However, after spending a few decades of observing the trajectory of Japan’s defensive capabilities, it’s easy to become a “glass half-empty” kind of guy. And a closer look at the plan—something that should have been in place years ago—doesn’t exactly inspire excitement.
The news account is admittedly fragmentary and confusing.
According to the report, the plan would be set in motion once the Japanese government declares the situation around Taiwan to be serious enough to “undermine the peace and security of Japan.”
Once that happens, U.S. Marines are allowed to set up an “attack base” somewhere along the Nansei Shoto—also known as the Ryukyu Islands chain, which includes the island of Okinawa—that stretches from Kyushu almost to Taiwan. This would be a first as the Marines are barely allowed to operate on Okinawa—even in peacetime.
What’s Japan’s role? According to the news story, the Japanese will provide logistical support, including ammunition and fuel. If so, Japan will need to start buying HIMARS missiles of the sort the Marines use. One suspects the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) hasn’t received that order yet.
So Tokyo permits the Marines to sally forth to do battle with the Chinese threatening Taiwan—when the Japanese decide it is time. And Japan apparently doesn’t have to join the fighting.
Capabilities, Training, Goals, and Laws
Almost inadvertently, the Kyodo report raises fundamental questions about the impediments to what actually needs to be done for Japan and the United States to defend Taiwan, each other, and themselves.For example, sending out a U.S. Marine missile battery or two isn’t a contingency plan for dealing with a Chinese move against Taiwan.
Rather, a proper operational plan requires melding the full resources and capabilities of U.S. forces and the JSDF—not just sending out the Marines. And even a detailed plan is still just a plan. If forces don’t train and exercise for the plan, then they might as well not bother.
The U.S. side is well aware of this. Whether the Japanese side is, is another question.
Additionally, one imagines that if and when serious planning takes place, the U.S. and the Japanese militaries may come at the problem from two completely different directions.
Whereas the Americans are interested in stopping the Chinese invasion of Taiwan—and that means killing Chinese troops—the Japanese may be more concerned with defending the Nansei Shoto and Japanese territory, and avoiding as much harm to anyone as possible.
And other reasons not to hold one’s breath about the “plan” having real world effects anytime soon is the Japanese still need to “study” revising laws to permit the Marines to deploy. And then they will have to actually pass the laws.
And Tokyo also needs to study and pass laws and/or regulations that lay out when an event involving Taiwan threatens Japan’s peace and security enough to let the aforementioned laws kick in.
And don’t forget the debating that will take place over all this—slowed by lobbies of all sorts.
Such things do not move quickly in Japan at the best of times.
One fears the Taiwan matter may be resolved one way or another before Japan has the legal structures in place that allow an operational plan to be implemented.
And if the Chinese don’t cooperate and patiently wait for Tokyo to get things in order before making their move, the U.S. and Japanese response will be haphazard and ad hoc. Not exactly a winning approach.
One retired Marine who is well aware of how things work in Japan noted on reading the Kyodo report: “Imagine the hand wringing that will ensue just to provide (the Marines with) some battle space, some fuel, and moral support.”
Another former Marine who worked closely with the Japanese military for many years noted: “This plan seems a good start, but it falls far short of the operational command structure required for the U.S. and Japan to properly fight together in a Taiwan or other contingency.”
Where’s the Alliance Coordination Mechanism?
The Japan-U.S. Defense Guidelines were revised in 2015 and allow Japan and the United States to do whatever is necessary to establish genuine operational linkages—for both planning and peacetime and wartime operations.Specifically, the Guidelines call for an “alliance coordination mechanism” (ACM), but don’t actually say what one is. One fairly thinks an ACM is at least a building with people in it who do alliance coordinating.
But six years after the Defense Guidelines revision (and 60 years after the Japan-U.S. defense treaty was signed), is there a standing, permanently staffed joint headquarters in Japan where the JSDF and U.S. forces handle the defense of Japan—to include a potential Taiwan contingency?
No. Not yet.
Now that would be news—and maybe even more momentous than drafting a plan full of caveats.
In fairness, 10 years ago nobody in Tokyo would have dared to talk about an operational plan for Taiwan—or hardly even one for Japan. But overall U.S.-Japan defense preparations are still nowhere near where they need to be—other than between the two navies.
One suspects that the Kyodo News story is part of a “messaging” effort by some part of the Japanese government rather than a sign of a serious desire to improve urgently needed bilateral operational capabilities. Such is the Japanese approach to things. The pro-forma over the substantial.
There are Japanese who understand this. They won’t mind if the Americans point this out.
