A common reaction to Henry Kissinger’s death is that he is a controversial figure.
This verdict is troubling and a bit generous to me. I know we are not supposed to say bad things about the deceased, and my remarks are not directed at his character but at his legacy, which should be wholly rejected as a bad influence.
Overall, Mr. Kissinger and his realpolitik diplomacy represent a deviation from the American tradition, a heritage we proudly pronounce as exceptionalism and triumphalism, anchored upon our Protestant origins, respect for universal human rights, and belief in justice. As Ronald Reagan aptly stated, we are the “shining city on the hill.” In contrast, Mr. Kissinger’s realpolitik is nothing but stooping to the level of banana republics and engaging with odious dictators at the expense of those cherished values.
His realpolitik policies might bring about temporary relief, immediate benefits, and instantaneous gratification, which made Mr. Kissinger a legend in foreign affairs. Still, the long-term effects are destructive and will only be felt when he is long gone. China is a good example to illustrate this point.
Until now, reopening the United States to communist China remains Mr. Kissinger’s major accomplishment. It was motivated by forging an alliance against the Soviet Union. Mr. Kissinger, for his erudition and knowledge about China, never realized that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has always been a fiercer ideological opponent. As a Harvard-trained political scientist, Mr. Kissinger should have known that the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956 largely stemmed from more fundamentalist intransigence of the Chinese communists.
The reality is that the invasion would not have occurred without the persistent coercion and threats from the CCP, led by Mao Zedong, who envisioned himself as a successor to Joseph Stalin in power—a fundamental cause behind the rift between the two communist titans. Mao and his cohorts applied pressure and forced Nikita Khrushchev to invade and quell the pro-democracy government led by Imre Nagy. Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai was the first to visit Hungary to show support for the invasion right after the puppet government was installed, with Soviet tanks visible wherever he went.
All this makes sense when you compare the different ways the communists in China and the Soviet Union handled mass protests. One was a notorious massacre in 1989 in Tiananmen Square, and one in 1991, when the Soviet troops withdrew, and a beaming Boris Yeltsin climbed onto a tank to announce his arrival in post-Soviet Russia.
It baffles me how Mr. Kissinger could misjudge such a crucial matter. A rising, authoritarian China has become a more formidable rival than the Soviet Union at any time in its nearly 70-year existence. Even more lamentable is that people still praise Mr. Kissinger for his China trip. While I understand why the CCP praises him and mourns his passing as the loss of an “old friend,” that sentiment seems odd to overseas Chinese who want a free, prosperous China.
Mr. Kissinger has proven to be an antithesis of President Reagan, who won the Cold War without firing a shot. He amassed immense wealth through his business, Kissinger Associates, to curry favor with the U.S. government on behalf of authoritarian regimes, including the CCP.
Indeed, how we judge Mr. Kissinger indicates the crossroads the United States is at. If you believe in him, you will see more appeasement and a weaker United States. If you reject his legacy completely, there is hope for America to return to its founding principles and recover its exceptionalism.
