Hong Kong’s Property Problems Reflect Beijing’s Mismanagement

Beijing’s mismanagement of the former British colony has ruined much of what the city meant to China.
Hong Kong’s Property Problems Reflect Beijing’s Mismanagement
A woman walks past a real estate agent in Hong Kong on May 13, 2022. Isaac Lawrence/AFP via Getty Images
Milton Ezrati
Updated:
0:00
Commentary

For years, Hong Kong had the richest property market in the world. Residential and commercial prices were so high that the city authorities imposed taxes and fees designed to discourage buying, reduce demand, and create a more affordable environment.

Though the high costs imposed hardship, they were also a sign that the city was a very attractive place to live and do business. Even after Beijing took sovereignty over the city from Great Britain in 1997, those attractions remained, impelling foreign multinationals to establish offices in the city and individuals to set up housekeeping there to be near the business.

But when, in 2020, Beijing shattered the pro-business legal system that Britain had left, those attractions began to disappear and did so quickly. Foreign firms relocated out of Hong Kong, as did many talented people. Property values tumbled, effectively announcing the demise of the city’s attractions and its use to China.

Beijing’s 2020 move was not its first attempt (no doubt inadvertent) to wipe out the city’s attractions. In 2003, China tried to interfere with the legal protections for individuals and business contracts that had made this “special administrative region” such an attractive place to work and do business. Mass protests at the time forced the authorities in Beijing to back down.

Though there were mass protests in 2020, Beijing did not back down. It had written a national security law (NSL) and forced the matter, with considerable police and military force as it turned out. With that law in place, the legal protections for contracts and individuals ended. Businesses started leaving Hong Kong almost immediately.

The effects have been overwhelming. According to the Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department, some 700,000 Chinese have left the city since the NSL went into effect. Foreign residents have also departed, but more telling is how global banks, shipping companies, and other businesses have also departed for more accommodating locations. Big names, such as Goldman Sachs and JP Morgan, have moved assets and personnel to other Asian locations, mainly Singapore.

All told, some 40 percent of the U.S. firms operating in Hong Kong in 2019 have left, and half of all foreign firms still operating in the city report an intention to leave. New stock and bond listings in Hong Kong’s financial markets have fallen by some 90 percent since 2020.

Jon Hartley of Canada’s prestigious MacDonald-Laurier Institute estimates that the city’s income per capita today is some 10 percent less than it would have been had Beijing not made its 2020 change, even considering the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and Beijing’s ill-fated zero-COVID measures that so delayed China’s recovery.

Against such a headlong flight, it should hardly be a surprise that Hong Kong real estate has lost some 25 percent of its value since 2021. Property transactions—in both primary and secondary markets—totaled only some $50 billion last year, down 30 percent from 2019. Super-luxury homes have lost one-quarter of their value in just the previous 18 months. Inventories of houses on the market stand at the highest level since 2007. Rental rates have fallen, too. Rental yields on such properties are calculated these days at barely 3 percent. With its heavy dependence on real estate, the city’s budget has also suffered and anticipates a $13 billion deficit for the fiscal year that begins April 1.

To be sure, the general slowdown in China’s overall pace of economic growth has played a role in this collapse since one of Hong Kong’s other attractions was proximity to what was a rapidly growing economy. High interest rates have also played a role since Hong Kong’s dollar peg forces the authorities there to follow the U.S. Federal Reserve rate hikes instead of the rate cuts of the People’s Bank of China. But neither of these considerations can account for the dramatic losses recounted above. Businesses could easily wait for a change in interest rate policies and a pickup in China’s economy. They have in the past. The cause is the NSL and how it fundamentally changed the business environment in Hong Kong.

To stem the pace of property price declines, Hong Kong authorities have reversed the laws put in place more than a decade ago to hold back price increases. The 15 percent stamp duty on nonpermanent residents is now gone, as is the 7.5 percent duty on existing homeowners. The city has also rescinded a flip tax on the resale of property in less than two years. Visa rules have also been eased to encourage the in-migration of talent. Though it is only reasonable for the Hong Kong authorities to make such changes, and they may slow the pace of value erosion, they also signal a panic of a sort.

In the end, nothing at the city’s disposal can change the underlying problem: the NSL. And to make matters worse, Beijing is pressing a still more stringent security law—titled Article 23—on Hong Kong. This new law, though ostensibly aimed only at foreign agents, has so far prosecuted only Chinese nationals. If it were not already clear, the city’s once attractive legal protections for contracts and individuals are long gone. No doubt Singapore delights in this circumstance. It is getting much of the business, talent, and wealth now bleeding out of Hong Kong.

In the meantime, the authorities in Beijing seem either unaware or unconcerned that they are killing the goose that once regularly laid golden eggs for China.

Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.
Milton Ezrati
Milton Ezrati
Author
Milton Ezrati is a contributing editor at The National Interest, an affiliate of the Center for the Study of Human Capital at the University at Buffalo (SUNY), and chief economist for Vested, a New York-based communications firm. Before joining Vested, he served as chief market strategist and economist for Lord, Abbett & Co. He also writes frequently for City Journal and blogs regularly for Forbes. His latest book is "Thirty Tomorrows: The Next Three Decades of Globalization, Demographics, and How We Will Live."