Can Taiwan deter China?
It’s not a rhetorical question, nor is it an idle inquiry. In fact, whether or not Taiwan can successfully dissuade China from attacking it could be the focal point for war and peace in Asia for the next 20 years.
Tensions across the Taiwan Strait have persisted for decades. Twenty-five years ago, the Chinese threat to Taiwan was perhaps the paramount security concern in East Asia. A war between China and Taiwan was considered to be the most likely military clash during the time, as evidenced by the 1995–96 missile crisis.
Interestingly, cross-strait tensions soon lessened. In fact, relations between Beijing and Taipei improved dramatically in the late 1990s and 2000s, with a host of new political, economic, and cultural cooperation. Twenty-five years ago, one couldn’t mail a letter directly from Taiwan to China; today, there are nonstop flights between Taiwan and the mainland.
That said, actually invading and occupying Taiwan might be more difficult than Xi expects. To be sure, the PLA is much more capable than it was in the mid-1990s. It has greatly expanded the PLA Navy (PLAN)—particularly its amphibious forces—and the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) is nearly fully modernized with 4th- and even 5th-generation fighters. Nevertheless, Taiwan would not be a push-over.
As such, Taiwan’s “coastal terrain … is a defender’s dream come true. Taiwan has only 14 small invasion beaches, and they are bordered by cliffs and urban jungles.”
Consequently, Easton argues that China might require a force of up to 2 million troops—practically the entire PLA—in order to overcome Taiwan’s counter-invasion force of at least 450,000 (based on the conventional wisdom that an invader needs at least a 3:1 ratio of numerical superiority over a defender).
Finally, invading and occupying Taiwan demands a level of confidence that even Xi cannot muster up. Such an attack would be a crapshoot of monumental proportions, an all-or-nothing proposition. If Xi were to try and fail, it would mean not only his own political demise, it could threaten the very future of the CCP.
Again, Taiwan wins by deterring an attack, not necessarily by defeating one.
In the first place, it is particularly under-manned. Force numbers continue to be cut, and conscription is only four months long—hardly enough time to consider a new recruit “battle-ready.” Although Taiwan says that it can count on 1.5 million reservists, Minnick notes that they train only five days every two years (if they are called up at all), “during which time they typically perform simple chores and not weapons training.” In fact, the reserves would be more than useless in wartime, Minnick argues, they would simply be “cannon-fodder.”
Minnick further argues that annual exercises have become just “dog-and-pony shows for the media,” and that individual infantry companies “must borrow heavily from other companies to fill [manpower] gaps.”
In comparison, Taiwan has not acquired a new submarine in more than 30 years or a new fighter jet since the late 1990s. It operates only 26 destroyers and frigates, and perhaps 460 combat aircraft. According to Minnick, the Taiwan air force has perhaps one day’s worth of missiles and other munitions.
In the mid-1990s, Taiwanese and Chinese military budgets were roughly equal. Today, Beijing outspends Taipei by more than twenty-to-one.
Of course, the United States contributes to Taiwanese deterrence efforts through its general support of the island and specifically through the Taiwan Relations Act (a “semi” security guarantee). Washington knows that if a Chinese invasion and occupation of Taiwan were successful, it would totally disrupt the status quo in the Indo-Pacific. The United States would lose a valuable outpost in the far western Pacific. Meanwhile, China would gain access to airbases and naval facilities on Taiwan, permitting it to tighten its hold over the South China Sea and control strategic lines of communication, affecting Japan, Australia, and U.S. allies and partners in Southeast Asia.
Taiwan’s continued existence as a self-governing and democratic entity could become the linchpin to security and stability in the Indo-Pacific in the 2020s and 2030s. Deterrence is the job, and the job never ends.