Chinese ‘Mercenaries’ Fighting Ukraine

They degrade Beijings diplomacy and will provide intelligence to the Chinese military.
Chinese ‘Mercenaries’ Fighting Ukraine
Chinese People’s Liberation Army soldiers assemble during military training at the Pamir Mountains in Kashgar in northwestern China’s Xinjiang region, in a photo taken on Jan. 4, 2021. STR/AFP via Getty Images
Anders Corr
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Commentary

Ukraine now claims that more than 150 Chinese citizens are fighting on Russia’s side in the war, as evidenced by two Chinese fighters captured by Ukrainian forces.

There is some question as to whether the Chinese fighters, who train with Russia and wear Russian uniforms and use Russian weapons, are acting as individual mercenaries or are in some way under the direction of Beijing.

One claim is that Russia offers citizenship to the Chinese in exchange for joining the Russian army, which is a common pathway historically that dates back to at least the Roman Empire. However, regular troops and spies have often disguised themselves as mercenaries; for example, Russians in the Crimea invasion of 2014. These so-called mercenaries and private security, called “little green men” at the time, were in fact under the control of Moscow. The lack of official military patches on their uniforms gave Vladimir Putin plausible deniability in case the invasion failed.

The number of “Chinese mercenaries fighting for Russia” is so small as to help China more than Russia, given that China will likely be able to extract valuable battlefield information from them at some point in the future. Russia almost certainly knows this, in which case the inclusion of Chinese mercenaries in Russian formations would be a concession by Moscow to Beijing in exchange for some other consideration. Moscow could welcome the Chinese fighters in exchange for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) accepting more Russian exports, or allowing Russian access to additional hard currencies, banking services, military materiel, and technology transfers.

Chinese “mercenaries” who make it back to China would almost certainly be debriefed about their experiences by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which thirsts for recent experience in modern land war. Those Chinese fighters who remain in Russia after their Russian military service would still likely be contacted by Chinese intelligence to extract as much of their military experience as possible, even if they do become Russian citizens.

The PLA desperately needs the lessons learned from these Chinese fighters, as the PLA’s military doctrine is dependent on outdated land wars and far more limited border disputes. China’s major land wars included the Korean War from 1950 to 1953, and the invasion of Vietnam in 1979. The border disputes with Russia and India in the 1960s, and India recently, will have yielded far fewer lessons.

So any experience that Chinese mercenaries, soldiers, or spies manage to get in Ukraine now will be invaluable toward informing future Chinese military doctrine. This will especially be the case when planning an invasion of Taiwan. The PLA Navy must contend with armed drones and surveillance by unmanned aerial vehicles as soon as naval ships and troop transports leave the mainland. Such drones are ubiquitous on today’s Ukrainian battlefields.

Chinese fighters in Ukraine will almost certainly get battlefield experience with modern artillery and small arms. Any more sophisticated Chinese spies or military attachés in the area using electronic means could get further information about hypersonic missiles and their delivery systems, including Russian MiG-31 fighter jets.

Chinese military experts deployed to theater would likely acquire information about U.S. weapons systems used in the Ukraine–Russia war, including F-16 fighter jets, M1A2 Abrams tanks, Stinger missiles, Patriot missiles, the M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS), medium-range National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS), and the advanced AMRAAM Extended Range surface-to-air missiles. All of these U.S. systems are also deployed, or planned for deployment, to Taiwan. So the PLA will be keenly interested in acquiring information about their performance in Ukraine.

While European capitals have somewhat ignored the CCP’s threat of invading Taiwan, due to U.S. leadership in Asia and Taiwan’s distance from Europe, the Europeans cannot as easily ignore more than 150 Chinese fighters on Europe’s doorstep. They visibly add to the already galling Chinese diplomatic and materiel support to Russia, and as many as 100,000 North Korean troops are fighting on Russia’s side. North Korea is close to China, not just in terms of geography.

Kaja Kallas, EU foreign policy chief, said at a press conference on April 8: “China is the key enabler of Russia’s war. Without Chinese support, Russia wouldn’t be able to wage the war in the amount they are waging this. So, we see that 80 percent of the dual-use goods are actually entering Russia via China.”

As this view proliferates in Europe, more European politicians will want to follow the U.S. lead in: first, not just derisking their economies from China, but in decoupling altogether; and, second, developing strategies to counter the Beijing’s plans to invade Taiwan and steal more territory from India, Japan, the Philippines, and other South China Sea nations. For these reasons, Europeans are hardening their views of the Chinese Communist Party. It’s about time.

Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.
Anders Corr
Anders Corr
Author
Anders Corr has a bachelor's/master's in political science from Yale University (2001) and a doctorate in government from Harvard University (2008). He is a principal at Corr Analytics Inc., publisher of the Journal of Political Risk, and has conducted extensive research in North America, Europe, and Asia. His latest books are “The Concentration of Power: Institutionalization, Hierarchy, and Hegemony” (2021) and “Great Powers, Grand Strategies: the New Game in the South China Sea" (2018).
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