Commentary
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is reportedly expanding the presence of its private security companies abroad, posing a new security threat.
There are more than 7,000 private security companies (PSCs) under the China Security Association, of which between 20 and 40 operate abroad. The CCP has security companies in countries across Central Asia, Africa, Latin America, and along the Mekong. Some of the largest names are Huayuan Security Guard, DeWe Security (a subsidiary of Hong Kong-listed Frontier Services Group), Huaxin Zhongan Group, and Shanghai-listed Anbang Save-Guard Group.
Beijing claims these PSCs are deployed abroad to protect Chinese investments, particularly those associated with the Belt and Road Initiative. Still, there’s concern that these firms are linked to the CCP and may be used to further Beijing’s foreign policy objectives.
The CCP argues that the use of private security companies abroad is necessary because China, unlike the United States, lacks a network of overseas military bases. Beijing contends that deploying the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) quickly to address international hotspots and safeguard Chinese interests or rescue civilians would be challenging. As a result, private security firms are seen as bridging this gap. Under Chinese law, PSCs must be wholly or majority-owned by the CCP. So the link to the regime is unquestionable.
Apart from protecting Chinese interests, private military companies (PMCs) that are similar to the Wagner Group and PSCs provide policymakers with a low-profile means of projecting power without resorting to the deployment of uniformed troops. This provides the government with plausible deniability, as well as major cost savings, compared to sending in the military.
The Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, along with Department of Defense analyses, typically emphasize China’s conventional military capabilities. However, the CCP increasingly relies on unconventional forces to achieve policy goals. The People’s Armed Police and the China Coast Guard, once under joint government/military control, are now fully under CCP authority and deployed abroad. The People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia represents another irregular force with plausible deniability, extending the CCP’s reach into the Pacific. The recent addition of PSCs further diversifies the CCP’s non-uniform agents. Together, these irregular forces significantly extend the influence and strength of the PLA, necessitating closer monitoring and consideration by U.S. defense and intelligence communities.
China’s PSCs have been compared to Wagner-type private military companies, but there are some significant differences. PMCs may be used to train foreign militaries and conduct active combat operations. PSCs, by contrast, carry out ongoing security operations, although both PMCs and PSCs may participate in armed conflict during a war or civil unrest.
China’s PSCs are increasingly shifting their focus from providing static security and consulting services to gathering intelligence and conducting surveillance. Two Chinese PSCs—Overseas Security Guardians and the Huaxin Zhongan Group—are authorized to carry weapons, which most PSCs aren’t permitted to do inside China. These companies specialize in offering maritime escorts to Chinese vessels in waters surrounding Africa. They operate from a network of “maritime logistics bases” strategically positioned around the Gulf of Aden, the Gulf of Guinea, and South Africa.
At least two other Chinese firms—China Security and Technology Group and Hanwei International Security Group—are certified under the International Code of Conduct Association’s International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers. But even those few Chinese firms that have attained international certification lag behind their European or American counterparts in terms of quality.
PSCs tend to hire PLA veterans, who generally have low levels of education and little or no knowledge of English, with similarly limited expertise functioning in a foreign country. The personnel are usually hired on a temporary basis for the completion of a specific mission. As a result, employee turnover is about 65 percent. It’s difficult for personnel to gain experience and improve.
In July 2016, the limitations of Chinese PSCs became obvious when 330 Chinese workers found themselves stranded between rival militias in South Sudan. PLA units in the vicinity on peacekeeping duty delegated the rescue mission to a PSC, DeWe. Given that DeWe’s personnel were unarmed, the extraction process could only commence once local forces had secured the area and quelled the conflict.
China’s diplomatic strategy consists of presenting itself as a non-colonialist option to the U.S.-led international order. Additionally, the CCP claims that its stance is noninterference in the domestic affairs of other countries. For this reason, PSCs offer a viable alternative to PLA intervention, allowing the CCP to maintain its charade of noninterference. On the other hand, allowing PMCs or PSCs to carry out military objectives violates basic CCP ideology, such as “the Party commands the gun.”
Additionally, Chinese leader Xi Jinping saw how the Kremlin’s use of the Wagner Group turned against them when late Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin launched an attempted coup against Moscow. Consequently, the CCP’s use of PSCs is expected to increase, but Beijing will exercise caution, gradually working out the details. Meanwhile, Washington should keep a close watch on these firms while providing a U.S. alternative.
Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.
