No “wolf warrior” bellicosity has so loudly proclaimed the situation in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as its recent silence. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is in a leadership transition, perhaps even a hidden internal war.
It could not have occurred at a more delicate time as the United States restored its anti-CCP stance under President Donald Trump.
This decline in the power of CCP leader Xi Jinping has been evident for some time, even before the 20th Party Congress in late 2022. The decline continued unabated even after Xi used that Congress to eliminate more of his rivals in the Party.
Now, as he promised before the U.S. presidential election of Nov. 5, 2024, Trump has delivered across-the-board 10 percent tariffs against Chinese exports to the United States, largely in an effort to force a reduction in PRC exports of fentanyl narcotics into the United States and to limit the impact of the over-capacity of PRC industry.
Beijing has said little in response; its own counter-tariffs are mild and unpublicized. The CCP has continued its activities in the Indo–Pacific, as witnessed by its recent comprehensive treaty with the Cook Islands. Still, the air of Beijing is that of the authorities trying to bring the nation back under control. Certainly, the PRC state’s actions seem inclined toward building a consumer economy to replace the civil economy destroyed by Xi over the past dozen years.
So how is this drama being played out behind the curtains of this latest Peking Opera?
First, there are indications—and many rumors—that Xi has, in the past six or more months, suffered one, possibly two strokes, significantly limiting him.
Second, over the past two years in particular and despite his purges of enemies within all sectors of the CCP and military structures, Xi has been unable to contain his “enemies.” That is evident by the reality that overt signals are being given, which challenge Xi, and he lacks the ability, resources, or allies to curb them.
Of primary importance is the fact that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) can no longer be guaranteed to be loyal to Xi, and neither can the equipment and training of the PLA be guaranteed to ensure its readiness to meet an internal or external threat or offensive. The internal security forces and general police equally are showing signs of fracturing, with many sharing with the general public a resentment against the mismanagement of the economy and the graft of the elite.
So what, specifically, does this massive blanket of silence indicate?
Is it that a transition is being devised without internal confrontations?
Or is the internal situation so polarized and hostile that none of the antagonists dares a sudden or decisive move?
Are top CCP officials looking for an ideal opportunity to quietly structure a change, or even possibly create the semblance of Xi’s retirement?
At present, there is no strong indication as to who a successor could be to Xi. As in many such societies over history, the danger of an early exposure of a potential claimant to power could be fatal to the candidate. Given the fractured nature of mainland Chinese society because of the economic collapse, how could a successful candidate contain the collapse before a popular uprising becomes inevitable?
It may well be that the decision on a change of leadership has already been taken. The “quiet period,” with the lack of potentially disruptive bombast, could be a period when plans are being put in place to forestall public unrest when the collapse of the Xi era begins to be seen. Bear in mind that the great period of “Xi Jinping Thought” was meant to position Xi as a pillar of the PRC, equal to Mao Zedong himself.
Mao Zedong Thought was largely reduced to nothing over the years, and Xi, an ardent neo-Maoist, had attempted to resurrect a failed legacy. Now, the symbols of Xi Jinping Thought, too, are being publicly disregarded without punitive consequences.
Could Xi’s final throes include an attempt to stage another internal putsch against his many factions of enemies?
Could he attempt a foreign adventure, including an attack on Taiwan, as a means of regaining momentum?
It is possible, and yet it appears that his remaining strength and following are insufficient for such a task, and any attempt at such last-minute grasping of glory could be fatal to the Communist Party itself.
What is next?
The CCP will want to announce a new leadership “election” and a good rationale for Xi’s “retirement” at a time when it is ready to implement a number of domestic and international policies that will stimulate calm and restore economic growth. That would probably need to be in 2025, given that internal anger and disregard for the Party’s power is not dissipating. The fact, too, that Panama volunteered in February to not renew its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) agreement with the PRC highlights the reality that Beijing has run out of economic steam to do anything significant internationally in the near future.
Its comprehensive treaty with the Cook Islands, undertaken also in February, was the stuff of small change and no real indicator of the PRC’s continued power projection capability.
Regionally, China’s biggest trading and investment partners, particularly Japan, have already significantly withdrawn, and overall foreign direct investment in Japan has declined by some 99 percent in the past year. The CCP, known for falsifying almost all figures, has acknowledged that and the outflow of foreign investment.
None of this underestimates the instability and resultant unpredictability of the CCP as an international actor at this stage. But many in the Party and the PLA recognize that any initiation of military force by the PRC at this stage would be suicidal, in much the same way that Imperial Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 was, in hindsight, suicidal.
So where does that leave the world when considering the “post-China” period? Xi seems to have been buried, but is he yet dead?
