Unfit for Duty, Part II: What the Canadian Armed Forces Needs to Rebuild

Unfit for Duty, Part II: What the Canadian Armed Forces Needs to Rebuild
Members of the Canadian Armed Forces wait to convoy to CFB Borden in Toronto on April 6, 2020. Cole Burston/Getty Images
David Redman
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Part I Can be read here
Commentary
For a time in the 2010s, it looked like Justin Trudeau’s Liberal government was committed to investing in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). In 2017, as part of a major foreign policy statement, then-Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan announced a new defence policy: “Strong, Secure, Engaged.” Canada was to be strong at home, secure in North America, and engaged in the world.
The government promised to increase spending on defence from a paltry 1 percent of GDP to 1.4 per cent by 2024, to buy advanced fighter jets and build surface frigates, and to grow the regular forces to 71,500 troops. While most of this sounded good, none of this lofty rhetoric was achieved. Current Defence Minister Bill Blair has admitted the CAF is short some 16,500 troops, and the Parliamentary Budget Office puts spending at just 1.29 percent of GDP, far below our NATO commitment of 2 percent. Some defence analysts consider it unlikely the Trudeau government ever intended to take serious action.

The CAF, as it stands today, is a depleted, demoralized, and nearly shattered force. The neglect and deterioration, which I explored in Part I of this series, is unforgivable. But it’s not irreversible. How should Canada begin to rebuild the CAF?

A military is defined, in simplest terms, by five factors:

1. Purpose

The first step must be to define the CAF’s purpose. In my opinion, the purpose of the military must be apolitical, long-term, and incorporate broad-based capabilities that serve Canada’s national interests. The CAF’s purpose must not be shaped by political whims, media frenzies, or short-term missions. In basic terms, the CAF must be capable of helping to maintain Canada’s unity, national borders, democratic system, citizens’ rights and freedoms, economic prosperity, and citizens’ well-being. It needs to be a combat-capable force able to face all threats foreign and domestic.
Geopolitical realities need to be integrated as well. That includes the role of demonstrating, where appropriate, our capabilities and intentions to aid and, in extreme cases, protect other countries, including the United States, in order to safeguard our own national interests.

2. Combat-Capable Personnel

Canada’s armed forces have often been used as an “emergency management force” for wildfires and floods, as a “training force for other nations” and, most recently, as a social experiment laboratory of the latest transgender, DEI, and cultural concepts, a.k.a. “wokism.” All this comes at the expense of maintaining the CAF as combat-capable force.
Standing armed forces have one primary mission: to fight. Those who join the CAF understand that and know it may cost them their lives. In return, they expect to be fully trained and equipped. Canada’s troops must be trained to develop the full range of combat skills as well as the leadership skills needed to lead others under the most dangerous conditions. These must be constantly practised and improved to ensure they are up to date and executable on a moment’s notice.

3. Military Equipment

A combat-capable military requires warfighting weapons and weapons systems, from the high profile—ships and fighter jets—to the mundane—rifles, pistols, and even bayonets—to the sophisticated and leading-edge—drones, anti-tank missiles, and anti-ship and anti-aircraft systems. They must be procured in sufficient quantity and available constantly for training, demonstration (deterrence), and, ultimately, deployment and use.
And the military needs robust parts and repair capability. This cannot be a “just in time” maintenance and supply system of the sort favoured in the commercial world. It must be a system with a focus on resilience, speed of repair, and significant redundancy in and of itself.

4. Combat Capability Deployment and Support Systems

Napoleon Bonaparte stated, “The amateurs discuss tactics: the professionals discuss logistics.” The combat-capable CAF must be deployable wherever and whenever they are required. The deployment system must be thoroughly planned and routinely used or, during quieter periods, routinely exercised. Entities that pose a threat must see both a permanent geographically based presence (in every province and territory) as well as a surge capability that reaches internationally.
Canada has a long history of supporting large expeditionary forces across oceans during wartime; restoring such a capability is not an unreasonable expectation, nor beyond the resources of a country of 40+ million with a $3 trillion annual GDP.

5. Replacement Systems—Personnel, Equipment and Supplies

The military must have a reliable system to replace personnel, equipment, and supplies. For personnel, that means a recruitment system driven by a need to find those best prepared to meet the combat-related needs of the CAF, who can be trained in the shortest realistic time frame, and who will be most likely to make a career in the CAF. The replacement system for equipment must be proactive in replacing worn-out systems and equipment, with direct links to procurement systems that are timely and pre-established. It should be based on the CAF’s requirements rather than politics (this is, admittedly, much easier said than done).
Part III of this series will set out the pathway to rebuild our armed forces. Canadians have rallied behind their military in the past when its purpose was clear and its values aligned with national pride. The Highway of Heroes is a powerful reminder of the respect and gratitude Canadians hold for their armed forces when they embody the best of the nation.

With bold action, sustained investment, and a collective resolve, Canada can reclaim its place as a reliable ally and a defender of democratic values. The cost of rebuilding the CAF is far outweighed by the cost of continued neglect.

David Redman was an officer in the Canadian Army for 27 years, during which he was deployed on operations in Germany, Egypt, the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, the United States and across Canada, before retiring in 2001 to become the head of Crisis Management-Counterterrorism in Alberta and later the head of Emergency Management Alberta.
The original, full-length version of this article was recently published in C2C Journal.
Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.
David Redman
David Redman
Author
David Redman is a retired lieutenant colonel in the Canadian Army and senior fellow at the Frontier Centre for Public Policy.