe Biden’s policies. She could, of course, choose a different approach in office, but given her limited experience with both foreign affairs and economics, it is probably safe to assume that the postures she shared with Biden will continue. And Biden, although he criticized Trump heavily during the 2020 campaign, has since exaggerated the hostile position that Trump had taken.

A little recent history can offer needed perspective. When Trump entered office in 2017, he showed considerable hostility toward globalization in general and China in particular. He claimed that globalization had stolen jobs from Americans and that Chinese policies had done the worst damage. He threatened retaliation if China continued subsidizing domestic industries, as it had been doing, violating patent protections, and demanding that American firms doing business in China take a Chinese partner to whom it must transfer proprietary technologies and trade secrets. He described these practices as a form of theft.

Trump imposed tariffs on Chinese goods entering the United States to pressure Beijing to make the changes he desired. In September 2018, he placed 10 percent tariffs on some $200 billion of Chinese imports. As Beijing remained adamant, Trump increased those tariffs to 25 percent in May 2019. In August 2019, he placed a 10 percent tariff on an additional $300 billion of Chinese goods coming into the country, and in September 2019, he extended that tariff to an additional $112 billion of goods imported from China.

Trump also tightened controls over technology sales to China and resisted Chinese firms opening in the United States, most noticeably Huawei. In January 2020, he reached an agreement with Beijing to remove the tariffs after Beijing made the desired policy changes. Nothing came of that agreement.

The Biden campaign of 2020 criticized Trump for his high-handed behavior, but once in office, Biden kept all his tariffs in place. His trade representative, Katherine Tai, described the tariffs as a tool to get Beijing to change its discriminatory policies, which is the same practice that Trump complained about.

The Biden administration then took additional steps to pressure Beijing. It forbade the sale of advanced computer chips to China, as well as the sale of chip-making equipment, and he enlisted Japan and the Netherlands to join with these restrictions. Biden also forbade American investment in Chinese technology. He countered Beijing’s subsidies by subsidizing domestic U.S. manufacturing of semiconductors. In the past 12 months, the administration has placed additional tariffs on Chinese-made electric vehicles (EVs), batteries, EV parts, and green technology products such as windmills and solar cells.

In contemplating another term in the White House, Trump shows every sign of increasing this pressure on Beijing. He has already proposed an across-the-board 60 percent tariff on all goods manufactured in China and the revocation of China’s permanent normal trade status with the United States, something it has enjoyed since 2000.

Trump has also proposed a complete technology decoupling with China, although he remains open to separate agreements on consumer goods, energy, and even some less sensitive areas of technology. Consistent with his previous term in office, Trump shows a distinct preference for bilateral deals rather than alliances and multilateralism.

Harris is less clear than Trump but shows no sign of deviating from the same trade hostility that the Biden administration has advanced. Her tactics, however, would differ considerably from Trump’s. She has refused to use the word “decoupling,” preferring “de-risking.” This is the same formulation that the Europeans have used, although it is unclear exactly where the practical differences between the two approaches lie. Still, the vaguer language does leave Harris an extra measure of flexibility, which, no doubt, is why the Europeans prefer it.

Harris has also shown an embrace of the multilateralism that Trump has rejected. She had supported Biden in pushing the G7 toward a joint global infrastructure project to counter Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative. Similarly, she seems on board with the so-called Chip-4 alliance that would create a semiconductor partnership among Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the United States. She might move away from all this should she become president but has given no such indication.

The tactics, rhetoric, and style may differ, but otherwise, the candidates seem to share a basic suspicion of Beijing and opposition to China’s trade practices and ambitions. Especially since this Congress has exhibited a bipartisan hostility toward China trade and investment and the next one likely will as well, it seems as though in this area, it hardly matters who wins in November.

Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.