The Growing Relationship Between China and the Cook Islands: Implications and Concerns

The Island of Rarotonga, the largest island in the Cook Islands, is viewed from the air on Aug. 30, 2012. Marty Melville/AFP/Getty Images

Commentary

The past 20 years have witnessed a growing relationship between China and the Cook Islands. This evolution has been marked by increased diplomatic, economic, and security engagements.

The growing partnership reflects communist China’s broader strategy to enhance its influence in the Pacific region, align with its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and secure strategic and economic advantages. While China sees many gains, the relationship has potentially negative effects on the Cook Islands and the geopolitical landscape and interests of the United States, Australia, and New Zealand.

The diplomatic relationship between China and the Cook Islands began in July 1997, and since then, both countries have engaged in various cooperative initiatives to solidify their ties. Key milestones in this relationship include former Cook Islands Prime Minister Henry Puna’s meetings with senior Chinese officials at the China–Pacific Islands Forum Dialogue in 2013 and subsequent interactions in 2014 and 2024—all focused on enhancing bilateral cooperation in areas such as trade, investment, infrastructure, and climate resilience.

In February this year, Cook Islands Prime Minister Mark Brown signed a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement with China, further solidifying the relationship. This agreement also highlights cooperation in trade and investment in addition to new partnerships in tourism, ocean science, aquaculture, agriculture, infrastructure, climate resilience, and disaster preparedness.

Potential Negative Effects on the Cook Islands

While the partnership with China offers the Cook Islands access to much-needed infrastructure development, economic investment, and enhanced connectivity, there are potential negative effects to consider. The Cook Islands will likely become heavily reliant on Chinese loans, leading to debt dependency.

Also, while the Cook Islands is getting low-interest rates and long repayment periods, China is expected to secure access to ports, deep sea mineral resources, distant water fishing, and seafood processing. The Chinese regime has already overfished the west coast of Africa to the point many of the coastal states can no longer sustain the needs of their populations.

Furthermore, a growing presence of Chinese contractors, materials, and economic activities will erode the Cook Islands’ sovereignty and decision-making autonomy. As Beijing’s interests grow, so will its influence on local policies and economic priorities, undermining the Cook Islands’ ability to pursue independent development strategies.

As Chinese businesses invest in marine economic cooperation parks, deep-sea fishing bases, and other blue economy sectors, there will be environmental impacts on the Cook Islands’ marine ecosystem. The exploitation of these resources is projected to have long-term ecological consequences, affecting local fisheries and biodiversity.

Implications for the US, Australia, New Zealand

The new China–Cook Islands agreement has significant implications for the United States, Australia, and New Zealand, particularly in the areas of economic competition and regional security. The Chinese regime will undoubtedly increase its naval presence, challenging the influence of the United States, Australia, and New Zealand throughout the region.

The provision of military aid, law enforcement training, and maritime security cooperation with Pacific Island countries, including the Cook Islands, raises the possibility of increased Chinese military presence and influence. This could impact regional security dynamics and create tensions between China and Western allies.

Beijing regularly employs private security companies (PSCs) to protect its BRI interests. These PSCs provide a broad range of security services, including safeguarding Chinese infrastructure and personnel abroad. The Chinese regime uses PSCs to project power and ensure the safety of its investments while distancing the People’s Liberation Army from projects, thus perpetuating a narrative of economic expansion, not force projection.

How China Exploited Similar Agreements 

The Hambantota Port project in Sri Lanka began with Beijing providing loans to Sri Lanka to construct the port. However, when Sri Lanka struggled to repay the debt, it was forced to lease the port to China for 99 years. This sets the stage for a potential military presence in the port.

The Solomon Islands switched diplomatic allegiance from Taiwan to China. Since then, the Chinese regime has increased its influence in the region, raising concerns that these projects could lead to increased Chinese military presence, beyond the PSCs already on the island nation.

Communities representing Cambodia, Laos, Burma (Myanmar), Thailand, and Vietnam, which rely on fishing along the Mekong River, have seen Chinese dam projects change the flow and block fish migrations, leading to loss of livelihood and shortages of basic needs.

Conclusion

The growing relationship between China and the Cook Islands is a critical development in the Pacific region, and it is likely to have far-reaching regional and global implications. While, at face value, the partnership offers economic and developmental benefits to the Cook Islands, it also poses risks of debt dependency, loss of sovereignty, and environmental impacts.

The Chinese regime’s presence will create instability for the United States, Australia, and New Zealand.

Understanding these dynamics is vital when formulating strategies to navigate the geopolitical changes in the Pacific.

Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.