People’s Republic of China (PRC) leader Xi Jinping may be close to achieving a coup de main that would increase Beijing’s dominance over Eurasia, the Middle East, and Africa. Provided, that is, that Beijing itself can retain cohesion and control at home in the face of economic collapse and impending food and water shortages.
Xi followed his ground-breaking visit to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council in December 2022 with a major Middle East breakthrough in March ... and the likelihood that Beijing could provide the fig-leaf excuse for talks to end the Russia–Ukraine conflict.
This is no longer your grandfather’s Cold War. The Eurasian bloc built around the PRC, Russia, and Iran has access to a far wider selection of global nations than the Soviet bloc had during the first Cold War. Beijing will need this broader trading canvas and the increasing ability to trade in the PRC’s yuan rather than in U.S. dollars if it’s to rebuild its economy and get immediate access to food and energy from the outside world.
Xi’s recent successes in some diplomatic arenas come as the PRC becomes mired in greater economic, food, and water crises—all exacerbated by droughts unprecedented in recent decades—that truly jeopardize the Chinese Communist Party’s control over mainland China. So Xi’s mission is a race against time.
It’s possible that talks brokered by Xi between Russia and Ukraine to end the war could be another major victory for Beijing, leaving the United States and its European North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies out of the action. But to achieve this, he would have to offer something really substantial to Kyiv. More importantly, he would have to offer some safeguards to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who had said on Feb. 25 that he wished to meet with Xi to discuss Xi’s 12-point peace plan for the Ukraine war.
“We need to work on that with China. Why not?” Zekenskyy said.
That meeting could occur at any time now that Xi has concluded his discussions with Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Moreover, the approach emerging from Beijing is that it will appear as though Moscow will offer concessions to Kyiv, but, in reality, it will be about getting combatants “off the hook” who have both painted themselves into non-negotiable situations.
The goal would be a peace treaty brokered without the input of the United States and, ideally, even without any European involvement. Such a deal could leave Washington—and NATO—sidelined. But Zelenskyy needs real safeguards before he would negotiate; he already knows that senior military and intelligence officials blame him for the losses incurred by Ukraine in allowing the war to start when it could have been averted in February 2022 by negotiation.
Several key Ukrainian security officials have indicated that they would “take care of” Zelenskyy when some kind of peace could be achieved, and most are aware that any peace now possible would likely result in a smaller Ukraine than existed before, say, 2004. So if Zelenskyy wished to retain his presidency after a peace deal, he would need to get major concessions for Ukraine.
This begs the question as to whether the PRC–Russia–Iran combine could offer something more appealing to Ukraine than Westernization and considerable U.S. funding. It would, of necessity, also include some “geopolitical creativity” that could, for example, see Ukraine revived in its post-Soviet borders, although divided between East and West, and with some restored common features but with unambiguous control by Moscow over its basing in Crimea and over the Donbas. Belarus or a Persian Gulf location could be a site for negotiations or the announcement of the results of shuttle diplomacy.
A post-conflict Ukraine could resume its place as a major food-producing area at a time when the PRC would willingly guarantee a market for its produce.
Meanwhile, on March 10, a joint trilateral statement was issued by the PRC, Saudi Arabia, and Iran supporting “good neighborly relations” between the Kingdom and the Iranian republic. It also began the process of restoring Saudi–Iranian diplomatic ties after a seven-year gap.
This was facilitated by work undertaken in advance by Iraq and Oman, who are keenly aware that Beijing can no longer be ignored in the region. The accord also papered over initial Iranian unhappiness that the PRC–Saudi talks occurred in December 2022 without Iran’s blessing or involvement. It doesn’t change all the realities on the ground in the region, however: The United States is still the dominant security partner.
But it does change the psychological and economic meter: Beijing is perceived to have done what Washington couldn’t. Moreover, it moves the region a degree or two away from total reliance on the “petro-dollar”—the measurement of all oil and gas sales in dollars. Again, this may be “rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic after it hit the iceberg,” but it covers up the growing reality of inherent weakness in the PRC economy and currency.
The March 10 accord moved Beijing further toward energy security while demonstrating that Xi, and not U.S. President Joe Biden, had control of a peace-making agenda. None of this is lost on Kyiv. What can the United States do to counter Beijing’s move when Biden has built up a “no compromise” approach, urging Kyiv to fight Moscow to the last U.S. dollar and the last Ukrainian?
