The current, expanded phase of the Russian-Ukrainian war is entering its eighth week. The invasion has triggered far-ranging changes to international relations.
Among them are the emerging remilitarization of Germany, a renewed sense of purpose within NATO, the potential expansion of the organization to include Sweden and Finland, and a rethinking of Europe’s energy procurement policy.
It has also triggered a profound reevaluation of how the United States and its allies should respond to both Beijing’s threats to invade Taiwan (the Republic of China) or an actual invasion of the island nation.
What lessons does the Ukrainian war offer for how the United States and its allies should support Taiwan?
A potential conflict between China and Taiwan would be very different from the current war between Russia and Ukraine. An invasion of Taiwan would have a significant naval component both to provide transport and cover for amphibious landings and to isolate the island and forestall resupply.
Moreover, Beijing would rely on a combination of land-based missiles, airpower, and sea power to create an area-denial zone around Taiwan, making it very dangerous for the U.S. and allied naval forces to operate around the island.
Ultimately, however, this will be a naval contest. The ability of China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to successfully deliver an invading army will primarily determine the outcome of the conflict.
The Taiwanese navy has around 100 ships. Most of these ships consist of frigates and fast-attack missile boats. Taiwan also has four submarines, only three of which are operational. These are older diesel-electric boats. Two of the submarines are ex-U.S. Navy boats, USS Cutlass and USS Tusk, and are mostly used for training. The other two submarines, the Chien Lung class, are based on an older Dutch design.
The largest ships in the Taiwanese navy are four Kee Lung-class destroyers. These are formerly U.S. Navy Kidd-class guided-missile destroyers that were decommissioned some 30 years ago.
Taiwan has a total of 67 ships tasked primarily with coastal defense and anti-submarine warfare. This fleet consists of frigates (22), corvettes (14), and fast-attack missile craft (31). These are of more modern construction.
The Cheng Kung-class frigates (10) are based on the U.S. Navy’s Oliver Hazard Perry-class design. The six Kang Ding-class frigates are based on the French-built La Fayette class. These frigates have a reduced radar cross-section and were originally nicknamed “stealth frigates.” The remaining six Chi Yang-class frigates are based on the older American Knox-class frigate.
The Corvettes consist of 12 Ching Chiang-class and two Tuo Chiang class ships. These are small, fast patrol ships of between 500 and 600 tons each. The Ching Chiang-class boats are primarily tasked with anti-submarine warfare duties. The two Tuo Chiang-class catamarans are designed to attack large-deck PLAN warships, like China’s two aircraft carriers, or PLAN Type 071 and 075 amphibious warships, as well as the civilian merchant ships that would be carrying PLA troops and their equipment.
Finally, the Taiwanese Navy has 31 Kuang Hua Vi-class fast-attack missile crafts. These are relatively new ships. They, too, are primarily tasked with coastal defense but could also be used to attack and sink the ships of an invasion fleet.
In the event of a Chinese amphibious invasion, Taiwan would primarily rely on a combination of land-based and ship-based missiles to keep the Chinese navy at bay. While these ships and missiles could do significant damage to an invading or blockading force, they probably lack the ability, given their numbers, to decisively cripple it.
The Taiwanese navy requires more anti-ship weapons from ships, shore, and aircraft to repel a PLAN invasion. Without acquiring these weapons systems, any such defensive operation would require the intervention of U.S. and allied naval forces.
Moreover, keeping sea lanes to Taiwan open in order to resupply such weapons in an environment where the PLAN would have overwhelming naval superiority, plus the advantage of the proximity of mainland air bases and a significant land-based missile arsenal, would be difficult.
Initially, much of the military aid provided to Ukrainian forces were termed defensive. The difference between defensive and offensive weapons is a subtle one. A Javelin anti-tank missile is considered a defensive weapon. To the Russian soldier sitting in the tank that it is targeting, it probably looks very offensive.
In reality, the distinction is not so much between defensive and offensive weapons as it is between short-range and long-range weapons. Initially, the Biden administration was unwilling to supply Ukraine with long-range weapons for fear that Ukrainian forces would escalate the conflict by attacking military targets inside Russia or attacking Russian population centers in retaliation for Russian attacks on Ukrainian cities and civilians.
This policy was particularly problematic for Ukraine because it allowed Russian navy ships in the Black Sea to shell coastal areas with relative impunity. For example, Kyiv’s request for longer-range anti-ship missiles was initially turned down by the Biden White House.
The Neptune is an anti-ship cruise missile with a range of approximately 180 miles. It’s based on the Zvezda Kh-35 anti-ship missile. This is a Soviet-era design that was improved by the Luch design bureau in Ukraine to give it a longer range and better targeting electronics. The missile went into production in 2019. It’s not known how many of the cruise missiles Ukraine produced.
Taiwan had requested the newest Harpoon variant, the RGM-84Q-4 Harpoon Block II+ ER missile, but Washington would only supply the older variant. The newer variant has a longer range, more lethal warhead, and the ability to receive in-flight targeting updates.
We will never know whether a more expansive and timely military assistance program to Kyiv might have deferred the Russian invasion of Ukraine. What is clear is that in the case of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, the supply of military assistance after the fact will be much more difficult and may well prove to be impossible. In a war, Taiwan’s military will likely have to fight with whatever it has on hand.
Beijing probably lacks the ability to mount an overwhelming amphibious invasion of Taiwan currently, but its capability is growing rapidly. The PLAN’s continued rapid development makes an invasion of Taiwan a realistic option in the next two to three years.
Taiwan, the United States, and its allies have less than a two-year window in which to ensure that Taipei has sufficient military capability to discourage a Chinese invasion or successfully defeat it once launched.
The United States has followed a policy of “strategic ambiguity” with respect to its willingness to intervene in the event Beijing launches an invasion of Taiwan. It has neither confirmed nor denied that it would respond militarily. The best way for Washington to ensure it doesn’t get dragged into a shooting war with China is to build up Taiwan’s ability to successfully defeat an invasion without the military intervention of the United States and its allies.
To deter or defeat an invasion, Taiwan needs to significantly expand its anti-ship missile arsenal and modernize and expand its air and naval forces, especially its submarine fleet. Two years may seem like a long time, but in the world of weapons procurement, it’s an instant. In the meantime, Taiwan’s future hangs in the balance.
