Fumio Kishida won’t be Japan’s prime minister after September. Kishida served longer than most—nearly three years. However, Japanese prime ministers, with the exception of the late Shinzo Abe, seem to come and go so often that one might think it isn’t so important who the prime minister actually is.
But it does matter, especially when it comes to Japan’s defense, which has made unusual progress in recent years.
One worries that with a different prime minister, Japan’s efforts to bolster defense will “drift” as has historically been the case.
There have been a few interludes of relatively rapid and measurable progress, but by and large, it “drifts,” no faster and no slower than Japan feels like moving—and nothing that might provoke too much Asahi Shimbun criticism or upset the Liberal Democratic Party’s coalition partner, Komeito, or even the leftist factions in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) itself.
So Japan ends up doing what is easy—rather than what it needs to do—regardless of regional circumstances and threats just beyond Japan’s borders.
For the past decade or more, these threats have been unmistakable as the People’s Republic of China (PRC) gears up to teach Japan a lesson—and finally has the means to do so, not to mention its friends in Pyongyang and Moscow who will help out.
The past few years have been an exception on the defense front for Japan, even if progress might have been faster. It has been faster than normal progress.
And Kishida deserves credit, even if he just had the good sense to not unduly interfere with the progress being made.
These improvements didn’t happen by coincidence.
Two of Kishida’s defense ministers, Minoru Kihara and Nobuo Kishi, were among the best of the more than 40 defense ministers (or defense agency heads) who have served since I got involved with Japan in the early 1990s. Both were interested in learning their portfolios, for starters, and that set them apart from 90 percent of their predecessors.
Kihara has some good advisers, and there are other solid officials sprinkled throughout the bureaucracy who have quietly supported defense initiatives.
Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) Joint Chief of Staff Gen. Yoshihide Yoshida is also excellent, with a sound understanding of Japan’s defense requirements.
However, this may not continue if the new prime minister “cleans house” to put his or her team in place.
Even more, the focus might likely be on domestic issues that are more about keeping the LDP in power than on defense matters that keep Japan independent.
Defense has never been a priority for most of Japan’s political class or the public at large, even though the Japanese public assumes that “somebody” is looking after Japan’s defense.
Yes, many politicians and most of the public are wary of China, but that doesn’t translate into defense being a vote-getter that warrants focused effort and clear thinking.
That’s the case in many, if not most, democracies.
With a couple of exceptions, Sanae Takaichi (currently minister for economic security) and Diet member Takayuki Kobayashi, it is unclear that defense is a priority for most prime minister candidates.
But what about Shigeru Ishiba? He’s the front-runner for prime minister and previously served as defense minister and head of the former defense agency. Impressive on paper, but one is not convinced that he’s the expert he thinks he is.
Japan also has a “don’t provoke China” and “must do business with China” constituency in its business class and political class—including within the LDP itself.
And Chinese “elite capture” has been as successful in Tokyo as it has been in Washington.
So one shouldn’t be surprised to see a push for a “reset” with the PRC to “dial things down.”
It’s not that Japan’s defense will be ignored, and a certain momentum will continue, but it could be slower and without proper focus.
Some would say it will be just the bare minimum to keep the Americans on the hook to underwrite Japan’s defense and fill in any gaps.
But isn’t Japan building warships and submarines and acquiring advanced fighter jets—including joint development with the British and Italians?
It is. However, the Japanese Navy and Air Force are about half the size they need to be, and there doesn’t seem to be any serious plan to address this issue, including the recruiting shortfalls that contribute to the problem.
And what of getting the JSDF and Japan writ-large ready to fight a war?
It’s an obvious objective, but progress toward this end has been challenging despite some progress. Things could become even harder if Kishida’s successor has other priorities.
So it very much matters who Japan’s next prime minister is.
A Japanese prime minister, no matter who it is, has the authority to do whatever defense-wise needs to be done—if he or she has the nerve. It just needs leadership and will—and explaining to the public what needs to be done and why. That’s hard.
It’s easier just to “drift.”
Japan cannot afford this.
