2 Factions, 1 Leader, and Flawed Character Within China’s Military

2 Factions, 1 Leader, and Flawed Character Within China’s Military
Chinese security guards look at military delegates during the speech of Chinese leader Xi Jinping at the Communist Party's 19th Congress in Beijing on Oct. 18, 2017. Fred Dufour/AFP via Getty Images
Charles Davis
Updated:
0:00
Commentary

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been experiencing its share of leadership changes. Some may be for the good of the organization, while others might be more aligned with the interests of Chinese communist leader Xi Jinping.

What many may miss in the reporting of these senior-level terminations is the connection to two primary political factions within the PLA: the Shaanxi gang and the Fujian clique.

The Shaanxi gang has significant familial ties to Xi’s family, as his father, Xi Zhongxun, was a revolutionary leader from Shaanxi Province. It is also deeply connected to the founding generation of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Leaders from this region are purported to be trusted allies of Xi Jinping, reinforcing both nepotism and the patronage system, where regional connections play a role in political appointments. Members of this informal organization claim a direct connection to revolutionary heritage, which strengthens the faction’s legitimacy.

While the Fujian clique lacks the familial connection of the Shaanxi gang, it reflects the longstanding relationships developed during Xi Jinping’s tenure in Fujian Province, which began in the mid-1980s and continued until his 2002 transfer to Zhejiang Province as Party chief. Members of the Fujian clique leverage the Confucian concept of quanxi, moving and promoting based on shared experiences, ideological alignment, and personal networks. Success within the clique is likely heavily dependent on cronyism and patronage.

Given the association both groups claim with Xi Jinping, it is likely frustrating and culturally embarrassing to him when their senior representative leaders are found to be involved in PLA corruption schemes. In the past year, three commanders from Shaanxi and five from Fujian have been dismissed or detained. Shaanxi members Zhang Youxia and Zhang Shengmin had close familial ties, and Fujian members He Weidong and Miao Hua served with Xi during his time in Fujian Province.

Most recently, Ding Laifu, who formerly commanded the 73rd Army Group and was a trusted subordinate of Xi Jinping, was relieved of his position. The change in leadership within the 73rd may be more reflective of differing views on action with Taiwan, as it is stationed in Xiamen city across the straits.

Also linked to military decisions and positions on Taiwan, Lin Xiangyang was serving as commander of the Eastern Theater at the time of his arrest. He may be associated with the reported leaked Taiwan Strait military operation plans. If these generals were openly opposed to Xi’s position on Taiwan, there may be significant internal conflict within the PLA.

Another telling connection, that might suggest divergent opinions regarding Taiwan, was the arrest of He Weidong, the vice chairman of the Central Military Commission. He previously served as the commander of the Eastern Theater, while Lin Xiangyang served as his commander of the 72nd group. Both leaders held significant influence within the Fujian clique and had intimate knowledge of the PLA’s intentions for Taiwan.

While these changes are likely tied to Party or strategic differences, the removals of Miao Hua and Li Shangfu appear to be in line with concerns over corruption. Corruption among senior leaders in the PLA may include pay for promotion, mismanagement of resources, kickbacks in procurement, or exploitation of privileges; all of which fall under the investigative authority of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection.

In the case of Li Shangfu, there are potential links to mismanagement of resources and kickbacks in procurement, with reports of missiles filled with water rather than rocket fuel and silo lids that don’t function. These actions would be viewed as a violation of public trust and a contradiction to the pillars of strength and discipline associated with the PLA.

Miao Hua, who was relieved of his position in November, served as the director of the Central Military Commission’s Political Work Department, which replaced the General Political Department. The organization’s goals are to maintain ideological control, propaganda, and discipline. While there are no released updates on his status or the specifics of his charges, there is speculation that he abused his authority to promote and demote personnel within the PLA.

Pay for promotion at the senior level came with substantial contributions and potential continued graft based on the officer’s placement and access. For example, a PLA corps commander position could cost around 40 million yuan, or about $5.4 million.

Regardless of the reasons for the terminations, many of the events can be tied to Xi Jinping’s acolytes, which could potentially weaken his authority. And while these leaders and their associated camps make an interesting story, the real story is the PLA’s reduced readiness, its inability to maintain modernization timelines, and its strategic vulnerabilities. Lastly, if there is a rift in relationships between Xi and senior-level officials over the country’s approach to Taiwan, will actions to silence or remove them have the intended effect?

Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.
Charles Davis
Charles Davis
Author
Charles Davis is a military veteran and lecturer with an intelligence background. His military awards include: two Bronze Star Service Medals, Defense Meritorious Service Medal, two Meritorious Service Medals, NATO Service Medal, Iraq Campaign Medal, Afghanistan Campaign Medal, Saudi Arabia Liberation Medal, and Kuwait Liberation Medal.