Xi Jinping’s options have evolved as it becomes clear that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) may be neither ready nor willing to embark on a direct war to seize Taiwan.
And the mainland Chinese economy might not be fit to sustain a long war.
This by no means indicates that General Secretary Xi has abandoned his call for the conquest of Taiwan and the destruction of the Republic of China (ROC). The PLA itself is manifestly unready for combat, and Mr. Xi has embarked on a major purge of the force, perhaps on the scale undertaken by Joseph Stalin in the USSR immediately before it was thrust into war with Germany.
What are Mr. Xi’s options if direct, kinetic warfare is, for now, off the table?
Firstly, the CCP is considering attempting to impose a blockade on Taiwan, entailing a complete maritime, air, and communications quarantine of the main island (Taiwan) and dependent islands. This would almost certainly create a response from the major allies of the ROC, under which they would forcibly breach the quarantine, sending escorted sea convoys and air traffic to Taiwanese airports, all potentially accompanied by U.S., Japanese, Australian, and possibly other allied warships and combat aircraft.
Any military (PLA) challenge to that breach of the Chinese regime’s quarantine of Taiwan would, by default, be an act of war, escalating the situation beyond what would be comfortable for Beijing at this time. The physical quarantine, then, would be substantially a high-risk bluff, but with consideration of additional factors by China.
Such a quarantine would likely be supplemented by another level of containment of Taiwan by the Chinese regime. That would include cutting the extensive undersea communications cables that connect Taiwan with the outside world. That would be a major escalation of the ocean and air quarantine and could certainly be construed as an attack on the sovereign soil of China. However, given that neither the United Nations nor the United States (nor Japan, Australia, India, etc.) actually recognizes the sovereignty of Taiwan/ROC, it might be a dialectical risk that Beijing could be prepared to take.
In any event, it is known that Beijing has considered and planned for the undersea cable interdiction and would have taken note of the ambiguity that attended the Sept. 26, 2022, explosions, which cut the Nord Stream 1 and 2 gas pipelines (from Russia to Germany) in the Baltic Sea. It took almost a year before blame could be reportedly placed on the Ukrainian government for that incident.
There would be less ambiguity about the interdiction of Taiwan’s communications cables: The only possible perpetrator would be the Chinese regime. The CCP’s effort to dominate the Solomon Islands, as well, is also linked to the country’s proximity to major trans-Pacific cable junctions of key importance to Australia.
At the same time, China would consider a targeted anti-satellite shot to take down Taiwan’s single dedicated military reconnaissance satellite. This would not, however, interrupt the beaming of some U.S. satellite imagery of the mainland to the Taiwanese ground station. A Chinese quarantine would presumably attempt to interfere with or jam Taiwanese satellite links. In this regard, the ROC was reportedly preparing to engage in the widespread use of entrepreneur Elon Musk’s Starlink network of low Earth orbit (LEO) communications satellites, which have proven significant to Ukraine in its war against Russia.
Again, Chinese attempts to control or jam Taiwanese satellite communications or reconnaissance capabilities would be equal to “acts of war” but with the possibility that they may not initially be treated by the United States and Japan with the urgency that would attend an actual military-kinetic act by the PLA. However, the U.S. response may not be a direct military escalation against China but rather for Washington to place U.S. space assets at the disposal of Taiwan to ensure continued seamless military and commercial capabilities.
The next stages of PLA escalation would be considered by the United States and Japan as actual declarations of war. For example, it is known that the PLA has gamed the prospect of initiating up to three space-based detonations of electromagnetic pulse weapons, probably nuclear, in LEO.
This would destroy the GPS and much of the reconnaissance and communications capabilities of the world, in the knowledge that the dominant user is the United States. So such an act would specifically be a declaration of war against the United States by the Chinese regime. Naturally, China would suffer the loss of its own LEO assets.
Such an act may avail China little.
The private U.S./Western space industry—including (particularly) Mr. Musk’s SpaceX, and Blue Origin and Virgin Galactic—has now demonstrated the ability to launch replacement GPS, communications, and other satellites within days and in large numbers. A Chinese LEO nuclear attack would, additionally, bring worldwide condemnation and engage a greater coalition of support for Taiwan in resisting Beijing.
So a Chinese space blast or blasts would escalate a war dramatically and, therefore, may only be considered by Beijing after a full military conflict was seen as unavoidable or had already been triggered.
Having considered these options, however, there is also evidence that Mr. Xi may feel the necessity to act within a fairly short timeframe. The Chinese regime has found itself in a difficult position regarding how to influence the January 2024 presidential election in Taiwan. The CCP has resolutely opposed the current government of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which it claims does not adhere to the “One China“ principle, which recognizes that there is only one China and ”Taiwan is an inalienable part of China.” However, it seems as though the DPP, under its candidate, Vice President Lai Ching-te, could be increasingly well-placed to take the presidency, replacing President Tsai Ing-wen, who cannot run for a new term.
In reality, regardless of the outcome, Beijing is likely to see a diminution of Taiwanese investment in the mainland, leading to further degradation of China’s employment situation and its capability to manufacture a range of vital high-tech systems.
In any event, before Mr. Xi loses control of the Taiwan situation—and his domestic credibility—he must do something or lose his mandate for the communist leadership on the mainland. So the ROC and some Japanese and U.S. analysts expect Mr. Xi to initiate some kind of strategic action against Taiwan after the election but before the investiture of the new president in late May 2023.
The Chinese regime’s imposition of a quarantine is the most likely option and would take a variety of forms. This would have a significant economic effect on the world, given that many trading states would also be forced to suspend trade with China.
But things could rapidly go downhill from there, regardless of the platitudes we should expect to be mouthed by President Joe Biden and Mr. Xi at their meeting in San Francisco this month.
