Unfit for Duty, Part I: The Decline of the Canadian Armed Forces

Unfit for Duty, Part I: The Decline of the Canadian Armed Forces
Soldiers of the 41 Canadian Brigade Group live fire a 105-mm howitzer during train at CFB Suffield, Alta., on Oct. 19, 2024.The Canadian Press/Jeff McIntosh
David Redman
Updated:
0:00
Commentary

National security is the bedrock upon which a country’s sovereignty and stability rest, yet Canada finds itself alarmingly ill-prepared to address escalating global threats or safeguard its borders.

Decades of neglect and underfunding have left the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) in disarray, compromising our national security and diminishing Canada’s global standing. I spent much of my career serving in the CAF, and its current state is simply unacceptable. Canada must urgently reassess its priorities to rebuild a robust military capable of meeting modern challenges.

National security encompasses much more than a country simply possessing armed forces. National security refers to a nation’s ability to preserve its physical integrity and territory; to maintain its economic relations with its neighbours and trading partners on reasonable terms; to preserve its nature, institutions, and governance from disruption; and to control its borders. And it means fulfilling international obligations.

Historically, the Canadian Armed Forces played a critical role in asserting Canada’s presence on the world stage, from triumphs in the world wars to peacekeeping missions that showed national resolve. Over the decades, our relationship with other Western democracies matured from a junior status of “former British colony” into a trusted ally and partner.

But in the past nine years, Canada’s position has seriously eroded. Our counterparts have watched Canada increasingly fail to meet the requirements of various formal and informal security agreements, if not ignore them altogether. Our critical ally, largest trading partner, and neighbour, the United States, has watched with growing and vocal concern.

The Canadian government’s near-complete inaction, for example, in response to damaging foreign interference provocations by foreign entities, most obviously the Communist Party of China (CPC), has not gone unnoticed. The unrest in our streets from Hamas supporters, as well as pro-Khalistan and other ethnic, sectarian, and/or factional agitators, has demonstrated that Canada either does not take domestic security seriously or is powerless to stop worsening instability.

The informal but important America, Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand (ABCA) arrangement, which focuses on interoperability of equipment and systems among the allied English-speaking countries, has taken to simply ignoring Canada, while our counterparts in the critical “Five Eyes” intelligence-sharing community regard us with diminishing respect and trust. A full “rethink” of national security should commence immediately, with a review of national defence policy and a focus on rebuilding capabilities.
The current state of the CAF can be traced back to decisions made in the 1990s. Canada had been a defence laggard for years before then, but the 1994 White Paper on Defence, introduced by Jean Chrétien’s Liberal government, prioritized cost-cutting over capability. The CAF’s personnel numbers were slashed, historical regiments disbanded, and investments in modern equipment deferred.
Stephen Harper’s Conservative government made a number of significant equipment purchases—such as strategic airlift and heavy-lift helicopters—but did not initiate a new, comprehensive defence policy and was soon more focused on balancing the budget that rebuilding the CAF. More recently, the Trudeau government’s 2017 defence strategy, “Strong, Secure, Engaged,” made ambitious promises—including an increase in defence spending to 1.4 percent of GDP by 2024—but these commitments have largely gone unmet. According to the Parliamentary Budget Officer, Canada’s defence expenditure remains at a mere 1.29 percent of GDP, far below NATO’s 2 percent benchmark.
The impact of this prolonged neglect is stark. The CAF’s personnel levels have plummeted. Defence Minister Bill Blair recently admitted that the CAF is short 16,500 members, leaving fewer than 32,000 combat-ready troops across all branches—a number smaller than the New York Police Department’s uniformed officers. Blair’s outrageous proposal to address what he calls a recruitment “death spiral”? Lower standards. This shows a government that fails even to understand the purpose of the CAF, let alone how to rebuild Canada’s military.

Current CAF equipment is almost entirely outdated. Hangars and runways are filled with unserviceable aircraft, ports with broken ships and submarines, and army bases with broken vehicles and unserviceable weapons, without spare parts or technicians to do the repairs.

Canada is ill-equipped to meet both domestic and international challenges at a time when the geopolitical environment has grown increasingly dangerous. The resurgence of great power competition, threats from authoritarian regimes, and the rise of cyberwarfare demand a capable and responsive military.

The country needs a comprehensive new national security strategy and a new White Paper on Defence. Rebuilding the CAF must become a national priority. Part II of this three-part series will examine what the military needs as part of that process.

Political leaders must recognize that national security is not a discretionary expense but a fundamental obligation. Citizens, too, must understand the critical role of a strong military in preserving their rights and freedoms. It is only through collective resolve that Canada can restore its military to a state befitting its history and aspirations—and the needs of our current, precarious moment.

David Redman was an officer in the Canadian Army for 27 years, during which he was deployed on operations in Germany, Egypt, the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, the United States and across Canada, before retiring in 2001 to become the head of Crisis Management-Counterterrorism in Alberta and later the head of Emergency Management Alberta.
The original, full-length version of this article was recently published in C2C Journal. Part II of this three-part op-ed series will examine what the CAF needs to rebuild.
Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.
David Redman
David Redman
Author
David Redman is a retired lieutenant colonel in the Canadian Army and senior fellow at the Frontier Centre for Public Policy.