The People’s Bank of China (PBOC) finally cut interest rates on July 22, with the goal of helping China’s economy recover its lost momentum. While this action was first promised months ago in a series of Communist Party planning meetings, the PBOC has held off acting until now.
Though any action is welcome in the face of China’s urgent economic needs, the PBOC has offered very little with these tiny cuts. It will have to do much more to get China’s economy moving again.
Rate reductions were timid, to say the least, especially in light of the economy’s needs. The central bank announced a cut of 20 basis points (hundredths of a percentage point) in the one-year medium-term policy rate, bringing it down to 2.3 percent from 2.5 percent. It cut 10 basis points off the five-year loan rate, lowering it to 3.85 percent. It also cut 10 basis points each off the one-year prime lending rate and the seven-day reverse repo rate, bringing the former down to 3.35 percent and the latter down to 1.7 percent.
China’s economic circumstances demand more—10 or 20 basis points are unlikely to have much of an effect on an economy that is clearly faltering. Still, more than that, the path of Chinese inflation raises doubts that even today’s reduced levels are stimulative at all. Consider that in early 2023, before the PBOC started cutting interest rates, Chinese consumer prices were rising at an annual rate of over 2 percent. Anyone who borrowed then would repay the loan with yuan that had about 2 percent less buying power. Since the prime lending rate in early 2023 was 3.65 percent, borrowers paid an effective real charge of only 1.65 percent on the loans. But now, Chinese consumer inflation is averaging close to 0.1 percent a year.
Still more fundamental is the huge drop in consumer and business confidence over the past few years. With no confidence in the future, it is doubtful that individuals and businesses would borrow even if the bank had managed to cut interest rates enough to stay ahead of decelerating inflation. Households have good reason to show reservations about spending and certainly borrowing. The slowdown in China’s economy has cut into wages, and even where wages have risen, the pace is nowhere near what Chinese workers had come to expect.
Private businesses have suffered similarly, causing them to hesitate, like households, on new spending initiatives and expansion plans. But they have been troubled by something more. Not too long ago, Xi Jinping criticized private businesses for seeking profits more earnestly than following the Communist Party’s agenda. He could not have done more to make businesses wary of spending and expansion. To be sure, Xi has changed his tune lately, but the damage has been done. Owners and managers remain reluctant to spend and certainly to borrow. Understandably, they worry that Xi might resume his former hostile attitude over the longer term.
Against such a disinflationary backdrop and the extremely low confidence levels among business and household decision-makers, it is easy to see why Beijing and the PBOC are having trouble with efforts to spur growth by inducing borrowing and spending, especially since the interest rate cuts are so timid. Meanwhile, the Chinese economy continues to suffer.