US and China Passing Laws to Stifle Trade and Investment

US and China Passing Laws to Stifle Trade and Investment
President Joe Biden speaks before signing the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022 during a ceremony on the South Lawn of the White House in Washington on Aug. 9, 2022. Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images
Milton Ezrati
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Commentary

Beijing and Washington seem to be traveling on parallel tracks. Both talk about improving relations while each, in its own way, imposes rules that stifle trade with and investment in the other.

Beijing’s new Anti-Espionage and Foreign Relations Laws will make it more dangerous for foreign firms to invest in China or do business there. Washington’s Chips for America Act restricts exports—mostly technology—to China, while the government plans to announce investment restraints later this summer. All these measures will stifle economic exchanges between these two nations much more than either government claims or expects. China will suffer more than the United States.

Officials on both sides, as well as many lawyers involved, claim that these laws will have only a limited effect on business. Typical is the judgment of Jeremy Daum, a senior fellow at Yale Law School’s Paul Tsai China Center. He declared that Beijing’s “legislative changes don’t increase the risk to foreign businesses in China.” On the American side, Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen asserts that Washington’s new rules—both existing and those soon to be announced—will not “broadly disrupt” trade between the two countries.

Both are mistaken. Businesspeople know that no matter how tightly written a law is, it carries ambiguities that allow authorities room for interpretation. That room makes it risky for any business to even approach activities forbidden by the legislation. Michael House of Perkins Coie summarized such fears in this way: “The current environment lends itself to more occasions when a regulator or someone in government ... may choose to take action that is not transparent.”

American business will assess the implicit risks and deny itself activities that are, in a strict sense, not even mentioned in either Beijing’s or Washington’s new rules. No one wants to invest large sums in a venture that an official reinterpretation might close or bear the expense of a major legal action to keep it open.

On both sides, these laws are especially dangerous to business because of their respective claims to serve “national security.” Especially in China but also in the United States, national security lends itself to expansive interpretations. China’s new laws certainly seem broad. The Ant-Espionage Law applies to anyone “seeking to align with an espionage organization” or obtaining “documents, data, materials, or items related to national security or interests.” Moreover, according to Perkins Coie’s translation, the law calls on “all levels” of government to educate and manage related security precautions.

The Foreign Relations Law could penalize a foreign firm and arrest its staff if it, in the judgment of a government official, “endangered China’s national security, harm the societal public interest, or undermine societal public order.” This kind of broad language is an invitation to official caprice.
The closed office of the Mintz Group is seen in an office building in Beijing on March 24, 2023. Five Chinese employees at the Beijing office of U.S. due diligence firm Mintz Group have been detained by authorities, the company said on March 24. (Greg Baker/AFP via Getty Images)
The closed office of the Mintz Group is seen in an office building in Beijing on March 24, 2023. Five Chinese employees at the Beijing office of U.S. due diligence firm Mintz Group have been detained by authorities, the company said on March 24. Greg Baker/AFP via Getty Images

As if to emphasize the dangers to foreign firms, Chinese authorities have already raided American and other foreign firms under these new laws. Chinese security arrived unannounced at the American due diligence firm Mintz Group and detained several staff members. Similarly, they questioned staff at the U.S. consultancy firm Bain & Co. at its Shanghai offices. Officials have investigated the international consultant Capvision. The authorities did not offer an explanation except to claim “national interest.” To date, no one in Beijing has revealed what these firms did to bring on these actions. From a foreign businessperson’s point of view, this news is a reason to steer clear of anything even vaguely like these otherwise reputable companies or simply avoid China altogether.

From the American side, things are less ominous, but the rules are restrictive, nonetheless. The Chips for America Act, passed last year, forbids the sale of advanced semiconductors to China as well as equipment to manufacture computer chips. Pending investment restrictions, according to Ms. Yellen, will focus on semiconductors, quantum computing, and artificial intelligence, with an eye on “national security.”

There is no suggestion of equivalence here. In the United States, unlike China, those subjected to such laws have recourse in the courts that might rule in their favor. From a business standpoint, however, this is small comfort. A legal fight would impose considerable expense and take considerable time, during which business would face disruption and the loss of return on what might well be a large investment. Managements might conclude that better judgment would just keep them away from anything close to the forbidden activity.

In this exchange of restrictions, China has more to lose than the United States. American business will also miss out on profitable opportunities in another large economy, perhaps as savings and efficiencies that a China operation might offer. In contrast, China wants and needs the expertise and technologies brought by foreign investments and foreign connections. Beijing has made that clear.

The restrictions—imposed by both Beijing and Washington—will make such transfers less abundant and likely also accelerate the flight of foreign business from China, something that readers of this column should by now be familiar with. These actions and decisions to avoid contact in the first place cannot help but starve China of these needs.
Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.
Milton Ezrati
Milton Ezrati
Author
Milton Ezrati is a contributing editor at The National Interest, an affiliate of the Center for the Study of Human Capital at the University at Buffalo (SUNY), and chief economist for Vested, a New York-based communications firm. Before joining Vested, he served as chief market strategist and economist for Lord, Abbett & Co. He also writes frequently for City Journal and blogs regularly for Forbes. His latest book is "Thirty Tomorrows: The Next Three Decades of Globalization, Demographics, and How We Will Live."
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