Contrary to the spin from neocons and the mainstream media, Russia is playing defence, not offense, in its confrontation with the West over Ukraine. Misunderstanding Russia’s motivations, and its fundamental nature, could have tragic repercussions for us, not least further driving Russia away from the West—its natural ally—into the arms of China, its natural enemy.
Almost continuously since the 17th century, when Peter the Great began to transform Russia along Western lines following his tour of Europe, Russia has identified with the West, and sought to join the West. The Russian court spoke French. Tsar Alexander II freed the serfs after Abraham Lincoln freed the slaves. Even Russia’s embrace of communism—the only time it strayed from its Judeo-Christian traditions—was a Western import, Karl Marx being the fashion in Germany, France, and England.
Today, Russia embraces traditional Western values more than does the West itself. While many in the West now reject our heritage, tearing down statues commemorating our history, rejecting the traditional family, and adopting critical race theory, Russia leads the opposition to wokeism.
Neither should Russia be perceived as a natural enemy of the United States when no country over the centuries has been a more steadfast ally. Before American independence, Russia’s Catherine the Great defied Britain’s mercantile system by trading directly with the American colonies. During the American War of Independence, Russia sided with the United States, financing the colonies and using its diplomatic leverage to help the colonies obtain a favorable peace. During the American Civil War, to dissuade Britain or France from militarily supporting the Confederacy, Russia’s Tsar Alexander II sent his Baltic and Pacific fleets to New York and San Francisco, along with instructions to their admirals to report to President Lincoln for duty should the Europeans enter the war. During both world wars, Russia was allied with the United States against Germany.
NATO—the defensive alliance of 12 countries that the West established in the late 1940s to oppose Soviet Russian attempts to advance westward, into Western Europe’s sphere of influence—morphed after the Cold War into an offensive alliance of 30 countries that expanded eastward toward Russia’s borders.
A NATO expansion would soon backfire, he wrote, since Russia “would likely look elsewhere for guarantees of a secure and hopeful future for themselves.” That “elsewhere” has become China, despite its culture being alien to Russia and despite a history of territorial and diplomatic disputes serious enough to lead to military clashes. Yet, from Putin’s perspective, he has no choice but to ally with China, given the West’s failure to welcome Russia back to the fold after it rejected communism and given its persistent rebukes of Putin’s demonstrations of good will.
To maximize the tightening of the screws on Russia, the West is also wielding economic weapons, such as the threat to sabotage Russia’s ability to use the international banking system. The unfortunate endgame of this brinksmanship would further push Russia into the arms of communist China, pitting the awesome nuclear weaponry of the Western powers against the awesome nuclear weaponry of a Russian–Chinese alliance. This cannot end well.