Over a six-month campaign from Aug. 7, 1942, to Feb. 9, 1943, 1,592 American troops were killed in action, and 4,183 were wounded in capturing Guadalcanal Island, which is roughly 1,100 miles northeast of Townsville, Australia, across the Coral Sea. Guadalcanal marked the first large-scale U.S. amphibious landing in the Pacific War, with the battle becoming part of Marine folklore (rightfully so!) and the first step on the long and bloody road to Tokyo.
Fast-forward to March 31, 2022, when the Solomon Islands “inked a wide-ranging security pact with Beijing, an agreement Western allies fear will pave the way for a first Chinese military foothold in the South Pacific,” according to The Straits Times.
Will the Solomons host PLA Navy ships and submarines or even provide them with a “home port away from home” in the near future?
The deal was not consummated without controversy, as there were several accusations that the Chinese bribed provincial politicians to support Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare’s diplomatic switcheroo. This is a standard Chinese Communist Party (CCP) tactic used in pursuing geopolitical and economic objectives around the world.
The weak U.S. policy of relying on Australia and New Zealand to manage the Chinese encroachment in the Solomons without visible U.S. commitment and presence did not work. In conjunction with support from allies in the region, direct U.S. involvement was likely the only way to reduce Chinese influence and stabilize the situation. Still, there was no concrete policy to engage all parties.
The Solomons and Scarborough Shoal
The U.S. retreat in the Solomons is a continuation of a similarly weak Obama administration policy that handed de facto control of Scarborough Shoal to communist China in 2012. The Shoal, about 130 miles from Luzon Island, is claimed by China and the Philippines.On April 12, 2012, the Philippine Navy’s BRP Gregorio Del Pilar attempted to apprehend a dozen Chinese fishing vessels near the Shoal. The prompt arrival of two civilian Chinese marine surveillance vessels stopped the arrest. The Philippines tried to deescalate the situation, but the Chinese sent additional patrol ships to confront a single Philippine Coast Guard ship that was on station.
The Chinese eventually constructed a chain barrier across the mouth of the Shoal, which essentially gave China de facto control.
To defuse the situation, the United States helped to broker an agreement in which China and the Philippines promised to withdraw their forces from the Shoal until a deal over its ownership could be reached at a future date. Although Filipino ships were withdrawn, China did not abide by the agreement and maintained a physical presence at the Shoal.
The Obama administration did nothing in response to the blatant Chinese violation. However, in 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague invalidated Beijing’s territorial claims in the area. It ruled in favor of the Philippines that the waters surrounding the Shoal were traditional fishing grounds that several countries should share in the region.
The Chinese regime refused to abide by the Permanent Court ruling and continues to dispute control of Scarborough Shoal to this very day. There have been four close encounters between Chinese Coast Guard vessels and Filipino patrol ships near the disputed Shoal over the last year, with the latest “near collision” incident on March 2.
Concluding Thoughts
The weak U.S. response to the Solomon Islands–China security pact is of a piece with the weak U.S. actions associated with the Scarborough Shoal incident. Both represent a retreat in the face of Chinese aggression and belligerence and an abandonment of U.S. allies.Although appalling, especially considering the expenditure of American blood and treasure at Guadalcanal and other islands in the Solomon Islands chain during World War II, this should not be a surprise to careful observers, as the Biden State Department includes a number of Obama administration retreads.
For example, Biden’s “Asia czar” Kurt Campbell was an enthusiastic supporter of cooperation and engagement with China during the Obama administration. He served as President Barack Obama’s assistant secretary for the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, who mediated the toothless Scarborough Shoals agreement in 2012 that China ignored.
After all, Biden was a senator throughout the entire period of the “Kissingerian engagement policy” while serving on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee beginning in 1997, as well as spearheading U.S.-China foreign policy as Obama’s vice president.
Those actions are at the heart of the decades-long “China engagement policy.” Somehow, in an apparent reversal, “extreme competition” entered Biden’s foreign policy repertoire and lexicon when he ran for president in 2020.
With Chinese aggression continuing in the East China Sea and South Pacific region, what could go wrong?
The outcome bears close watching to discern if any concrete actions will be taken to counter China’s moves in the Southwest Pacific. Since “personnel is policy,” we can expect similar weak—and late—responses to communist Chinese actions from the Biden State Department in the future.