A U.S. Navy destroyer, USS Rafael Peralta, recently visited Japan’s Ishigaki Island, between Okinawa and Taiwan. It wasn’t exactly welcomed with open arms. At first, the local authorities refused permission for the ship to dock, claiming the water wasn’t deep enough. They later relented, but the local dockworkers union went on strike to protest the ship’s visit.
Okinawa’s prefectural government also opposed the visit.
This isn’t the first time U.S. Navy ships have had trouble getting into Japanese “civilian” ports.
Keep in mind that Japan is said to be America’s strongest ally and is supposedly in “lockstep” with the United States. The United States is also obligated to defend Japan—and has been since 1960 when the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty was signed.
So what’s going on?
First, the Operational Requirements
The Americans don’t send ships to Ishigaki and other Japanese ports to be difficult.Rather, the U.S. military wants access to as many ports as possible to mount an effective defense. And it’s important to use them in so-called phase zero—peacetime, or, at least, before the shooting starts.
It helps to be familiar with a location and operating environment (including the local inhabitants) rather than figuring things out on the fly once trouble occurs.
If you’ve been somewhere and “done something,” it’s different than showing up for the first time. A military practices for the same reasons a baseball team or an orchestra does.
Having more ports to operate from also makes you a harder target and gives you better odds of surviving a strike on your “main” base and still being able to operate. And that’s an obvious vulnerability for U.S. naval forces in Japan—now operating out of a small number of bases—that are easily targeted by Chinese missiles.
It’s not just ports and the U.S. Navy that face the same problem of overconcentration on a small number of facilities. The U.S. Air Force, Marine, and Navy aviation units face the same problem.
Japan has 100-plus civilian airfields, having been overbuilt during the bubble era. Most of these airports are underutilized.
The Japanese should open them up to U.S. military aircraft—and to the Japan Self-Defense Forces—for the same reasons mentioned above.
Political Reasons for Ship Visits
There’s also a political aspect to U.S. Navy ships using civilian ports in the Nansei Shoto (Japan’s southern islands)—and anywhere else in Japan.Under the U.S.–Japan Status of Forces Agreement, the Japanese government is obligated to allow U.S. forces access to Japan’s ports and airfields.
For decades, Americans haven’t exercised these rights as fully as they should have, and this “right” has atrophied.
It’s important that the Americans get over their self-imposed restraint and do what’s necessary to protect Japan and increase their own odds of success and survival.
Getting out and about and using ports such as Ishigaki is important for setting a precedent—not to mention demonstrating that both countries will live up to their treaty obligations.
These need to be regular visits—and in many more parts of Japan.
Of course, there’s a necessary balance between local sensitivities and doing what’s necessary to defend Japan. But things shifted much too far in the wrong direction over the years and haven’t shifted back enough.
Some progress is being made—as evidenced by the Iron Fist exercises that recently concluded in the Nansei Shoto. The training between U.S. Marines and Navy and Japanese forces included a landing on Okinoerabu, halfway between Okinawa and Kyushu (Japan’s southernmost main island).
This wouldn’t have been possible not so many years ago owing to local opposition and central government oversensitivity.
Japanese Opposition
Some of the opposition is principled—citizens opposed to all military operations. And given Japan’s horrific experiences in World War II, that’s understandable. The protesters are generally elderly and few in number.There is, in fact, much support for the presence of the U.S. and Japanese militaries on Okinawa Island, especially on the other islands along the Nansei Shoto chain.
Press reporting seldom mentions this fact.
But aside from local opposition, maybe a bigger impediment is the “burden business.”
The “burden business”? Put simply, localities get money from the central government for “allowing” military training nearby. Complain and play difficult, and the money keeps flowing. Complain enough, and you might even get more money flowing.
Yes, it’s a shakedown racket. Bureaucrats go along with it because they always have, and there’s the inordinate fear of being criticized. The Japanese military is not in a position to complain.
US Political Considerations?
One would get the impression that only Japanese politics matter.But consider things from the U.S. public’s perspective—Japan is saying: “We want you to be here to die for us when we snap our fingers. And until then, stay in your cage or on a short leash.”
That’s not entirely fair, but that’s how it will be characterized—and China’s “white” lobbyists in Washington will make that case when the time comes.
And that could resonate with many Americans—on and off Capitol Hill.
Given the Chinese threats to Japan (and the United States), we should not be dealing with obstructions of the sort that USS Peralta experienced on Ishigaki Island.
If Japan and the alliance can’t stand U.S. Navy ships using more Japanese ports—or American aircraft using more Japanese airports—it won’t be able to withstand the stress of U.S. servicemembers dying by the thousands for a Japan that didn’t let them prepare properly to defend the country.
Time is running out.